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Title of Study: INVESTOR ACTIVISM AND MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
(M&A) 
 
Major Field: BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
 
Abstract:  
This study analyzed activism that leads to a merger or acquisition (M&A) of a firm to see 
its benefits for the shareholders at the target firm as well as its acquirer. It used over thirty 
years of data to understand the impact of the activists’ demands of strategic significance 
for the firms. It examined the premium fetched at acquisition announcement, bid counts 
and cash versus stock offers to see the benefits of activism to the target firm and its 
shareholders. It checked the performance reflected in the premium fetched to compare 
activists based on their overall experience, industry specialization and ownership stake. 
Most importantly, it analyzed the long-term post-acquisition performance of firms for 
cases that involved the activists versus others. It noted that the involvement of activists 
led to above 30% premium for the target firms benefitting its shareholders, as compared 
to about 15-20% for the non-activism related M&A. It also observed a 30% increase in 
the post-acquisition performance of the acquirer or the merged firm up to five years after 
the effective date of the M&A transaction for an activism related M&A, as compared to 
others. The results provide strong evidence that activism leads to positive value creation 
for the shareholders of a target firm at the time of acquisition. It challenged the popular 
perception that activists are near-term focused investors and corporate raiders. It found 
that activists bring lasting gains to the acquirer and its shareholders. The strategic 
changes brought in by the activist continue to influence the performance of the target and 
its acquirer for the long-term. It concluded that activists help discipline a target firm in 
the short as well as the long terms. Investor activism can steer M&A to successful 
outcomes for the target and the acquirer. It also observed the positive spillover effects of 
activism on comparable firms in the M&A context. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“I hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in the political 
world as storms in the physical… It is a medicine necessary for the sound health of government."  
- Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Paris, January 30, 1787 
Most of us would concur that Mr. Jefferson’s quote fits well for governance in the corporate 
world too. The word activism signifies drive and action, as if in a rebellion or the occasional 
storm that washes the yard clean. It continues to fascinate researchers far and wide.  In this 
section, we shall start with a brief discussion of shareholder activism to develop a general 
understanding of the terminologies. Next we shall delve into the role of activists when their 
targets also become the targets for mergers and acquisitions by other firms. It is amongst the first 
of activism research that makes the leap from opportunistic immediate event studies to 
recognizing the role of activism in the strategic management considerations related to the mergers 
and acquisitions of firms. Contrary to public perception, we believe that activism brings in 
considerable change inside a target firm that gets reflected in the higher premium that an acquirer 
is willing to pay. Our most important contribution shall be the finding that despite paying a 
seemingly higher premium, the impact of the lasting changes that are attributable to activist 
intervention, also get reflected in the longer term value of the acquiring firm. 
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We shall consolidate the questions that we hope to find the answers to as we proceed on our quest 
for knowledge in the subsequent chapters. Lastly, we shall discuss the significance of this 
research to the society and its contribution to knowledge. 
 
1.1. The story in brief 
 
To explain the context of our research, we shall start with a very short description of the three 
main characters in our research: the activists, the target firm and the acquiring firm. The 
activists are savvy and action oriented investors whose business model is to grab value seeking 
opportunities by investing in underperforming businesses, with a hope to turn them around into 
better performing companies and then increasing the value through retention or harvesting 
their investments by selling the firm to another higher premium paying acquirer firm or merging 
with them. The target firm is initially a target of the activists. The activists engage the 
management at their target firm to bring improvements and make it look appealing to other 
investors. This better performing firm now becomes the target of potential acquirers who may 
be willing to pay a higher price for it. At this stage the activists may choose to retain their stakes 
in the higher valued firm or harvest their investment by getting the firm sold at a premium to 
the acquiring firm.  
 
Investor activism studies in general have been primarily short-term focused and have observed 
mixed performance results in the post-activism performance outcome for the shareholders at a 
target firm (Goodwin, Singh, Slipetz and Rao 2014). Similarly, the mergers and acquisition (M&A) 
literature also shows mixed outcomes, and commonly concludes that half of all M&A deals are a 
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failure (Moeller 2004). Despite the uncertainty of the outcome, both activism and M&A topics 
continue to grab headlines, and it shows in the rising count of the cases related to activism as 
well as M&A. There seems to be an unexplained anomaly in the research that defies general 
understanding and interest. So through this research we shall study an almost virgin context 
where we see a convergence of activism and M&A to answer the question whether activism 
driven acquisitions are good for the activists, the shareholders at the target firm or its acquirers. 
Our core argument in the rest of the study is that the momentum effect of the positive changes 
brought in by the activists at a firm, as well as the self-realization of its own potential by the 
target firm, shall keep it performing better for a long time.  
 
To help develop a better understanding of this phenomenon, we propose the following carrot 
and stick model. Activists create an environment of challenge and change at the target firm. They 
use threats and action to reduce underperformance and reward the target with suitable actionable 
intelligence by steering the strategy of the firm. Thus activist intervention helps the target firm 
realize its untapped or underutilized potential; it further leads to the development of sustained 
motivation to perform. The improvements brought in by the activists create a momentum for 
longer lasting performance that appeals to the potential acquirers too. 
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Figure 1: Model of Activist influence on Firm Performance 
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1.2. Activism is an engaged citizenry 
(Title Courtesy: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Activism) 
Most people in the world go about their lives in a normal manner and tend to shy away from 
their problems rather than confront them. They are like a gently flowing stream that tries to 
ignore a hurdle that comes in its way, and changes its course by going around it or finds a new 
way. On the contrary, activists are action minded people who campaign to achieve an objective 
that usually benefits more people than the activists themselves. We can classify activism based 
upon the context, the targeted objectives of the activists and the means used by them to bring 
attention to their agenda. An internet search on the word activism brings more attention to the 
social activists, perhaps because they bring in change to the society in general and hence could 
have a broader appeal due to their focus on social causes. A focus on social or political 
objectives, when conducted using political means, can lead to those activists being considered 
as political activists. When certain individuals or a group campaign for achieving an 
environmental cause, they are considered as environmental activists (for example Greenpeace).  
 
Similarly, when some shareholder investors at a firm become dissatisfied by the performance of 
the firm or feel that their interests are being ignored by the management of the firm, they seek 
activist agendas to bring about changes that can enhance the value of their investments. We call 
such a group of investors as the activist investors or the shareholder activists. Aligned with the 
context of this study, we shall focus on investor activism by hedge funds where the outcome is 
an acquisition of the target. 
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1.3. Investor Activism 
 
Management is hired by corporations to execute effectively on its mission and be the guardians 
of the shareholders interest in the firm. An underlying assumption is that the shareholders have 
the power and means to influence the decisions and control the actions of the management. 
Another implicit assumption is that choices made by the management are a reflection of the 
shareholder’s interests and are approved by the shareholders. Since ownership of stock does 
not lead to direct control, at times the shareholders believe that their dialogue with the 
management is either incomplete or nonexistent (Burnett, Xu, Morris, Rodriguez Jr. 2012). The 
dissatisfaction of some shareholders with the firm’s performance or its management may lead 
them to consider active and aggressive means to safeguard their interests in the firm and they 
may become an activist. Activism is a costly affair (Gantchev 2013), and activists weigh their 
outcomes before committing their resources to a target firm. Unlike the popular image, the 
observation by some researchers shows that most activists use peaceful means like a dialogue 
with the board or management at the target firm rather than get confrontational with them. 
 
When the results seem unsatisfactory a common individual or passive investor may simply 
consider moving his or her investment from a firm to another. Most individuals, mutual funds 
and institutional investors fall in this category because it is not cost effective for them to take on 
an engagement role. They would rather ‘exit’ their holdings than ‘engage’ with the board, the 
management or other shareholders to improve performance at the firm. However, hedge funds 
primarily are a category of the investors that has found it advantageous to improve firm 
performance by engaging the management and holding them to task.  These investors research 
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to examine the strengths and vulnerabilities of a firm before selecting it as a target for 
investment. Activists demand change for the improvement in the performance, management 
and strategy of the firm. Savvy investing interests, easy information access, faster means of 
communication, supportive legal system and political climate create a good combination of 
conditions that support shareholder activism. The environment and considerable costs favor 
larger activist shareholders or mutual funds or those who can group and act as block holders.   
 
Firms targeted by hedge funds have common characteristics that demonstrate an opportunity to 
generate better returns for its shareholders: 7% or higher returns in a 40 to 60 day event study 
window around activist announcement date as observed by Boyson and Mooradian (2011), Brav 
et al. (2008), and Klein and Zur (2009). Recent research has found evidence that the longer term 
performance of target firms also improves following activist interventions (Boyson and 
Mooradian 2011; Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang 2013; Goodwin, Singh, Slipetz and Rao 2014). Brav, 
Jiang and Kim (2015) observe that beyond short term shareholder benefits, activism leads to 
long term (three years window) improvement in operating performance at the target firm, and 
its level is significantly higher than that observed during the year of intervention or the year 
prior to intervention. Shareholder activism is becoming a global phenomenon and has been 
successful in creating shareholder value across countries (Becht, Franks, Grant and Wagner 
2015). In an international study of activism covering both public and private (362) events from 
2000 to 2008, it was noted that the returns from hostile activist interventions showed to be 
more profitable than co-operative ones, and returns for specialist activist funds were 
substantially larger than for other investors. Separate legal jurisdictions also could not explain 
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differences in returns across countries; and the success rate of activism across countries looks 
similar (Becht, Franks and Grant 2010). 
 
Activists bring shareholder proposals to a firm. They work to engage or change the board of 
directors or the management at a firm, to alter the policy and practice at a firm, or to even 
consider the sale, merger or acquisition of firms. Thus, by engaging with the target firm, activist 
hedge funds attempt to pressure the firm into making corporate governance, investment, 
management, financial structure and other strategic changes including the sale of the company 
itself.  
 
The role of the activists has not been without criticism and they are also viewed as nuisance 
creating self-seekers who cause disarray and plunder their target firms to achieve short term 
profits. For some, activism is the doctrine of shareholder value taken to an absurd extreme. 
They are raiders who stifle innovation by discouraging employee trainings and stopping strategic 
value creating research and development efforts. In the name of saving costs they force firms to 
sell assets, layoff experienced valuable resources making the firm vulnerable to competition; 
and by reducing bench strength they render the firm incapable of grabbing fast market 
opportunities. A significant proportion of target firms end up getting acquired, implying that it 
may have been an outcome of a pre-planned strategy of the activists, for better or for worse. 
Hence, the focus of my dissertation is on the eventual acquisition of the activist’s target firm as 
it has been very controversial.  
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1.4. Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) 
 
Like activist events, mergers and acquisitions news also invokes public curiosity. In 2000, the 
dollar value of completed mergers, acquisitions and divestitures was in excess of US$1.7 trillion 
which represented an increase of 25% on the previous year (Cartwright & Price, 2003). By 2006, 
the world-wide acquisition activity had hit $3.79 trillion (Barkema and Schijven 2008). It rose to 
$4.17 trillion in 2007 before the financial crisis of 2008 and fell to $2.08 trillion in 2009 (Bevins, 
Feeney and Jones 2010). It has since surged back during the recovery to reach $3.5 trillion in 
2014, up 47% from the prior year (Primack 2015). A Corporate Board Member/FTI Consulting 
survey found mergers and acquisitions as one (#3) of the top ten concerns of public company 
directors (Monks and Minow 2011). An average 33.8 percent premium gets exchanged above 
the market value of the target firm in general (Mueller and Sirower 2003). The average 
abnormal announcement returns for target firms is 19.45% (median is 16.2%), while mean 
abnormal return of acquirers is 0.2% (median is -0.6%) and the average combined 
announcement returns (measured as Total Value of Acquisition or TVA) is a significant 4.5% 
(median is 4.4%) (Yaghoubi, Locke and Gibb 2013). Shareholders of target companies earn 
sizable positive market-returns, bidders in general earned zero adjusted returns and jointly the 
bidders and targets earned positive adjusted returns (Bruner 2002). So, for smart investors, like 
the activists, who study their targets well and approach them strategically, M&A returns appear 
lucrative too!  
 
Despite the interest garnered by mergers and acquisitions (M&A) announcement by firms, 
researchers have also noted that more than half of the M&A outcomes are considered 
unsuccessful (Price 2013). There is little doubt that M&A is one of the most aggressive change-
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agents in the business: volatile and disruptive (Bruner 2004). Just like popular press, academic 
literature too is awed and confused in its understanding of the drivers of success in mergers and 
acquisitions. We shall examine the role of activism in determining the premium paid by the 
acquiring firm in a mergers and acquisitions context and understand the reasons that lead to a 
better (or worse) post-acquisition performance as compared to an M&A case where an activist 
was not involved. 
 
1.5. Activism and M&A jointly 
 
Shareholder activism significantly affects takeover outcomes (El-Khatib 2012). A common belief 
about the outcome of an activist campaign is that the target firm gets merged or acquired. It is 
reflected in the researchers’ observation of an increasing count of activism related shareholder 
proposals that are being associated with mergers and acquisitions (Burnett, Zu, Morris and 
Rodriguez 2011). Firms receiving shareholder proposals are 30% more likely to become a target 
of a subsequent completed acquisition (El-Khatib 2012).  
 
Unlike passive shareholders, the activists are serious about their ownership and engage in 
corporate governance to bring about strategically targeted performance improvements at their 
target firm. Evidence based on the performance of over 500 acquisitions in the U.K., suggests 
that hostile takeovers tend to outperform friendly acquisitions (Sudarshan and Mahate 2004; 
Cartwright 2005). In a study of 1740 activism cases from 23 countries, Becht, Franks, Grant and 
Wagner (2015) observed that takeovers accounted for 22% of all outcomes or 16% of all deals, 
while other forms of restructuring like divestitures and sale of non-core assets accounted for 
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20% of all outcomes or 14% of all deals. Another international study of activism covering both 
public and private (362) events from 2000 to 2008, noted that the largest outcome gains were 
attributable to restructuring announcements (8.4% cases); where 40% of the restructurings 
were takeover announcements and had associated abnormal returns of 15% compared with 
3.7% for the remaining restructurings (Becht, Franks and Grant 2010). 
 
Greenwood and Schor (2009) were among the first to note that the best returns in investor 
activism are achieved only when the outcome of activism is a merger or acquisition. Evidence 
from an international study by Becht, Franks, Grant and Wagner (2015) confirms that the 
expectation of a favorable takeover outcome may be a key parameter for the activist business 
model. The contrarians may argue that M&A may not be in the best interest of the firm and a 
significant proportion of its shareholder’s interest, because the target firm may lose its identity 
and mission after it gets acquired. Greenwood and Schor (2009) as well as Becht et al (2015) did 
not measure the post-acquisition performance to explain if the effect of activism lasted farther 
beyond the acquisition announcements. We hope to address this gap in knowledge through this 
research. 
 
The selective choices of firms by the activists shows that they study their target firms and collect 
sufficient information beyond what is popular or easily known to others. The information they 
collect gives them the competitive learning advantage that motivates them to obtain sufficient 
stock of a target firm and give credence to their intentions presented to the shareholders of the 
target firm. The information advantage and negotiation skills also enable the activists to seek 
better acquisition premiums for the target firm.  Similar to Robert F. Bruner (2002), we are also 
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tempted to conclude that on balance, M&A does pay! However, we cannot ignore the 50-50 
split chances of success observed by other researchers in the general M&A context. In this 
research, we shall go a step further and examine the post-acquisition performance to see if an 
activist influenced M&A pays overall better than an M&A that is unrelated to an activist. 
 
Price paid by a customer for a product reflects the utility in terms of the value that the product 
brings to the customer. Determining the right premium to pay is a challenge for the acquiring 
firm because it should reflect the expected value addition that the M&A of a target firm shall 
bring to the acquiring firm in the future. Unavailability of information about a target firm after it 
has been acquired complicates the ability to measure the outcome of a merger or an acquisition 
for the target. Measuring post-acquisition performance is not easy, there is a dearth of good 
acquisition performance measures and the need for evolution of innovative means to do so 
(Schoenberg 2006). Brav, Jiang and Kim (2015) drilled down to gather plant level performance 
data to measure the effect of activism on target firms post-acquisition. The motivation for this 
research lies in the outcome of the little researched subject of activist driven M&A and its 
effects on the various stakeholders – the activists, the target firm and the acquirer. Measuring 
post-acquisition performance in the absence of any readily available data or standard 
measurement methods shall be an added challenge. 
 
1.6. Expected Contribution of this Research 
1.6.1. Contribution to Knowledge 
Research in isolation shows sufficient controversy on the outcome of activism or the outcome of 
M&A. It is not surprising that the literature review showed very limited research in the 
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performance of acquisition related gains to the firms targeted by activists. We found three 
studies that discussed this subject: Greenwood and Schor (2009), Brav, Jiang and Kim (2013) and 
Guo, Paudyal, Utham and Xing (2015). 
 
In a related research, Greenwood and Schor (2009) made a key observation that the best 
returns in activism are observed only when the target gets acquired. Greenwood and Schor 
(2009) have focused primarily on returns generated for bigger target firms (greater than 100 
million dollars) and did not examine the post-acquisition performance for the acquirer. They 
questioned the argument of a forced change at a firm by the activists. In support of activists’ 
ability to extract higher premiums, they suggested an alternate hypothesis that hedge funds are 
effective at identifying undervalued companies, locating potential partners for them and 
removing opposition to a takeover. We concur with their argument in general and the 
observation that activists play a role in securing a target. Differentiating from the prior studies, 
and  as shown in the earlier presented model  of activism (figure 1), we attribute the skill of 
activists to their insightfulness that helps a target firm realize its weakness, their action 
orientation and ability to motivate its management to perform and improve the target firm from 
its core.  
 
By observing short-term returns around activist intervention and acquisition announcement 
dates, Guo, Paudyal, Utham and Xing (2015) have barely touched the subject of value creation in 
acquisitions that can be attributable to hedge fund activism. They note that activists take better 
advantage of firms affected by hubris to extract higher premiums. Other than their observation 
in the short-term event returns post-acquisition, they have missed to build a theoretical 
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rationale for their observations and fail to explain the reasons that can lead to develop a new 
understanding. Their contribution leaves many unanswered questions and gaps in knowledge.  
 
Since only half of mergers and acquisitions are considered successful, there is a controversy on 
the real reasons that define success during a merger or acquisition. Firms receiving shareholder 
proposals are associated with approximately 30% relatively higher chance of becoming a target 
of a subsequent completed acquisition. The best related work has been by Brav, Jiang and Kim 
(2013) who overcame the challenge of measuring performance of the acquired entity after it 
gets acquired from popular databases (e.g. Compustat) by drilling deeper to measure the 
performance at the plant level. Comparing to a controlled sample unaffected by activism, they 
found evidence of longer term gains that can be attributed to the activists’ impact on the firm’s 
operating abilities. We view it as a support of our belief that activists shake the firm to its core 
and force a top-to-bottom rethink about how to get stronger. 
 
As a direct effect we hope to see performance gains for a target firm in the longer term (similar 
to Goodwin, Singh, Slipetz and Rao 2014). We expect potential acquirers willing to pay a higher 
premium for a lean, mean and revitalized target firm that has reduced its agency costs and has 
embarked on a path to progress. As a contagion effect of good practices adopted by the target 
firm, we also expect to find better performance at the acquirer firm after the merger or 
acquisition than others where no activists were involved. In fact, our beliefs and findings shall 
indirectly add to the knowledge created by researchers who observed improved performance of 
peer firms (spillover effect) even when they were not directly affected by activism (Lee and Park 
2009; Gantchev, Gredil and Jotikasthira 2013). We believe that activism can become the new 
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standard in corporate governance and thus create a lasting value for its target firms, the 
acquirer and the industry too.  
 
This research joins the leaders in activism research that make the leap from the activism to the 
M&A context, by looking beyond opportunistic portrayal of activists in near-term event studies 
alone. This paper is amongst the pioneers that examines activism as an antecedent to favorable 
merger and acquisition outcomes. Thus, we are amongst the first to recognize the activists for 
their role in strategic management considerations as it relates to the mergers and acquisitions 
of firms.  
 
1.6.2. Research Questions 
 
There are three main research questions that we address through this study: 
 First Research Question (RQ1): Is activist led acquisition better than others for the 
target firm?  
This question looks at how hedge fund target firm shareholders benefit from being 
acquired using quantitative and qualitative measures.  
- Do they receive a higher premium? 
- Do they receive more bids? 
- Does mode of payment (Cash or Stock) matter? 
 Second Research Question (RQ2): Are activist hedge funds equally good in 
generating merger or acquisition related value for target firm shareholders?   
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To develop a better understanding of the skills of activists, we examined: 
- EXPERIENCE - TOTAL:  
o Number of M&A engagements (Prior overall experience): Does an activist 
with prior overall experience across industries of target firm fetch a better 
premium? 
- EXPERIENCE - INDUSTRY:  
o Prior industry experience: Does an activist with prior experience in the 
industry of target firm fetch a better premium? 
- OWNERSHIP:  
o Ownership percentage in the target firm: Does a higher ownership stake by 
an activist in its target fetch a better premium? 
 
 Third Research Question (RQ3): Does an activist involvement in a merger or 
acquisition lead to better post-acquisition performance for the acquirer?   
 
In the following section, we shall review the literature as it relates to our research interests. 
Next, we shall discuss the data and the methods. Subsequent sections shall uncover our 
research findings and conclusions.
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
This chapter is primarily comprised of two sections: first we shall discuss the existing research in 
the Activism area; second we shall discuss the relevant research in the Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A) area. We start these sections with a table summarizing the relevant research (refer 
Appendix 1-3). Within the following sections we have tried to organize the discussion as it leads 
to the research questions that we want to seek the answers for. It shall provide the theoretical 
rationale for the development of our hypotheses that shall be described in a subsequent section 
after a review of the literature. 
 
2.1. Investor Activism Research 
2.1.1. Influence of Agency Theory 
Berle and Means (1932) highlighted the concerns caused by the separation of ownership and 
control at firms. Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt 1989) followed later to 
help explain the conflict of interests between those of the principal and the agent. The 
theoretical framework of activism can be associated with the theory of corporate governance, 
agency theory and the theory of the entrenchment of managers (Sahut, Lantz and Montandrau 
2010). 
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We can view the shareholders or investors as the principal; and the management as the agent at 
a firm. Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) explains that self-serving interests of the 
managers (agents) could lead to loss of value for the firm and its shareholders (principal). Even 
though the firm and its management may be fully informed about its condition, the shareholder 
and others are less informed. It can be well represented by the classic model of asymmetry in 
the quality of information that leads to the tension between parties. Other practical challenges 
also make it difficult for a general shareholder to understand the complexities of the 
management and discipline them. It creates an opportunity and incentive for a shareholder with 
a substantial interest, and who wants to put in the extra effort to bring about a change at the 
firm to see better returns on his/her investment in the firm, to step in and get the management 
to listen and act. Such a shareholder may be considered as an activist investor. Investor Activism 
studies, to a significant extent, have followed the Agency theory in trying to explain that they 
are better guardians of shareholder interests. However, the results of these studies are mixed.  
 
2.1.2. Many definitions of Activism 
We consider an activist investor shareholder as one who enters into a substantial position (say 
5% or more of all shares of the firm), with an active agenda and one who acts on his/her beliefs, 
to the extent of challenging the management at the firm or driving a change in the corporate 
governance, strategy and performance of the firm. Sahut, Lantz and Montandrau (2010) define 
activism as an involvement by institutional investors to influence the management of companies 
in their investment portfolio, following a conflict between the shareholders and the company’s 
management. Burnett et al (2012) consider shareholder activism as no more than a relationship 
investing process that focuses on pressuring management to improve performance along some 
given path that will work to enhance shareholder value. Differentiating from the hedge fund 
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activists, Klein and Zur (2006) defined an entrepreneurial activist as an investor who buys a large 
stake in a publicly held corporation with an intention to bring about change and thereby realize 
a profit on the investment.  
 
The studies paint a different picture based on the color of the lens of the researcher and the 
prevailing climate of perceptions at the respective time. Some earlier researchers viewed the 
rise in voice of the shareholder as noise at the shareholder meetings (Vogel 1983; Cane 1985; 
Goranova and Ryan 2014); a few people have also called them corporate raiders. Recent 
researchers have gained good attention by shedding light on the celebrity investor activists 
(Venkiteshwaran, Iyer and Rao 2010) and have even called the newly found popularity as 
‘Shareholder Spring’ (Farrell 2012; Morphy 2012; Goranova and Ryan 2014).  
 
2.1.3. Mixed outcomes of Activism 
Many studies have found evidence of generation of fair returns around the announcement of 
activism events (Bessler et al 2015; Boyson and Mooradian 2007; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and 
Thomas 2008; Brav, Jiang and Kim 2013; Gantchev 2013; Kahan and Rock 2007; Klein and Zur 
2009; Frank et al 2006; Greenwood and Schor 2009; Goodwin, Singh, Slipetz and Rao 2014). On 
the contrary, some researchers cite lack of evidence to support a claim of improvement in value 
at a target firm by institutional investors (Karpoff 2001; Greenwood and Schor 2009). There are 
others who claim that investor activism as a whole has no influence on the target company’s 
market value (Filatotchev and Dotsenko 2013). 
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The detractors of activism consider them as ‘myopic’ investors who create noise and disarray at 
firms. They derail a company from its strategic path. They may sell it in parts, causing stress to 
employees and wipe-out the long term interests of other shareholders (Goodwin, Singh, Slipetz 
and Rao 2014). According to this claim, activist shareholders with short investment horizon, 
especially activist hedge funds, push for actions that are profitable in the short term but are 
detrimental to the long-term interests of companies and their long-term shareholders 
(Bebchuck et al 2013). 
 
The good returns observed around the activist events in the short as well as the long term 
(Bebchuck et al 2013; Brav et al 2015; Goodwin et al 2014) can also explain the growing interest 
in activism. A recent research claims evidence that hedge fund intervention has a real and long-
term effect on the fundamental values of target firms as measured in its return on assets (ROA) 
measured three years prior to the activist intervention and three years after the activism event 
(Brav, Jiang and Kim 2015). Hedge fund activism is successful in creating value for shareholders 
of target companies.  
 
Bebchuck, Brav and Jiang (2013) found that activist interventions are followed by improved 
operating performance of the target company during the five-year period following these 
interventions. Performance at the target firms improves relative to that of peer companies with 
similar performance at the time of the intervention. Evidence of abnormal long-term negative 
returns at exit by activists (pump and dump the stock) has not been observed. We hypothesize 
that potential acquirers of a firm could be willing to pay a higher premium for an activist’s target 
with a hope to see longer term performance.  
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2.1.4. Activism around the World 
80% of all activist interventions in the world happen in America, where the culture and legal 
system are better suited to shareholder revolts than those in Europe or Asia (The Economist 
2015). An international study of activism covering both public and private (362) events from 
2000 to 2008, noted that the returns from hostile activist interventions showed to be more 
profitable than co-operative ones. It also observed a focus on expertise and noted that returns 
for specialist activist funds were substantially larger than for other investors. It observed that 
different legal jurisdiction could not explain differences in returns across countries (Becht, 
Franks and Grant 2010).  
 
2.1.5. Many Types of Activist Investors 
The studies have tried to differentiate their focus based upon characteristics of the activists 
themselves, their size or the size of their targets, their motives, the type of changes they want to 
bring to the target firm, the time window to observe the effects. Klein and Zur (2006) 
highlighted the differences in terms of the choice of target firm and focus areas between hedge 
fund and other entrepreneurial activists. Bessler et al. (2015) observed that hedge funds tend to 
acquire stakes in firms that suffer from weak corporate governance and are less profitable than 
their industry-matched peers. Interestingly, Klein and Zur (2006) observed that hedge funds 
targeted more profitable firms than other activists. They also noted that the differences in the 
post-13D filing strategies of the activists: hedge funds address cash flow agency costs whereas 
other private investors change the target's investment strategies.   
 
Zhu (2013) focused on the effect of activism on corporate policy and observed that when 
likelihood of hedge fund activism increases, firms responded by returning more dividends to 
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shareholders, reduced CEO pay, reduced stocking cash, leveraged more and invested into 
research and development while reducing capital expenses.  
 
Armour and Cheffins (2012) use the terms defensive and offensive to describe activism. 
Defensive activism is ex-poste (reactive) in orientation: happens when an existing shareholder 
becomes dissatisfied with corporate performance or governance and lobbies to change it. In 
offensive (proactive) investor activism, the investor intends ex-ante to agitate for change to 
maximize shareholder returns. Institutional investors usually have a significant investment in a 
target and so use defensive activism by exercising control.  
 
Hedge funds are notorious for using offensive activism to make strategic changes at the target 
firm and try to seek control. However, the statistics show that most activism is conducted 
through peaceful means where the activists engage the target firm in a dialogue and negotiate 
their way to bring changes at the firm. It is only rarely that activists use proxy contests to push 
their agenda. 
 
2.1.6. Public versus Private Activism 
Becht et al (2010) helped analyze public versus private activism too. They note that private 
activism usually occurs behind closed doors and so is able to achieve better returns compared to 
public activism. They found that the abnormal annualized returns over the holding period were 
11.4% for the public activist engagements in comparison to 6% for the private engagements. 
The holding period was 2.2 years for public activist engagements and 2.5 years for the private 
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engagements. The largest outcome gains were attributable to restructuring announcements 
(8.4% cases) where 40% of the restructurings were takeover announcements and had associated 
abnormal returns of 15% compared with 3.7% for the remaining restructurings. Significantly, 
these returns include the global financial crisis year 2008 when activist funds suffered large 
abnormal losses (Becht, Franks and Grant 2010). We shall limit our research to study of public 
activism due to a lack of data related to private activism cases. 
 
2.1.7. Activism outcomes leading to M&A 
The researchers have focused on various types of activist demands. Goodwin, Singh, Slipetz and 
Rao (2014) observed that within two years of a dissident shareholder joining the board of a 
target firm, the CEO resigned approximately 60% of the time and over the course of the five 
years 40% of the target firms were sold or merged. The Economist (2015) analyzed 50 largest 
activist positions taken since 2009 and noted that in most cases profits, capital investment and 
R&D had risen. It shows that activists work in the longer-term interest of the firm that can make 
it stronger and unleash its potential to perform – a quality of a target that could also appeal to 
possible acquirers! We are focused on the activism outcome that leads to a merger or 
acquisition of a target firm and hence shall try to keep the discussion related to our context.  
 
Lilienfeld-Total and Schnitzler (2014) highlight three common determinants of abnormal returns 
observed around activism announcement events: high ownership, an active plan and the 
anticipation of a future merger and acquisition. From a large international sample, Becht, 
Franks, Grant and Wagner (2015) observed that takeovers continue to be the most popular 
activist outcome. Greenwood and Schor (2009) also specifically noted that from amongst all 
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possible activist outcomes, it is the ability of the hedge fund activists to force the target firm to 
get acquired that creates the maximum value for the shareholders of the target firm.  
 
2.1.8. What can explain success of activists 
Gantchev (2013) had observed higher returns with certain activists than others. The reasons for 
success of activism cases could be due to many factors and their combinations – activist, firm, 
market or others. Greenwood and Schor (2009) believe that unique tax structures and incentive 
structure at Hedge Funds enables them to successfully use activism and monitor management.  
Waldron, Navis and Fisher (2012) adopted a socio-cognitive perspective to account for 
differences in the reaction of managers of firms in an industry to activism, even when subject to 
common campaigns and strategies.  
 
We have been able to figure out a few attributes of the hedge funds that help define the success 
for the investor activists: Ability to identify targets, Structure, Proximity, Industry focus, Prior 
overall experience, Prior activism experience, Specialization, Focused approach, Aggressiveness, 
Ability to turn hostile, Ability to collaborate and Negotiate.  
 
2.1.8.1. Ability to identify targets 
Nain and Yao (2013) attribute the commonly observed correlation between institutional 
investor ownership and their successful outcomes to their superior active stock picking skills. 
Greenwood and Schor (2009) stated that activists create value to acquirers by identifying targets 
that are performing poorly under the current management, or they identify companies for 
which acquirers might overpay. Commenting on the target identification, Boyson and 
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Mooradian (2011) observe that targets of high frequency hedge funds and their managers have 
considerable overall experience in activism or experience in the industry of focus for the hedge 
fund. They attribute these results to the managerial skills gained through prior activism related 
experience. They note that poor stock performance, high working capital and high research and 
development (R&D) observed at targets of high frequency hedge funds suggests that these 
target firms have a greater potential for improvement.  
 
Bessler, Drobetz and Holler (2015), attributed the superior performance of the longer term Buy 
and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) of non-aggressive hedge funds to their security selection 
skills. Identification of valuable targets requires a significant amount of research by the activists. 
Informed stock picking could be the key differentiator skill between the successful activist 
investor and those who try to imitate them as a herd. It is difficult to say whether the activists 
are good at identifying a target firm; or the action oriented approach of the activists is the key to 
their success; or they are better at finding the right acquirers for the target firm’s assets; or they 
are good at all of these skills and more. It seems that the activists may be good at taking 
advantage of the information asymmetry through superior intelligence to identify and engage a 
suitable target before supplementing their investment with other value enhancing action. 
 
2.1.8.2. Proximity 
In an international study sample of 1,740 activist engagements between 2000-2010 period, 
across 23 countries in Asia, Europe and North America; Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2015) 
observed striking differences in the outcomes of the activist engagements across countries. 
Interestingly, they also observed that even though the U.S. model of activism has been copied 
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across countries by foreign activists, the non-U.S. activists performed better than the U.S. 
activists in their domestic markets. It is perhaps a reflection that the non-U.S. activists know 
their closer targets better than the U.S. activists through superior intelligence owing to closer 
proximity and regional experience. It shows that skills gained through regional proximity, 
knowledge about local culture and customs, relevant experience, industry focus, market 
knowledge and informational advantage matters for success in activism, similar to its role in 
strategic management at firms. 
 
2.1.8.3. Industry Focus and Overall Experience 
Overall experience and also a focus on the drivers of the target bring in better results to the 
activists and add to their skillset. Hedge funds that have considerable prior experience and that 
seem to hire managers with prior activist experience (high frequency hedge funds) showed 
31.1% returns in three years post-activist intervention start date compared to -12.6% returns for 
low-frequency hedge funds. Also, displaying a superior ability to avoid bad outcomes, the 
targets of high frequency hedge funds filed fewer bankruptcies and faced lesser liquidation (6%) 
compared to (16%) targets of low frequency hedge funds. Thus both the target firm 
shareholders as well as hedge fund investors both gain from more experienced and skilled 
hedge funds (Boyson and Mooradian 2011).   
 
High frequency hedge funds and their managers have considerable overall experience in 
activism or experience in the industry of focus for the hedge fund. Experience of the activist 
fund and its fund managers helps the activist hedge fund pick better targets. Further, high 
frequency activists follow a focused approach, they put their target firms “on notice” – they 
 27 
 
issue a threat of intense action, and follow it with hostile action if the firm fails to show 
expected improvements quick enough. Experienced activists become more aggressive and 
hostile when target firms fail to meet their performance expectations (Boyson and Mooradian 
2011).  
 
It shows that prior related experience with activists and their industry focus helps successful 
activists research their target’s potential well in advance and follow it with a swift action 
business model with clearly defined stricter corrective maneuvers to achieve their results. 
 
2.1.8.4. Specialization 
Becht, Frank and Grant (2010) classified funds based on their activism focus. They observed that 
specialist funds are exclusively activism focused. Non-specialist funds are typically multi-strategy 
hedge funds and did not necessarily engage as part of their investment philosophy. They 
observed an outcome of 6.9% for specialist funds and 0.57% for non-specialist funds, using a 
public database where the mean abnormal returns from the announcement of the stake funds 
were 4.4% around the block disclosure date. It shows the importance of focus and strategy by 
the activist hedge funds, and helps them target the right firms to achieve their desired outcome. 
 
An international study of activism covering both public and private (362) events from 2000 to 
2008, observed a focus on expertise and noted that returns for specialist activist funds were 
substantially larger than for other investors. It observed that different legal jurisdiction could 
not explain differences in returns across countries. The abnormal annualized returns over the 
 28 
 
holding period were 11.4% for the public activist engagements in comparison to 6% for the 
private engagements. The holding period was 2.2 years for public activist engagements and 2.5 
years for the private engagements. The largest outcome gains were attributable to restructuring 
announcements (8.4% cases) where 40% of the restructurings were takeover announcements 
and had associated abnormal returns of 15% compared with 3.7% for the remaining 
restructurings. Significantly, these returns include the global financial crisis year 2008 when 
activist funds suffered large abnormal losses (Becht, Franks and Grant 2010). Boyson and 
Mooradian also noted the presence of specialization in the approach taken by ‘frequent 
activists’ that tends to take a consistent, rather predictable approach to their target firms, and 
exhibits persistence in the long-term stock performance of the target firm. 
 
2.1.8.5. Aggressive and Hostile approach 
Popular press states that a call from the activist is one of the most dreaded communication that 
a firm’s CEO can receive (The Economist 2015) at a firm. It is usually followed by some level of 
acceptance of the activists’ demands. The international study of activism by Becht, Franks and 
Grant (2010), noted that the returns from hostile activist interventions showed to be more 
profitable than co-operative ones.  
 
Conflicting results were observed in another study comprising 231 events involving 81 target 
firms and 111 hedge funds using hand collected samples between 2000 and 2006, from 
Germany by Bessler, Drobetz and Holler (2015). They found that more aggressive hedge funds 
(37%) generated higher returns in the short term before and after the event date. They note 
that the outperformance of the aggressive hedge funds quickly reversed and the non-aggressive 
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hedge funds (63%) ultimately out-performed their aggressive peers. They also noted that 
aggressive hedge funds attempt to expropriate the target firm’s log-term shareholders and term 
debt holders and try to temporarily increase share prices so that they can sell and exit at the 
temporarily higher prices. They observed that when multiple hedge-funds buy into the same 
target firm, a coordinated a wolf-pack like attack on a target firm was observed during a quarter 
(23%) of all cases, however they observed that three-quarter (77%) cases showed no wolf-pack 
like coordination. It shows that activists are smart enough to use hostile technique to their 
advantage for short term gains or drum-up support for their cause, yet they are intelligent 
enough to negotiate their way through to achieve lasting goals.  
 
2.1.8.6. Networking, Collaboration and Negotiation 
The activists get involved with their targets to achieve their objectives. They network with the 
directors and the management at the firm. They discuss their ideas with the institutional 
investors whose support is crucial, in case the activists face resistance from the firm (Briggs 
2007). In surveys, asset fund managers claim to routinely analyze the information related to the 
companies they invest in and have meetings with the company managers (Martin and Nisar 
2007). Briggs (2007) undertook a legal, empirical, and theoretical study in an effort to 
understand the implications of hedge fund activism. He observed that hedge funds are not-
normal institutional investors because they launch proxy fights for corporate control and are 
successful. He observed that the activist tactics (like wolf-pack) and the influence of activist 
proxy advisory firms (the recommendations of which many institutional investors follow 
automatically) had made hedge fund activists a real power in corporate governance. Like many 
other researchers, and contrary to conventional beliefs, he found that hedge funds did not hold 
short positions primarily. Subjecting his survey results to theoretical analysis using current nexus 
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of contracts, shareholder primacy, director primacy, team production, connected contracts, and 
other theories, he found none to be completely satisfactory. He concluded that an almost 
unprincipled balance-of-power political model best explains the hedge fund activism 
phenomenon; and if these activities cause managements to review and reassess their strategies, 
corporate governance improves at the target firm.  
 
2.1.8.7. Expertise and Type of Investment 
Focusing on investment vehicle used, Boyson and Mooradian (2011) note that experienced 
activist hedge funds mostly bought common stock of target firms (for 87% activist cases) 
primarily from the open market (for 93% cases). Instead, low frequency or lesser experienced 
funds bought debt, preferred stock, and warrants, besides common stock. Common stock allows 
experienced hedge fund managers to more efficiently exit their positions. Experience of 
managers at high frequency activist funds is evident in their consistent approach to their target 
firms which in turn gets reflected in long term stock performance of the target firm. The better 
results also show that the specialist activists engage more frequently with the target firm to 
achieve better target firm results (Becht, Franks and Grant 2010; Boyson and Mooradian 2011). 
 
While many have tried to imitate successful activist investors, the performance varies among 
the activists. Considering monitoring costs and the net returns to shareholder activism, 
Gantchev (2013) found that the mean net activist return is close to zero but the top quartile of 
activists earn higher returns on their activist holdings than on their non-activist investments. 
Since knowledge and consistent focus lead to development of experience, one wonders about a 
focus on the characteristics of the target or activists with other forms of special expertise. 
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Would those focused in their respective specializations also perform better on their turf than 
others! Whatever be the means, the activists know how to engage their target and channel its 
energies to extract favorable results. 
 
2.1.8.8. Target firm characteristics that appeal to Activists 
We observe some common characteristics of the firms targeted by activists. These firms are 
usually low-performing firms, low-sales, with low profits, are cash rich, have low debt, have a 
good cashflow, return little or no cash to their shareholders and seem to be unable to figure out 
a way to unlock the secret to a higher performance. The target firms also are known to have 
corporate governance issues like high CEO payments, dual-role of a chairman of the board and 
the CEO being held by the same person, or a board that is unable to monitor effectively. The size 
of the target firm has also been observed to play a significant role (Gomes et al 2013). 
 
Boyson and Mooradian (2011) note that target firm can be best described as cash cows with 
poor growth prospects hampered by the agency costs of free cash flow. The target firms are 
value stocks, with a smaller size, higher book to market ratio, lower Tobin’s Q. The target firms 
have poor stock performance but good operating performance, with better return on assets 
(ROA) and cash flows as a percentage of assets as compared to their matched samples. This 
makes the firms as excellent targets of activism for changes aimed at reducing the agency costs 
of free cash flow. 
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Bessler, Drobetz and Holler (2015) note that hedge funds tend to acquire stakes in firms that 
suffer from weak corporate governance and are less profitable than their industry-matched 
peers. They reject the notion that hedge funds are pure value investors without deeper 
knowledge about their target firms. They believed that governance rather than operational 
issues seem to be the reason for being targeted by hedge fund activism. They consider that 
hedge funds do not simply target undervalued stocks, but their investment strategies may be 
driven by other objectives like market timing or capturing price and earnings momentum as 
well. They observe good support for their hypothesis that hedge funds target firms with 
excessive free cashflow (and related agency problems), the event returns are significantly higher 
if target firm uses lower leverage or generates higher operating cashflows. 
 
Brav et al (2008) note that hedge funds seem to like simple business models and shied away 
from complicated business models such as those with high research and development (R&D) 
type activities. Hedge funds tend to be comfortable dealing with issues that are generalizable to 
all firms, such as changes to governance and payout policies, rather than issues that are specific 
to individual target firms (example a sales slump). Targeted firms are typically profitable and 
enjoy sound cash flows but could be affected by the agency problem of free cash flows, such as 
relatively low dividend payout and diversifying investments that might not be in the best 
interest of shareholders. Klein and Zur (2009) also observe that hedge fund targets are normally 
healthier firms, with higher earnings and hold more cash than other comparable firms. 
 
Firm size helps determines the amount that an activist would have to invest to gain a significant 
position to submit a shareholder proposal or make their voice heard. Since smaller firms tend to 
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have greater informational asymmetry, size could be considered as a measure of information 
asymmetry (Bessler et al 2015). Hedge funds seem to favor smaller sized firms as targets 
(Greenwood and Schor 2009). While hedge fund targets also typically have poor stock 
performance, they are small in size and usually have good operational performance, making 
them potentially better candidates for improvement by activists (Boyson and Mooradian 2011). 
Low sales could also lead to dis-satisfied shareholders at a target firm and they may propose to 
bring in change at the firm. Hedge funds use different strategies of engagement based upon the 
size of a target firm and so size is an important parameter to consider during the analysis to 
develop a richer understanding.  
 
2.1.8.9. Target Firm improvement post–acquisition 
Brav, Jiang and Kim (2015) cite evidence suggesting that the presence of hedge funds is essential 
for the matching of plants to new owners who can operate the underperforming plants more 
efficiently. By focusing on the subsample of plants that were sold after hedge fund intervention, 
they found that these plants showed lower productivity than the other plants in the control 
sample prior to the sale, but experienced a significant improvement in their productivity under 
new ownership. They noted that the improvement is significantly greater than that of plants 
sold without the involvement of hedge funds. We predict that the changes brought in at a firm 
shall lead to long term performance improvements at the target firm and shall also help the 
acquirer firm reap the benefits post acquisition. It is perhaps the anticipated future gains owing 
to activists’ involvement that encourages acquirers to pay a higher premium for activist targeted 
firms than others. 
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2.1.8.10. Target Firm – self-realization 
Activists challenge the firm through threats and action (like removal of CEO or board members). 
Activists also provide guidance, acquired in the form of their intelligence about the target and 
provide encouragement by sharing their independently thought out strategy for the target firm. 
We believe that this leads to a self-realization at the target firm about its untapped potential 
that can be channeled into better performance. It forces introspection at the firm, its 
management and workforce, thus revitalizing the firm to its core. We hypothesize that the 
replenished energy at the firm, obtained via self-realization, shows in the overall performance 
improvements at the target firm.  
 
We expect the management of the firm to focus better on performance after activist 
intervention. In fact, some studies have observed improved performance of peer firms even 
when they were not directly affected by activism (Lee and Park 2009; Gantchev, Gredil and 
Jotikasthira 2013). Thus we expect activism to create a lasting value for its target firms and the 
industry too. We can even hope to see future researchers show improvements in the 
performance of firms that did not get acquired, but faced activist action.  
 
Irrespective of the root cause, whether it’s the CEO’s fear of activists, or choice of the board to 
bring in better corporate governance, or replenished motivation we believe that, in general, a 
brush with the activists revitalizes the desire to perform better at a firm and brings in significant 
strategic changes that can help the firm in the longer term.  
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2.2. Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) Research 
As described earlier, activism and M&A are both popular subjects by themselves. Yet, there is 
very limited research that makes the connection between activism and mergers and 
acquisitions. In this section, we shall start with a general discussion of the mergers and 
acquisitions followed by a review of the M&A literature that is primarily focused in two areas 
that are relevant to this dissertation.  We shall examine the literature on target firm returns and 
premiums, followed with an examination of the post-acquisition performance.    
 
Merger and Acquisition announcements get considerable media coverage. A flurry of news and 
stock market activity can be commonly observed around the announcement and the event 
studies seem to confirm it. Bruner (2004) noted that M&A is one of the most aggressive change-
agents in the business: volatile and disruptive. Since change is not easy to manage or bear with, 
it is not surprising that more than half of the outcomes of M&A transactions are considered 
unsuccessful (Price 2013).  
 
The complex phenomenon represented by M&A has attracted the interest and research 
attention of a broad range of management disciplines encompassing the financial, strategic, 
behavioral, operational and cross-cultural aspects of this challenging and high risk activity 
(Cartwright and Schoenberg 2006). Similarly, the reason for the attraction towards M&A news 
could also be owing to a mix of psychological, emotional, financial, social and political factors.  
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Companies engage in mergers and acquisitions for multiple reasons and often more than one 
reason at a time. The most common reasons cited by companies are economic gains from 
synergies and cost reduction; and access to new markets or technologies or customers. Macro 
factors like market deregulation, advent of new technology, or globalization also affect M&A 
(Virani 2007; Mensah 2011). Acquisitions provide faster access to technologies or speed of entry 
to new markets as compared to traditional growth channels (Carbonara and Caiazza 2009; 
Mensah 2011). From a strategic reasons perspective, cross-border mergers could provide access 
to new resources, markets, and customers (Hopkins 2008). These reasons indicate the role of 
informational asymmetry that could expose new opportunities. 
 
Hubris at top management team (TMT) is also often noted as a reason for M&A (Gaughan 2011; 
Martynova and Renneboog 2008; Mensah 2011). Pursuit of self-seeking interests by the 
managers at the expense of their shareholders – the classic Agency Theory - also explains some 
of the motives quoted for acquisitions (Jensen 1986; Roll 1986; Tuch and O’Sullivan 2007). The 
ability of bidders to take on a governance role by acquiring firms that are not pursuing 
shareholder objectives and seek to extract greater wealth from the firm’s assets for the benefit 
of acquiring shareholders, can also be considered as a motive for acquisition (Manne 1965; 
Marris 1963; Tuch and O’Sullivan 2007). However, it can be perceived as an aggressive posturing 
when taken by the acquirers alone. The culture and incentive structure at hedge funds demands 
agility to identify and act on new opportunities. Activists stay armed with superior intelligence 
and can engage a target firm before an acquirer. The firm-wide strategic changes at a target firm 
that are brought in by activists, could appeal even more to a potential acquirer. It could perhaps 
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explain to some extent a fall in hostile takeovers since the mid-1990s and the coincidental rise in 
activism. 
 
2.2.1. M&A – Premium and Performance 
M&A decision by the management is associated with a hope to gain from the synergies of the 
merger (‘two and two make five’) or the independence of the split (‘sum of parts is more than 
the sum of the whole’). The premium reflects the hope, the knowledge level and the learning 
process that is related to the information about the firms and the uncertainties that could affect 
their future valuations. The post-acquisition performance reflects the reality of whether the 
hope associated with the high premium materializes into gains or not. Premium can be readily 
inferred from the price, measuring post-acquisition performance continues to be a challenge.  
 
In an event study from 1990-1999 examining 473 M&A cases, Moeller (2005) found that 
acquirer (bidder) announcement returns averaged -2.9% (or a loss); Target firm acquisition 
announcement returns averaged 21.3% with a takeover premium average at 30.8%; while the 
combined market value of bidder and target increase averaged at 2%. Similarly in other studies 
too, we see good premium and higher returns to target firm shareholders at M&A 
announcement.  
 
Longer term or overall M&A performance studies have observed mixed post-acquisition 
performance outcomes. King (2014) observed that M&A activity on average does not lead to 
superior financial performance, but a rather modest negative effect on the long-term financial 
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performance of acquiring firms! Qualitative studies based on interviews or surveys reflect 
attitudes of acquiring managers who want to claim victory irrespective of the true outcome. 
Quantitative measurement of post-acquisition performance is difficult because the target firm 
ceases to exist after the conclusion of the merger or acquisition as an independent entity and so 
respective data for the target firm is hard to find. Also, it is difficult to segregate the share of the 
acquired target from the rest of the acquirer to isolate the outcome performance of the M&A. 
 
General market data and numerous research studies, frequently demonstrate that on average, 
acquirer firms pay substantial premiums over market values of the target firm. Ideally, from 
general finance theory of market efficiency, the market value of a firm is an unbiased estimate 
of the present value of the expected future dividends accruing to current outstanding shares. It 
leaves little room to explain the conditions under which an acquirer firm could be expected to 
pay a higher premium.  
 
Varaiya (1987) attributes a premium during M&A to (a.) Increase in the value of gains from 
acquisition (in form of synergies, reduced operating expenses, lower taxation, increased 
leverage, lesser competition, better market power, access to a larger market share, etc.) created 
from the merged firm exceeds the standalone value of the target firm and the acquirer; and (b.) 
the acquired (target) firm's relative bargaining strength with the acquirer.  There is quite a bit of 
commonality between the approach used by Activists in general and the model that Varaiya 
(1987) proposed to estimate the premium in M&A. They tend to rely on seeking targets that can 
provide the gains (from two sources: under-pricing and under-management) and using focused 
communication (bargaining) to achieve their goals.  
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Varaiya and Ferris (1987) found that acquirers performed worse when excessive acquisition 
premiums were paid. A considerable set of long-term return studies have found that acquirer 
shareholders suffer significant wealth-losses post-acquisition. This seems logical because, if 
takeover premiums paid to target shareholders are greater, the acquirer’s cost for the 
acquisition shall also be more, and it may have a negative impact on the post-acquisition 
performance of the acquirer. Takeover targets that offer the potential to provide the acquirer 
with increased opportunity for wealth creation, could also offer the expectation that a 
significant portion of this could materialize in improved performance (as can be measured 
through better stock returns and accounting performance) for shareholders. However, it is not 
easy for the M&A studies to segregate the target firms based on their future profitability 
potential, but activists are a special group who possess the ability to pick targets wisely (Boyson 
and Mooradian 2011; Nain and Yao 2013). 
 
Similar to the corporate governance and agency problem concerns usually raised by activists at 
target firms, Moeller (2005) sought to find if target managers trade takeover premiums in return 
for private benefits and thus hurt target shareholders’ interests. Evidence suggests that 
powerful entrenched target CEOs reduce takeover premiums, possibly in return for bidder-
provided incentives. Thus to maximize takeover premiums in the interest of all shareholders of 
the target firm, he hoped that large outside blockholders with board representation should 
exert influence on the target management. Here Moeller (2005) seems to be picking on the 
under-management factor that was also raised by Varaiya (1987). Interestingly, activists are 
known to play this role quite well – they discipline the management to take actions that 
enhance shareholder wealth. We can expect the activists to market the target firm well to get 
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and appropriate bidder representation and can expect better premiums in an activist led M&A 
than otherwise. 
 
As noted earlier that the activists are savvy investors, who use thorough research and skills to 
pick an underpriced firm that offers a potential to perform better (Boyson and Mooradian 
2011). They bring strategic changes to improve the performance of the target firm, and thus 
make it a suitable candidate for acquirers. The activists are also effective communicators and 
negotiators, so they can convincingly present the target firm to the acquirer to extract better 
premium (Briggs 2007). The depth of the changes that activists bring to the target firm and its 
momentum is sufficient to extract a continued better performance from the target firm assets 
and resources that help the acquirer post-acquisition (Brav, Jiang and Kim 2012). A crucial 
research question therefore is whether the expected efficiency gains from targets justify the 
increased premiums typically paid to target company shareholders in activism led M&A cases? 
Stated in simple terms, does activism led M&A benefit the acquirer? 
 
2.2.2. M&A – Method of Payment 
Research is divided even on the method of payment in an M&A. Some believe that friendly deals 
using Stock perform better than those using Cash (Gomes, Angwin, Weber and Tarba 2013). 
Others believe that hostile acquisitions paid using Cash tend to perform better than those paid 
with Stock (Tuch and O’Sullivan 2007; Gomes, Angwin, Weber and Tarba 2013). King et al (2004) 
observed that the 'conditions' most commonly studied in prior M&A research (conglomerate 
acquisitions, related acquisitions, method of payment [cash vs. equity], and prior acquisition 
experience) do not impact post acquisition performance.  
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This is in contrast with the findings of Datta, Pinches and Narayanan (1992), who employed a 
multivariate framework and regression analysis using observations from 41 studies to observe 
that target firm's shareholders gain significantly from mergers and acquisitions, while those of 
the acquirer (or bidding firm) do not. Their findings indicate that the use of stock financing has a 
significant impact on the wealth of both the target and bidding firms' shareholders. They also 
observe that presence of multiple bidders and the type of acquisition influences the bidders' 
return, while regulatory changes and tender offers influence the targets' returns.  
 
2.2.3. M&A – A Success 
Most companies undertake acquisitions with an eye toward fueling growth, the resulting 
infusion of new ideas, perspectives and processes can produce lasting benefits that are broader 
and deeper (Vermeulen 2005). An M&A is considered a success or failure depending on whether 
the originally expected benefits from the transaction are realized or are not realized by the 
acquirer. Checking the realized benefits against the premium paid is one of the easiest ways to 
determine the success or failure in economic terms. Reports of culture clashes, power struggles 
and people trying to maintain the status quo seem like common post-merger problems at firms. 
 
A study that used world-wide M&A data from Global Mergers and Acquisitions database of 
Thompson Financial Securities Data (TFSD) for a period 1981 to 1998 to determine the effects of 
mergers on efficiency and market power (Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker 2003), observed that 
56.7% of all mergers result in higher than projected profits, but almost the same fraction of 
mergers results in lower than projected sales after 5 years. It shows that profit increases and 
sales declines for mergers that increase market power. More than a fourth of all mergers exhibit 
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this pattern, and this helps to explain why mergers look more successful, when one examines 
post-merger profits than for post-merger sales. The study observed no significant differences 
between domestic and cross-border mergers.  
 
In general, acquisitions create around 4% value on average (Yaghoubi, Locke and Gibb 2013). 
Robert F. Bruner (2002) observes that shareholders of target companies earn sizable positive 
market-returns, bidders in general earned zero adjusted returns and jointly the bidders and 
targets earned positive adjusted returns. It is in contrast with other researchers who found that 
M&A is successful in approximately about half the cases. Since activists are known to be shrewd 
and value seeking investors, their use of the M&A vehicle poses an interesting challenge. 
Activists seem to research their targets well to gain from the informational asymmetry challenge 
faced by others and bring in deep rooted changes to the core of a firm. We propose that post-
acquisition performance for activist inspired M&A deals would be better than cases where no 
activist were involved. 
 
2.2.4. M&A – A Failure 
A disproportionate count of M&A transactions fail to meet their originally stated objectives 
(Bruner 2004; Cartwright and Schoenberg 2006; Mensah 2011). In a 1990-1999 study of M&A, 
Moeller (2005) observed that (acquirer) bidder announcement returns averaged -2.9%. The 
conventional belief is that on average firms overpay for target firms during acquisitions due to 
hubris at the top management team of the acquirer who mistakenly overestimate the benefits 
of synergy, market access or diversification. Other reasons for failure are attributed to lack of 
sufficient information about the target firm that leads to mispricing and overvaluation. Post-
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acquisition failures are often blamed on cultural issues, inter-firm team dynamics, political 
influences and information hoarding. Other reasons to blame are a lack of clear focus, vision, 
implementation planning, change management and integration of resources, people and 
processes (Bruner 2004; Cartwright and Schoenberg 2006; Mensah 2011). 
 
Rather than a superior financial performance, M&A activity could lead to a rather modest 
negative effect on the long-term financial performance of acquiring firms (King et al 2004). An 
analysis of 30 years of prior research observed by Cartwright and Schoenberg (2006) had found 
that the failure rate in M&A was about half of the total cases. These failures were attributed to 
three possible reasons: (1.) Executives undertook acquisitions driven by non-value maximizing 
motives; (2.) The prescriptions from academic research did not reach the practitioner 
community; and (3.) The research to date seems incomplete in some manner. Unfortunately, 
later researchers have observed a similar failure or success rate too. This makes us wonder if 
indeed a lack of understanding of the root causes of success or failures of M&A, as determined 
through impactful research is the root cause. Thus our study of M&A with an activist focus may 
aid to enhancing the related knowledge. 
 
2.2.5. M&A - Target selection and Acquirer identification skills 
Boyson and Mooradian (2011) had argued that in order to succeed, hedge fund activists need 
specialized skills that provide an ability to identify targets with strong upside stock potential, low 
monitoring costs, and sufficient liquidity for a timely exit. Nain and Yao (2013) note the largely 
unexplored possibility that some institutional investors like mutual funds, pick firms to 
subsequently engage in more value enhancing investments. Using a sample of 3,988 mergers 
and acquisitions between publicly traded acquirers and targets during the period from 1990 to 
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2006, they observed that several proxies for mutual fund stock selection skill could help predict 
the post-merger performance of portfolio companies. Indicative of active stock picking skills, 
they observe that several mutual fund stock selection skill measures strongly predict the post-
merger performance of corporate acquirers.  
 
Nain and Yao (2013) further note that firms held by funds with higher stock selection skills are 
more likely to subsequently become acquirers, suggesting that the mutual fund skill-set includes 
the ability to identify acquirers with value-enhancing acquisition opportunities. Also, from the 
other earlier discussions and the good investment returns and success rate of activism we can 
confidently say that the activist hedge funds are better at target selection. We believe that 
superior stock selection skills could help activist hedge funds to find a good target firm, bring 
improvements to it and then market it better to an acquirer too, thus enhancing their chance of 
gaining in the purchase as well as the sale of the target firm. 
 
2.2.6. Target firm characteristics that appeal to Acquirers 
Companies engage in mergers and acquisitions for multiple reasons and often could do so for 
multiple reasons simultaneously. The most commonly cited reasons by acquiring firms are 
economic gains from synergies, diversification, cost reduction, lower taxation, low operating 
expenses, and increased market power through access to new technologies or customers or 
market segments. Macro factors that could induce M&A are market deregulation, advent of new 
technology, or globalization (Virani 2007; Mensah 2011). Acquisitions provide increased market 
power through a faster access to technologies or speed of entry to new markets as compared to 
traditional growth channels (Carbonara and Caiazza 2009; Mensah 2011). From a strategic 
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reasons perspective, cross-border mergers could provide access to cheaper resources for lower 
costs or lower operating expenses, increased market share and customer base (Hopkins 2008). 
Hubris at top management team (TMT) is also often noted as a reason for M&A (Gaughan 2011; 
Martynova and Renneboog 2008; Mensah 2011; Tuch and O’Sullivan 2007). The characteristics 
of a target firm that are favored by an acquirer are smaller size (Moeller, Schlingemann and 
Stulz 2004), low debt, cash rich (low payout ratio), profitability and good corporate governance. 
The acquisition timings favor market timing to capture price and earnings momentum, or even 
opportunities exposed by changing geo-political and regulatory regimes. 
 
Target firm characteristics seem to be of significance to acquirers and it has been observed by 
many researchers as can be seen in the following two literature reviews. The first literature 
review (Gomes et al 2013) differentiated the M&A process in terms of various interrelated sub-
processes. Target firm characteristics show as factors in the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition 
stages. The pre-acquisition critical success factors considered are choice and evaluation of the 
strategic partners (due-diligence to ensure a good ‘strategic fit’ and ‘organizational fit’ between 
the parties). Paying the Right Price (over-priced premiums are often blamed for failures), Form 
of Payment (Stock versus Cash), Size Mismatches (size similarity is mostly favored), Overall 
Strategy and Accumulated Experience (continuous learning and merger process management 
helps), Courtship Period (helps reduce informational asymmetry and builds trust and confidence 
in partners), Communication (adequate levels help reduce uncertainty) and Future 
Compensation Policy (clear incentive structures aligned with M&A goals help). Some of the 
target firm characteristics also manifest as important post-acquisition success factors to ensure 
a proper management of the new organization.  
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The second fairly comprehensive literature review by Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter 
and Davison (2009) also shows the significance of Target firm characteristics as antecedents and 
moderators. The related antecedents are Value Creation (Market Power, Efficiency, Resource 
redeployment, Market Discipline) and Firm Characteristics (Acquisition Experience, Firm strategy 
and position). The Moderators also included Firm Characteristics (Performance, Size, and 
Acquirer Experience). The M&A performance as well as the performance of activists in the M&A 
context can be tested with relation to the firm characteristics. 
 
2.3. Closest related studies 
There is sufficient market interest as well as confusion around the areas of activism and M&A, 
by themselves. The subject of activism in the context of M&A has not been widely researched. 
We observe three researches that come close to this study. First paper is by Greenwood and 
Schor (2009) who made a key observation that the best returns in activism are observed only 
when the target firm gets acquired. The second conference paper is by Guo, Paudyal, Utham 
and Xing (2015) where they attribute the high returns to ability of activists to seek higher 
premiums from acquirers affected by hubris. The third paper is by Brav, Jiang and Kim (2013) 
where they tracked plant level data to understand long term post-acquisition effect of activism. 
 
Greenwood and Schor (2009) are amongst the first to observe that the best returns in activism 
are observed only when the target gets acquired. Their study was based on SEC filings data from 
the period 1996-2006 in the U.S. They questioned the argument of a forced change at a firm by 
the activists. In support of activists’ ability to extract higher premiums, they suggested an 
alternate hypothesis that hedge funds are effective at identifying undervalued companies, 
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locating potential partners for them and removing opposition to a takeover. We concur with 
their argument and observations that activists play a role in securing a target. To add qualitative 
reasoning, we attribute the skill of activists to their insightfulness that helps the firm realize its 
weakness, their action orientation and ability to bring in a lasting change that shakes the target 
firm to its core and motivates its management to perform. Greenwood and Schor (2009) 
suggested future researchers to examine the post-acquisition performance for the acquirer.  
  
We were excited when we stumbled upon a paper that was presented at the Midwest Finance 
Association 2015 conference in March 2015 by Guo, Paudyal, Utham and Xing (2015). However, 
unlike its title, the subject of value creation in acquisitions was barely touched upon. The paper 
had discussed short-term (3-day, 5-day, 11-day) returns around activist intervention and 
acquisition announcement dates. It noted that activists take better advantage of firms affected 
by hubris to extract higher premiums. Other than the observations in the post-acquisition short-
term event returns, the paper missed to build a theoretical rationale for its hypothesis or 
empirical observations. It is difficult to conclude whether the hypotheses were originally 
targeted or whether it was a conclusion that was drawn later based on the observed results of 
the analysis. Considerable questions can be raised about the generalization of the data sample 
too. The study had a hand picked a sample of 42 activists from the website of 13DMonitor.com 
(that lists 71 activists presently) and has missed some prominent activist names. It observed that 
64.29% of the deals were between the acquirer and the target from the same industry. The 
study missed to explain the impact of industry, experience, relationships or networking in its 
hypotheses. With a lack of good theoretical support or qualitative arguments besides hubris, the 
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study fails to explain the reasons that can lead to development of any new understanding; and 
so the study makes a limited contribution to knowledge.  
   
Brav, Jiang and Kim (2015) observed that the current literature on hedge fund activism has not 
explicitly identified the underlying sources of value creation by hedge fund activists. So, in a 
unique study of its kind, they studied the long-term effect of hedge fund activism on the 
productivity of target firms using plant-level information from the U.S. Census Bureau. They 
matched the plant observations to hedge fund activism events from 1994 to 2007, to examine 
the dynamics of production efficiency for firms targeted by activists (measured by total factor 
productivity (TFP), and the gains in efficiency due to the reallocation of target firms’ plants). By 
following plants that were sold after intervention by activists, they found that these results 
reveal that hedge fund activism leads to a significant improvement in the production efficiency 
and profitability for targeted firms, particularly in competitive industries. Their effort is 
praiseworthy because of their rigorous approach. They also showed that measuring 
performance using the Compustat data is likely to lead to a downward bias because target firms 
experiencing greater improvement post-intervention are also more likely to disappear from the 
Compustat database.  
 
Brav, Jiang and Kim (2015) note that Target firms’ productivity deteriorates during the two years 
leading to the activist intervention to a level similar to that of the control plants, but then 
rebounds to the pre-activism level two years post-activism. Their study is the first to observe a 
positive “spillover effect” of activism on the industry peers of targeted plants. Further, plants 
that operate in an industry repeatedly targeted by hedge fund activists also experience a 
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significant improvement in productivity even though they are not direct targets. Thus, they 
demonstrate that activism helps by facilitating efficient reallocation of corporate assets. They 
observe that sold plants exhibit falling productivity and profitability, prior to their sale. However, 
the sold plants experience greater improvement in the hands of the new owners, suggesting 
that hedge funds facilitate the matching to new owners who can operate the underperforming 
plants more efficiently. 
 
2.4. Hypotheses 
In the prior sections we noticed that the existing literature as well as prior research has been 
divided on the outcome of activism and M&A. We also articulated the theoretical rationale for 
the beliefs expressed in the story of activism. The present set of hypotheses is an extension of 
the beliefs as it leads to the outcomes for activism and M&A jointly. 
 
We had observed from literature that activists are good at identifying firms that have an 
untapped potential (Boyson and Mooradian 2011; Nain and Yao 2013). We also observed from 
multiple studies that they are good at improving performance at the target firm (Goodwin, 
Singh, Slipetz, Rao 2014; Brav, Jiang, Kim 2012; Bebchuck et al 2013). The activists have been 
observed to be smart and who are good at using many tactics that can help them with their 
objectives. Quoting age old wisdom used in common parlance, the activists are good at showing 
the carrot and the stick, as needed, to the firm during their engagement with it, to obtain 
favorable returns. On one hand, the activists use their own thorough research and findings 
about the firm, its competitors and the market to encourage the firm towards achieving better 
performance – thus creating a picture of a well-positioned firm with returns that look promising 
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(show the carrot). On the other hand, the activists challenge the management through the use 
of threats followed with actions that forces the management to bring changes at the firm to 
achieve better performance (use the stick).  
 
Thus using a hostile approach where needed (Boyson and Mooradian 2011), the activists add 
color to their portrayal of a well-positioned firm with returns that look promising. To help 
recollect, our first research Question is: Is activist led acquisition better than others for the 
target firm? This question looks at how hedge fund target firm shareholders benefit from being 
acquired using quantitative and qualitative measures. To simplify the understanding we decided 
to examine this question from three quantifiable factors: the price premium, the count of bids 
and the form of the payment.  
   
We believe that the stock market has taken a note of the activists’ abilities to bring in positive 
changes to their target firms (as shown in the short term and long term event studies around 
activist announcements of their engagement with a target firm). The changes to a target firm 
that activists help bring in, also leads to an improved marketability of the target firm. We believe 
that it shall get reflected in the price premium offered for the target firm by an acquirer as well 
as in the interest (count of bids) received by the target firm. We believe that the price premium 
as well as the interest in the firm shall be more for an M&A case where an activist was involved 
as compared to an M&A case where an activist was not involved. Hence the two hypotheses: 
H1.a. Activist influenced M&A shall lead to higher premium for target firm shareholders, as 
compared to others. 
 51 
 
H1.b. More bids shall be observed for the target firm in an activist influenced M&A deal, as 
compared to others.  
 
Cash as a form of payment is considered more liquid in general. Cash also is favored by activists 
over dealing with stock when they show their activist intentions (Greenwood and Schor 2009). 
Cash has also shown better returns in the M&A studies. So from a general reciprocity 
perspective and the power of liquidity, we expect cash offers to be the favored vehicle for 
payment in the activist led M&A cases too. This led us to the hypothesis: 
H1.c. We shall observe more cash offers than stock for the target by the acquirer in activist led 
M&A. 
 
Our second research question is: Are activist hedge funds equally good in generating merger or 
acquisition related value for target firm shareholders? This question compares the abilities of 
hedge funds by classifying them based upon their prior overall experience, their experience in 
the industry of the target firm and the amount of the ownership interest that the activists have 
in the target firm. 
 
Through the literature review we observed that prior knowledge gained through experience in 
an industry, total overall experience that offers the practice needed to improve the learning and 
self-performance of activists helped them extract better performance from their target firms 
(Boyson and Mooradian 2011). We expect that these attributes along with the proven ability of 
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the activists to improve firm performance shall help them seek better acquisition premium too. 
Hence the hypotheses: 
H2.a. An activist with prior experience in the industry of target firm shall get better premium 
for the target. 
H2.b. An activist with prior overall experience shall get better premium for the target than 
when a lesser experienced activist is involved. 
 
It seems natural that as ownership interest of an investor increases it becomes more concerned 
about his or her investment in the firm and increases his or her engagement with the target 
firm. The increased engagement leads to higher expectations for a better performance and shall 
get reflected in the higher premium for the target firm. Hence the hypothesis: 
H2.c. An activist with greater ownership in the target firm shall get a higher premium for the 
target. 
 
Our third research question is: Does an activist involvement in a merger or acquisition lead to 
better post-acquisition performance for the acquirer? The smart activists through their use of 
skills of encouragement and threats shake the target firm to its core, leading to a self-realization 
of its un-tapped potential ability to perform better and execute on a superior strategy. The self-
realization and the other firm-wide changes brought in due to the activist influence stick on like 
a momentum effect with the target firm, where it continues to perform better for a long time 
even after it gets acquired (Brav, Jiang and Kim 2012). The belief also finds support from studies 
that analyzed the performance improvement (spill-over) effects of activism on peer firms that 
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were not directly affected by activism (Lee and Park 2009; Gantchev, Gredil and Jotikasthira 
2013). Thus we can expect that the target firm continues to perform better even after it gets 
acquired. Hence the hypothesis: 
H3.a. Post-acquisition performance for the acquirer of an activist targeted firm shall be higher 
than acquirers of non-activist targeted firms. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The rest of the chapter contains a discussion of the data sources and definitions used in this study 
before we move on to discuss the methods. 
3.1. Data collection 
This study involved pulling different types of data from multiple sources. We start the process by 
examining data related to activism and then follow it with data related to Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A). Subsequently we discuss the data used for measuring the stock and 
financial performance of the activism related M&A outcomes.  
 
3.1.1. Activism data 
Most of at the investor activism related studies have focused on the use of 13D filings as their 
source of data. In the USA, section 13(d) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act requires 
investors who are beneficial owners holding over 5% of shares with active interests to file 
Schedule 13D (and Schedule 13G for shareholders with passive interests), within 10 days of the 
date when their total holding reaches 5% or more of the total shares for a firm. 
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The shareholders are also required to inform the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of 
any material change in their ownership in a timely manner. The SEC promotes electronic filing of 
information and the filings can be freely accessed by the public using the internet from the SEC’s 
EDGAR database (or via S&P Capital IQ database via a paid subscription). The most important 
information that the Schedule 13D filing collects is the activist’s intent, as captured in Item 4 
“Purpose of Transaction”. The filing also contains many other details about the activist firm, the 
target firm, the ownership, the purchase details, etc. that could be used for further analysis to 
develop a richer understanding. In the absence of a reliable centralized database for hedge fund 
activism events, the most reliable source for such events comes from the Schedule 13D filings 
(Brav, Jiang and Kim 2010).  
 
A schedule 13D form does not have a simple check-box to indicate the filer’s intentions. Instead, 
the schedule 13D form has a free-form text entry field (Item 4: ‘Purpose of Transaction’) where 
the filer can express his or her intent. One has to read through the filing documents to interpret 
the true intent of the filer.  A variation of interpretations between individuals causes significant 
difficulties for research and poses considerable challenges for individuals and other smaller 
investors who lack the resources to scan through scores of filings to identify opportunities. 
Some commercially available 13D filing databases parse through item 4 (‘Purpose of 
Transaction’) of the 13D filings to extract the motives of the activist investor. One can raise 
quality concerns about the interpretation of an investor’s motives and their categorization by 
the automated parsers. Since commercial databases are driven by financial gains primarily, 
some of these databases focus on events related to firms greater than $100 million worth only 
(for example 13Dinsights.com). This leaves a large gap in research about smaller firms and 
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makes it difficult to understand the role of other drivers, if any, that affects these investments. 
To add complexity, certain commercial databases store only the electronically filed Schedule 
13D forms (example EDGAR), while others contain paper filings as well as electronic filings 
(example Thomson Reuters database). The databases also vary by the amount of content that is 
available. Irrespective of the concerns, the extent of effort involved and attention to detail that 
is exercised by the researchers to determine the intent of a 13D filing is commendable. 
 
Our sample of activism cases comprises the hand collected activism cases by fellow researcher 
and cohort member Shane Goodwin (from Goodwin, Singh, Slipetz and Rao 2014). We are 
grateful to Shane for allowing use of his personal database that he has created and maintains 
using general intelligence from media and other specialist sources. This database is more 
comprehensive and contains activism cases that did not involve 13D filings alone. We randomly 
selected above 300 events from the activism database to cross-check the accuracy of the 
information from the SEC filings and were satisfied with the outcome. 
 
We started with 5728 cases of activist events from our hand collected data (years 1984 through 
2014) of USA based target firms. We divided it into two groups: A. the cases that led to an M&A 
subsequently within the next five years and B. the cases that did not lead to an M&A. Set A 
comprises a count of 1977 items; that is about 40% of all activist events and represents the 
activist events that are in-scope for this study. Set B comprises approximately 60% of the activist 
events, but is not M&A focused and so it shall be treated as out-of-scope for this study. 
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3.1.2. Mergers and Acquisition data 
Mergers and Acquisitions data can be obtained from the Schedule 14A (DEFM14A) filings at the 
SEC and can be accessed using the SEC’s EDGAR database (www.SECInfo.com). PREM14A filings 
are described by the SEC as a preliminary proxy statement relating to a merger, acquisition, or 
disposition. PREM14C filings are described by the SEC as a preliminary information statements 
relating to merger or acquisition. DEFM14A filings are described by the SEC as a definitive proxy 
statement relating to a merger, acquisition, or disposition. DEFM14C filings are described by the 
SEC as a definitive information statement relating to merger or acquisition. To save us the hassle 
of parsing through the various filings, at the SEC, we chose to obtain the Mergers and 
Acquisition data from the SDC Platinum commercial database. 
 
3.1.3. Stock data 
For the event studies, we used the database provided by The Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP). It was accessed using the Eventus software (published by Cowan Research, LC) 
hosted at the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) system by the University of Pennsylvania.  
 
3.1.4. Financial data 
We used the Compustat database from Standard & Poor's (S&P) for obtaining the financial 
accounting performance measures data for the target and acquirer firms. Our databases did not 
contain the ownership information of activists in their target firms. So we scanned through the 
S&P Capital IQ database as well as the various filings at the SEC’s EDGAR database to hand-
collect the ownership details for over 300 cases that were picked randomly from the Activism 
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dataset. Further, we drew random samples from our datasets and checked them against other 
sources of similar information, the popular media or the internet and were satisfied with the 
overall level of data quality. 
 
3.2. Data Organization 
3.2.1. Datasets 
We created four datasets to help organize the way we analyzed and reported our findings, 
namely: “Activism”, “NonActivism”, “CompNonActivism” and “CompActivism” respectively. We 
obtained details about the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals having an enterprise value 
exceeding 10 million dollars (USD) from the SDC Platinum database for period 1980 through 
middle of 2015. The “Activism” dataset was created by using the CUSIP of the firms targeted by 
Activists (group A above) to extract the M&A cases where the target of the acquirer was also the 
target of the activists. The “NonActivism” dataset contains the remaining M&A cases where the 
target of acquirers had not been targeted by the activists. We created a third sample dataset 
“ComparableNonActivism” comprising a control group extracted from the “NonActivism” 
dataset, by closely matching the characteristics (Timing of M&A announcement, Industry Group, 
Firm Size and Prior Performance) of the cases in the dataset “Activism”. Similarly, we created a 
fourth sample dataset “ComparableActivism” to represent another control group extracted from 
the “Activism” dataset, by closely matching the characteristics of the cases in the 
“ComparableNonActivism” dataset. A reverse lookup was used to confirm that the datasets 
were appropriately constructed. 
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Activism dataset: To create the “Activism” dataset we selected the M&A cases where the target 
firm also happened to have been the firm that was targeted by Activists during the 5 years prior 
to the announcement of the M&A deal or where the Activists targeted the firm after the M&A 
deal was announced but before the M&A became effective. The 6-digit CUSIP code was used to 
match the target firms between the Activism and M&A databases. Thus, we arrived at a sample 
of 1977 cases in the activism dataset. We observed that 60% of the activism cases did not lead 
to a merger or acquisition (M&A), while only 40% of Activism cases led to a subsequent M&A. 
This observation has been similar to the findings of earlier researchers who found acquisitions to 
be a high or increasing outcome of activism (Greenwood & Schor 2007; Burnett, Zu, Morris and 
Rodriguez 2011; Franks, Grant & Wagner 2015). In our observation of the activism cases that 
were followed by an M&A event; M&A announcement followed Activism campaign within the 
first year for half (50%) of the cases, followed by about 70%/80%/90%/100% cases during the 
second/third/fourth/fifth year respectively. We did not see any significant difference in the time 
taken between announcement of M&A and it becoming effective: all three datasets showed 
M&A becoming effective during the first year in about 80% cases and above 95% cases during 
the second year. 
 
NonActivism dataset: Our “Non-Activism” dataset comprises 23357 cases where we found that 
the targets of M&A were either not targeted by activists or where the activists had also targeted 
the same M&A target firm more than 5 years prior to the announcement of the corresponding 
M&A deal or where the activism intent of the activists for the target firm of the M&A was 
announced or became known after the respective M&A deal became effective.  
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ComparableNonActivism dataset: Using prior research as a guiding light, the comparable non-
activism dataset was created as a controlled group or subset of the non-activism dataset that 
could be considered as comparable to the cases in the activism dataset based on four key 
criteria: timing, size, financial performance and industry. We used 6 months around the M&A 
announcement date as the criteria to match for the timing. To obtain cases with a similar 
financial performance, we used a band of 50% around a ratio of the earnings before income tax 
and depreciation (EBITDA) to the total value of the assets from a year prior to the 
announcement date of the M&A at the target firm. To obtain target firms with similar size 
between the activism and M&A target firms, we selected firms based on a band of 50% around 
the enterprise value of the target firm from a year prior to the M&A announcement date. 
Similar to a considerable amount of prior research, and to ensure acceptable diversity among 
the comparable non-activism target firm samples, we used a match on the first two digits of the 
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code that reflects the major industry group. Thus, we 
arrived at 1239 sample cases for the “comparable non-activism” dataset and used it here in the 
research as the control group. 
 
ComparableActivism dataset: Using the “comparable non-activism” dataset, we identified the 
corresponding 770 matching cases from the “Activism” dataset to create the “Comparable 
Activism” dataset.  
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3.3. Variable Definitions 
Premium: Premium usually reflects the gains (or losses) reflected in the change of a stock price 
of a firm between two points of time that its shareholder can benefit from. The higher is the 
premium, as seen in the higher price of the stock of a firm, the higher is the gain for the 
shareholders of that firm. A Premium is calculated with reference to a certain event or point in 
time. In this research we consider the premium with reference to the announcement of the 
M&A deal. 
 
Premium related to announcement of Activism versus Premium related to announcement of 
M&A:  
Please note that the premium observed in most activism studies relates to the increase in price of 
the target firm (of activism) as a result of the activism campaign and is with reference to the 
activism campaign announcement date (irrespective of whether the event is related to an M&A or 
not). Those studies do not enter the M&A context like we do here. This study does not refer the 
Premium related to the announcement of Activism. 
In this research, we refer the premium with reference to the M&A announcement event 
(irrespective of whether it is related to an activism event or not). 
 
Prem_4w_BefAnnDate: We consider that 4 weeks is a sufficient gap of time between the 
reference point used to compute the premium on the stock price of a target firm and its M&A 
announcement event date. We used the field representing the premium 4 weeks prior to the 
M&A announcement date from the SDC Platinum database as a measure of premium value 
 62 
 
(expressed in percentage) for the shareholders of the target firm in a M&A transaction. Using 
randomly picked samples, we computed the value separately and cross-checked to validate that 
the value in the SDC database matched the relative change in the stock price of the target firm 
from the start of the 4 week time period and the M&A announcement date. 
 
Num_Of_Bidders: We used the count of bidders as a proxy to obtain the count of bids that were 
made during a M&A transaction for a target firm. More bids or more bidders for a target 
indicate more interest from possible acquirers. More bids also reflect fair competition and 
chances to get a fair value for the target firm. In fact, some of the activism events occur to 
prevent a target firm from getting undersold quietly to a preferred acquirer or to prevent an 
under-the-table deal with an acquirer in exchange for private or limited benefits to the board or 
management of a target firm that could hurt the interest of the general shareholders. The count 
of bids values for the M&A transactions in this research were obtained from the count of 
bidders field present in the SDC Platinum database.  
 
Cash Offer Vs. Stock Offer: Many forms of payment for a target firm could be used in a M&A 
transaction: Cash, Stock or others or any combination of these. Cash has the highest liquidity 
and is simple to understand from a value perspective. Cash settlement usually involves no 
conversions either (except may be for different currencies) and are also easy to settle. Hence, 
we believe that Activists would prefer cash offers over other forms of payment. SDC Platinum 
database provides three fields to reflect the form of payment used in a M&A transaction: 
percentage of cash, percentage of stock and percent of other. We created a dummy variable 
CashOnly with a value 1 if the percentage of cash was 100 and a value 0, if otherwise. Similarly, 
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we created a dummy variable StockOnly with a value 1 if the percentage of stock was 100 and a 
value 0 otherwise. We created a variable OtherOrMixed and assigned a value 1 if it was neither 
100 percent cash or stock and 0 otherwise.  
 
PriorExp_Act: We examined our activism dataset and created a dummy variable PriorExp_Act 
that was assigned a value based on the count of prior instances of activism with the various 
target firms that the activist had been involved with. The magnitude of this variable was used to 
determine the prior overall experience of the activist for the respective target firm. 
 
PriorExp_Act_Ind: We examined our activism dataset and created a dummy variable 
PriorExp_Act_Ind that was assigned a value based on the count of prior instances of activism 
with firms that the activist had in the same industry. We considered a match on the first two 
digits of the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code of the target firm as an indicator of firms 
from the same industry. The magnitude of this variable was used to determine the prior overall 
experience of the activist in the industry of the respective target firm. 
 
3.4. Post-Acquisition Performance measures  
A focus on short term abnormal market return around activism or M&A announcement event 
appears to be the most commonly used performance measure in finance and strategic 
management (Haleblian et al 2009). To determine the benefit of an M&A transaction to an 
acquirer firm and its shareholders we measure the outcome in terms of the financial 
performance of the acquirer firm as well as the performance of the stock price of the acquirer 
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for the long term (up to 5 years after the M&A transaction became effective). We use the return 
on assets (ROA) as a measure of the financial accounting performance for the acquirer. We 
compute Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) using Market Model method, Market Adjusted 
returns method and the four-factor Fama French Momentum methods and use them as 
measures of stock price based performance. We also compute the Buy and Hold Abnormal 
returns (BHAR) using the Fama French Momentum method and use it as a measure of stock 
price based performance. 
 
Return on Assets (ROA): Return on Assets (ROA) is one of the popular measures of financial 
analysis using the Du Pont Identity. As the name suggests, ROA represents the profitability of 
the assets in generating revenue for the firm. It provides a good indication of the capital 
intensity of the company.  It is usually expressed as a simple numeric ratio (or percentage). ROA 
helps an investor assess the ability of a company to derive a unit (dollar) of earnings from every 
unit (dollar) of assets that it invests. ROA is used as a decision metric by the investors to 
compare the performance of firms and is watched closely by the management, existing 
shareholders and potential investors. Usually, the large scale infrastructure investment projects 
are known to have lower ROA, but could provide stable long term returns, and their ROA over 
5% may be considered good. On the other hand, some service sector or high technology firms 
may have very low assets, but could provide very high ROA, even over a shorter term. 
 
Using the Compustat database, we obtain the Earnings Before Income, Tax, Depreciation and 
Amortization (EBITDA) and the Total Assets values from the annual filings by the firms. We 
calculated the ROA as a ratio of the EBITDA to the Total Assets for the firm. 
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3.5. Event study measures 
We used the Market Model (MM) method, the Market Adjusted Returns (MAR) method and the 
Fama French Momentum (FFM) methods to obtain cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). We also 
compute the Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) using the Fama French Momentum model. 
We used the Eventus software from WRDS for the CAR and BHAR computations used in this 
research; the equation and formulas used are explained well in the Eventus User Guide (Cowan 
2007). 
 
Market Model method 
Event Studies continue to be one of the most popular methodology among researchers (Zollo 
and Degenhard 2007; Krishnakumar and Sethi 2012). It involves estimation of the normal 
returns for a firm with reference to the market using a simple linear regression as shown in the 
below equation representing a single factor market model (Cowan 2007).  
Rit = αi + βiRmt + ϵit 
Here,  
Rit is the expected return on the i
th firm at time t. 
Rmt is the rate of return of a market index at time t 
αi is the intercept term 
βi is a measure of the sensitivity of the return on the firm Rit to the returns from the 
market index Rmt 
ϵit is the error term, representing a random variable that must have a zero expected 
value, and not be correlated to the market returns Rmt; not be correlated to returns 
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from other firms Rkt (where k is different from j); should not have auto-correlation; and 
be homoscedastic.  
The Abnormal Return (AR) can thus defined to be 
Ait = Rit – ( i + iRmt) 
Where, i and i are regression estimates of αi and βi. We used ordinary least squares (OLS) for 
estimation of the regression coefficients used in this research.  
The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) over a range of time, say between T1 and T2, shall 
compute the sum of the AR for the periods from T1 to T2, for the respective firm j. The Average 
Abnormal Return (AAR) is a simple arithmetic average of AR over the given time range (for 
example 180 days). The Cumulative Average Abnormal return (CAAR) over a range of time for N 
firms, say between T1 and T2, shall compute the average of CAR for the periods from T1 to T2, 
for the N firms by adding all CARs and dividing by N. 
 
Market Adjusted Returns (MAR) model 
A market adjusted return value represents the excess of the return from a firm over its 
corresponding market return. The MAR for a firm j is computed by subtracting the return for the 
market index at time t (Rmt) from the stock for firm j (Rjt).   
Ajt = Rjt - Rmt 
The other definitions for CAR, AAR and CAAR follow the same process as the market model.   
Fama French Momentum (FFM) model 
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The Fama French Momentum (FFM) model combines the three factor Fama French model 
(1993) with the momentum factor suggested by Carhart (1997). A separate estimation period 
can be used for the parameters introduced in the below FFM equation, beyond those borrowed 
from the Market Model equation: 
Rjt = αj + βjRmt + sjSMBt + hjHMLt + ujUMDt + ϵjt 
Here, SMBt is the average return on small market-capitalization portfolio minus the average 
return on three large market-capitalization portfolios. Its coefficient sjt measures the sensitivity 
of Rjt to the difference between small and large market-capitalization stock returns.  
HMLt is the average return on two high book-to-market equity (growth) portfolios minus the 
average return on two low book-to-market equity (value) portfolios. Its coefficient hjt measures 
the sensitivity of Rjt to the difference between the stock returns of the value and growth 
portfolios.  
UMDt is the average return on two high prior-return portfolios minus the average return on 
two low prior-return portfolios. Its coefficient ujt measures the sensitivity of Rjt to the difference 
between the high prior-return stock returns and low prior-return stock returns.  
The Abnormal Return (AR) for the FFM model can be estimated using the equation: 
Ajt = Rjt – ( j + jRmt + ŝjSMBt + ĥjHMLt + ūjUMDt) 
Here the coefficient j, j, ŝj, ĥj, ūj cab be estimated using regression for αj, βj, sj, hj, uj. We have 
used ordinary least squares (OLS) method for regression estimation in this research. 
The other definitions for CAR, AAR, and CAAR follow the same process as described in the 
market model.    
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3.6. Statistical Tests 
Basic Statistics: To understand the characteristics of a variable and its distribution we computed 
the mean, trimmed mean (1%), median, standard deviation and other general measures related 
to a univariate distribution. We use the Student’s t-test (that compares a sample distribution to 
a normal distribution) to check if the mean of a distribution is different from the population 
mean (zero). We have used the symbols *, **, ***, **** to show the statistical significance of 
the mean determined using the Student’s t-test at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels 
respectively. A symbol ~ indicates that the p-value for the t-test indicated that the mean value is 
not statistically significant and here, we advise to use the trimmed mean value if it was found to 
be significantly different than zero as well. We used the SAS software to compute the statistical 
results and have included the basic statistics tables in the appendix for all variables of 
significance that were used in this research. 
 
Understanding the Distributions: We started with basic tests of normality to understand the 
type of the distribution and considered the results from the Shapiro-Wilk test (when sample 
had less than 2000 cases) and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (for datasets with above 2000 
cases). We do not report the tests of normality. We also relied on understanding the 
distributions through visualization techniques (some plots are available in the Appendix sections 
later).  
Comparing the distributions: We used parametric tests as well as non-parametric tests to 
compare the distributions of the samples/datasets. The parametric tests rely on the shape or 
form of the distribution (example normality) or its parameters (for example mean, standard 
deviation, etc.). The parametric tests used to compare the distributions are: the Pooled t-Test 
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and the Satterthwaite t-Test. They represent different methods for computing the standard 
error of the difference between the means of a variable that is drawn from the two samples. 
The Pooled t-Test assumes that the two sample populations have equal variances. The 
Satterthwaite t-Test does not assume that the populations have equal variances. We conducted 
the t-Tests for a 95% confidence level (Alpha = 0.05). These test scores are shown as a pair of t-
Value & its significance or p-value that is shown in parentheses. The respective t-Test score (t 
Value) and its associated p-value (Pr > |t|) helps check and compare whether the mean for the 
first sample differs significantly from the mean for the corresponding other sample. The p-value 
is the two-tailed probability computed using the t distribution. It is the probability of observing a 
greater than or equal absolute t-value under the null hypothesis (H0: The two means are the 
same or that the difference between the means from the two samples is zero).  For a one-tailed 
test, we can halve this probability (p-value). When interpreting the results, a p-value that is less 
than our pre-specified alpha level (here 0.05), shall help us conclude that the difference 
between the means of the two sample distributions is significantly different from zero (or that 
the distributions have different mean values). A p-value that is greater than or equal to alpha 
(here 0.05) indicates a non-highly significant p-value, and supports the conclusion of a non-
significant difference between the means of the samples being tested. We examined (but not 
reported) the F-test score and its associated probability or p-value (Pr > F) from the Folded-F 
test that is used to compare the variance of the two samples. A p-value < Alpha (0.05) indicates 
that the variances are not equal and recommends use of the Satterthwaite test. A p-value >= 
Alpha (0.05) indicates that the difference in the variances is not statistically significant and 
recommends the use of the Pooled test for the comparison of the means. 
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Non-parametric tests seem enticing because they make no assumptions about the shape or 
parameters of distributions being compared. However, the generality of non-parametric tests 
comes at the cost of making them less accurate than parametric tests: for example where the 
shape of the distribution is normal and the tests may also require a comparatively larger sample 
size. The results from the non-parametric tests can also be difficult to interpret than the results 
from the parametric tests (for example the mean of ranks does not tell much about the data), 
thus making them useful in some cases but not universally applicable either. We used the non-
parametric tests: Wilkoxon and Kruskal-Wallis; to compare pairs of samples and to check if the 
respective samples arise from different distributions, or not. In simple terms when comparing 
the distributions drawn from the two samples for a variable, these tests check whether the 
distribution of the variable is the same across the different groups, or is not the same.  The 
Wilkoxon (Rank Sum) test is used primarily to indicate if the medians are different between the 
concerned sample and the activist target sample. The Wilcoxon test is used as an alternative to 
the t-test when the population cannot be assumed to be normally distributed. Even with 
normality assumptions, the efficiency of the Wilcoxon test results compares well (95%) with the 
t-test. In the results used here, the Normal Approximation Z statistic is quoted for the Wilcoxon 
test and it includes a continuity correction of 0.5. In the result tables, the Z-score is followed by 
its corresponding One-Sided p-value (Pr > Z) and the Two-Sided p-value (Pr > |Z|) respectively in 
parentheses. The Kruskal-Wallis test also compares the medians across the samples. Here, the 
null hypothesis (H0) is that the medians of all groups are equal; and the alternative hypothesis 
(H1) states that at least the population median of one group is different from the population 
median of at least one other group. The Kruskal-Wallis test score is reported here as the Chi-
Square statistic and its significance or p-value (Pr > Chi-Square) as shown in the parentheses. 
The tests were conducted for 95% confidence level (Alpha = 0.05). A p-value that is less than 
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alpha (0.05) indicates a highly significant p-value, and supports the conclusion of a significant 
difference between the samples being tested. A p-value that is greater than or equal to alpha 
(0.05) indicates a non-highly significant p-value, and supports the conclusion of a non-significant 
difference between the samples being tested. 
 
We have also used the McNemar’s test to compare the binary outcomes of questions (for 
example here we checked for above or below the mean/median value) between two variables. 
The results get arranged in a two-way contingency table.  The null hypothesis for the McNemar’s 
test assumes that the two questions with binary outcomes get answered correctly or incorrectly 
at the same rate (or that the contingency table appears symmetric). Where relevant, we also 
analyzed the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient to understand the strength and direction of 
relationship between variables and reported its significance.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Results and Analysis 
We shall use the earlier established order of the key research questions and the hypotheses to 
discuss the analysis and results in this section. 
H1.a. Premium for target during M&A 
H1.a. Activist influenced M&A shall lead to higher premium for target firm shareholders, as 
compared to others. 
To ensure an appropriate balance between going out too far from or close to the event date, we 
chose the premium computed from a period four weeks prior to the M&A announcement date. 
We compared the premium percentages across the datasets: Activism, Comparable Activism, 
Comparable Non-Activism and All Non-Activism. We excluded premium values that were 
negative or above 500% to reduce the effect of outliers. We observed that premium earned by 
target firm shareholders during the 4 weeks that led to the M&A announcement, for activism 
cases averaged 34% (median 25% and 1%-trimmed-mean at 32%) from a sample of 1977 cases, 
as compared to an average 21% (median 3% and 1%-trimmed-mean at 18%) from a sample of 
23357 cases for all of M&A that was not preceded by activism. 
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It is interesting to note that a sample of 1239 “comparable non-activism” related cases also stayed 
closer to the general “non-activism” cases and had an average premium value of 25% (median 
15% and 1%-trimmed-mean at 23%). Similarly, the sample of 770 cases from the “comparable 
activism” dataset stayed closer to the general “Activism” dataset cases and had an average 
premium value of 29% (median 23% and 1%-trimmed-mean at 28%).  These results were found 
to be statistically significant using parametric as well as non-parametric measures at the 99th 
percentile or higher (details are shown in the appendix section 6.4.1.1.). We observed very strong 
support for our hypothesis H1.a. 
 
Prior research (usually with lesser data and from specific economic cycles) had observed that the 
best gains in activism, around the date of “Activists announcement” come from targets that get 
acquired subsequently (Greenwood and Schor 2009). Our research accepted the challenge to look 
beyond this stage to analyze the subsequent gains from the M&A announcement event, in the 
shorter term. We also used a much larger data sample that overlaps the data used in most research 
and spans multiple economic cycles. It could be argued that the media highlights the presence of 
activists and thus helps market the target firm to potential acquirers. Please note from the prior 
research that the price of targets of activism usually gets inflated initially when activists target 
them (the activism announcement event date) – irrespective of the subsequent M&A 
announcement or not. As we observe that about 40% of the activism cases lead to an M&A, it can 
be argued that the premium associated with the announcement of activism should have already 
captured some share of the subsequently anticipated M&A announcement too. This makes us 
believe that our results are conservative because the 4 week premium we observe does not 
include: (i) the activism related premium around the time of activist engagement with its target; 
(ii) the acquisition premiums discounted at the time of the initial acquisition of the target by the 
activists.    
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Please also note that the premium for the comparable non-activism related M&A cases is not very 
different from the general non-activism cases, so what is special about the activism related M&A 
cases that they seek such a high M&A premium? Activists are known to study their targets well 
and strike at opportune moments for example at times of institutional fire sales (Gantchev and 
Jotikasthira 2015; Zhu 2014) and it demonstrates their superior ability to utilize information and 
make the best out of the opportunity. Is being opportunistic about an investment decision and 
executing astutely with precision a bad call? Would a reader of this article not do so, if it was 
legal and did not hurt anyone? As more buyers converge to a stock, the increased interest drives 
the price up, thus increasing the firm’s valuation and benefitting its existing shareholders. We 
believe that the presence of activists helps bring attention to a promising firm with an 
undervalued stock (Gantchev, Gredil and Jotikasthira 2015). It also benefits other comparable 
firms in an M&A context in two ways at least:  A. it helps boost their stock and firm value; and 
B. it motivates the management and the board to make strategic decisions to improve firm 
performance that the activists advocate for in the interest of the firm and its shareholders. 
 
However, besides seeking better stock prices, the activists take interest in their firms and use their 
superior intelligence gathering ability to demand changes of strategic significance that benefit the 
firm and its shareholders. For example, activists engage the management and the board to 
improve firm performance, curtail wasteful expenditure, limit CEO pay, bring better governance, 
consider divestiture or acquisition, strengthen stock value, return cash to shareholders, etc.  
 
Acquisition decisions are well-thought out strategic choices made by the firms with a long term 
focus and should not be considered like short-term tactical moves to gain from higher stock 
prices. We conclude that the higher premiums observed at activism led M&A announcement 
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events shows that A. acquirers believe that they are investing in a lean and mean target firm (a 
quality that can be attributed primarily to investor activism alone, at that moment); B. that they 
believe that the target firm has the potential to perform well in the long term; C. they believe that 
the target is available for the right price; D. that the activists can help make it a smoother 
acquisition by removing the impediments to success, prior to the conclusion of the acquisition; E. 
that the activists help bring a faster closure to the M&A process; and F. activists use their superior 
intelligence about the capabilities of the target to market it well to more potential acquirers in a 
stealth yet firm manner to obtain a higher premium.  
 
H1.b. Number of Bids 
H1.b. More bids shall be observed for the target firm in an activist influenced M&A deal, as 
compared to others. 
We chose the number of bidders in an M&A deal to check on the magnitude of the count of bids. 
We compared the bids across the three datasets: Activism, Comparable Non-Activism and All 
Non-Activism. We observed that the average number of Bidders for a target firm in an activist 
influenced M&A deal (Average 1.12, Trimmed-mean (at 1%) 1.10) is approximately 10% better 
than comparable non-activism related M&A deals ( Average 1.02, Trimmed-mean (at 1%) 1.00) 
as well as all non-activism M&A deals not preceded by activism (Average 1.03, Trimmed-mean 
(at 1%) 1.01). The control groups from the activism and non-activism perspective also showed a 
similar pattern: the “comparable activism” cases showed an average 1.12 bids (Trimmed-mean (at 
1%) 1.10) compared to 1.01 (Trimmed-mean (at 1%) 1.00) bids for the “comparable non-
activism” cases. These results were found to be statistically significant using parametric as well 
as non-parametric measures at the 99th percentile or higher (details are shown in the appendix 
section 6.4.2.1. ). These results show strong evidence in support for our hypothesis H1.b. 
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What is it that lures more bidders to an activism led M&A deal as compared to others? We 
observed a similar level of bids between our control group or the comparable non-activism related 
M&A deals as the general non-activism deals; and both cases were about 10% lower than the bids 
received for activism related M&A target firms. Does it indicate a higher interest in the 
expectations of future performance from activist targeted firms? As explained while analyzing the 
results of hypothesis H1.a. and in prior research that the activists help bring a sloppy or low 
performing firm back to its feet and they also help remove the impediments to its growth 
prospects (for example by  shedding of under-performing and dissenting management). We 
believe that like general shareholders who like investing in activist targets, potential acquirers 
would also like to gain from such a re-invigorated firm where the management has bought into 
the arguments of the activists and are committed to a better performance and a brighter future for 
the firm.  
 
We should also try to perform a qualitative examination of the reasons that lead to activism, to 
answer the prior question. For example, in general, a golden parachute may be available to a non-
performing executive in an M&A event, but not necessarily during an activism event. We 
randomly examined the voluminous text found in the activism related M&A context from the 
SEC filings and related news articles to develop a richer understanding. We observed numerous 
examples where activists stepped in to prevent a firm from being undersold or being sold to a 
preferred acquirer or where we found accusations that the management or the board or both 
groups from the respective target firm had agreed to an under-the-table deal to an acquisition in 
exchange for private benefits to themselves; and where the interests of the general shareholders 
were being ignored. Hence, it is our belief that activists bring fairness to the bidding process by 
making it more open and honest. Being able to attract the interest of a higher count of potential 
bidder seems natural for the activist targeted firm when we combine these arguments of fairness 
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with those used for the hypothesis H1.a., that the activists are perceived to be armed with superior 
intelligence for the target and invite attention of potential acquirers to matters of strategic 
significance for the firm and its shareholders.  
 
H1.c. Cash Offer: Mode of Payment 
H1.c. We shall observe more cash offers than stock for the target by the acquirer in activist led 
M&A  
We marked the M&A deals that had 100 percent cash form of payment as having an All Cash 
Offer. Similarly, we marked the deals with 100 percent stock form of payment as having an All 
Stock Offer. We grouped the remaining deals as having a Mixed or Other form of payment. It 
helped us compare the form of payment used in the Activism related M&A dataset. When 
considering the form of payment, we observed a much higher percentage of All Cash Offers for a 
target firm in Activist influenced M&A deals (Average 66%) than the All Stock Offers (8%) or 
Others (26%). Further, we also found more All Cash Offers for a target firm in Activist 
influenced M&A deals (Average 66%) in contrast to all non-activism (Average 50%) related 
M&A deals. The pattern of a higher All Cash Offer repeated for the control groups: “comparable 
activism” dataset (average 71%) and “comparable non-activism” (Average 55%) dataset. These 
results were found to be statistically significant using parametric as well as non-parametric 
measures at the 99th percentile (details are shown in the appendix section 6.4.3.1.). Thus, we 
observe strong support for our hypothesis H1.c. 
 
Why do activists prefer Cash only deals above Stock or mixed forms of payment? Similar, to the 
reasoning provided for the prior hypotheses H1.a. and H1.b., here too we observe that the count 
of All Cash Offers for a target firm is similar at about half the total cases for the comparable non-
 78 
 
activism and all non-activism related M&A deals; while it is at two-thirds level for the activism 
related M&A cases and the related “comparable activism” control group. It is well known that a 
position in stock is subject to uncertainty owing to numerous factors. However, cash is known to 
holds it value well irrespective of the market. It brings liquidity, agility and a hassle free 
settlement in a transaction. Stock value is subject to market volatility and other regulations, 
making it considerably less liquid and difficult to exchange as compared to cash. So it is easier to 
convince general shareholders about the future gains from a cash transaction compared to a stock 
based transaction. Activists are known to be lean, mean, fast and action oriented. Presence of 
activists during an M&A gets reflected in the demand and expectation to settle the transaction in a 
quick and clean manner. Hence, we see more all cash offers than stock in activism led M&A 
deals. 
 
H2.a. Prior Experience of Activist in Industry 
H2.a. An activist with prior experience in the industry of target firm shall get better premium 
for the target.  
We matched based on the first two digits of the SIC code (industry group), to measure the prior 
experience count for the respective activist in the industry of a specific target firm. We observed 
about 4% higher premium 4 weeks prior to the M&A announcement date for activists having 
prior experience in the industry of a target firm (Average 36%; trimmed mean 34% and median 
28%) in contrast to those who did not have prior experience in the same industry as that of the 
target (Average 32%; trimmed mean 30% and median 23%). The sample data was filtered to 
exclude cases where premium was negative or above 500% to reduce the effect of outliers in the 
activism dataset sample. These results were found to be statistically significant using parametric 
as well as non-parametric measures (details are shown in the appendix section 6.4.4.1.). We also 
note a positive correlation (8.4%) between the count of prior experience in the industry of the 
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target firm and the premium observed four weeks prior to announcement of the M&A deal. Thus, 
we observe a fair support for our hypothesis H2.a. 
 
The results confirm similar observations by prior researchers, who studied returns at target around 
activist intervention alone. We have moved the dialogue forward and created a new 
understanding into the returns around the M&A announcement stage after the firm had already 
been a target of the activists. Again, this is significant because the returns we observe do not 
include the returns observed at the M&A announcement date by the prior research. These results 
are not surprising from a qualitative perspective too. We can observe concentration of activism in 
specific industry groups when analyzing the premium four weeks prior to announcement date 
across the datasets. However, as we drill-down further and include the temporal dimension 
(observed based on yearly, 5-year or 10-year groups), we observed different patterns across 
industry groups. It requires significant intelligence gathering and study of the opportune moment 
for an activist to hone in on a specific target versus being interested in another. It leads us to 
believe that activists tend to develop a specialization or preference in certain sectors over others 
and we see it reflected in the higher premium concentration in their choice of industry group of 
their target firms. This could be a key criterion for consideration in strategic management 
research and also be a factor in predictive models of premium outcomes for investors and 
financial analysts.  
 
H2.b. Prior Overall Experience of Activist w.r.t. Premium 
H2.b. An activist with prior overall experience shall get better premium for the target than 
when a lesser experienced activist is involved. 
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Some well-known activists perform consistently well and they have done so irrespective of the 
industries of their target firms. This hypothesis was drafted to examine general experience alone 
as a skillset of activists, as compared to a specialized skill as examined in hypothesis H2.a. To 
examine this hypothesis, we computed the median value of the count of overall experiences of the 
activists, based on the events observed in our activism related M&A sample. We observed that 
the median value was 6 instances. We defined presence or absence of prior overall experience for 
an activist based upon the count of prior instance of activism falling above or below the median 
level. We observed that the average premium for activists with the higher overall experience 
sample (37%) was higher than those with lesser experience (28%). These counts had a fair 
support from the non-parametric (Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis) tests for comparing 
distributions, but did not enjoy statistically significant scores from the parametric tests (Pooled 
and Satterthwaite T-Tests). We tried to reduce the effect of outliers by excluding cases where the 
premium was negative or above 500%. When comparing distributions using the parametric tests, 
we observed low statistical significance on the unfiltered datasets, as well. From a curiosity 
perspective, we also examined this hypothesis using different amounts of prior experience (1-7 
instances) and observed similar statistical insignificance in the results that compared the 
distributions. 
 
We also checked the Pearson’s correlation coefficient and found that Prior Experience of the 
Activist (Prior_Exp_Act) had a positive correlation value 0.14606 (statistically significant at 99
th
 
percentile; Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0) to the premium four weeks prior to M&A announcement 
date for the activism cases. Thus prior experience of an activist could be a criterion for 
consideration in strategic management research and also be considered as a factor in predictive 
models of premium outcomes for investors and financial analysts. 
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Comparing the distributions and the size of the samples, we can notice that the percent of 
premium is more evenly distributed in the experienced sample, compared to that in the data 
sample of lesser overall experienced activists. Performing analysis from the data samples via 
cross-tab reports (not included) for various criteria we observe that overall experience of the 
activists could matter as it shows in the higher performance, especially for the well-known 
activists. Overall, an analysis using cross-tab reports between count of Prior overall Experience 
instances and Premium showed uneven levels, and also did not reveal any patterns or other 
significant details. The narrow spike for lesser experienced activists could indicate a matter of 
chance or insider tipping, that can be examined by future researchers. These results were found to 
be statistically insignificant using parametric measures at the 95
th
 percentile but significant at the 
90
th
 percentile (details are shown in the appendix section 6.4.5. and its subsections).  We 
conclude that we did not find very strong support for our hypothesis H2.b. We encourage future 
researchers to examine this hypothesis further from different perspectives. 
 
H2.c. Ownership Interest of Activist w.r.t. Premium 
H2.c. An activist with greater ownership in the target firm shall get better premium than 
activists with lower ownership. 
Our databases did not contain a field that represented the ownership level of activists in their 
target firms. We manually scanned through SEC filings corresponding to randomly picked cases 
from our activism dataset and created another dataset of 326 samples containing activist 
ownership percentages in their target firms. It involved manually parsing through the SEC filings 
and was performed on a case by case basis. We found that the average ownership of activists in 
the target firm was 9.94% (Median 7.175%). We divided the ownership dataset into two groups 
based on the median value. The first group was the dataset where the activists had a percentage of 
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ownership at or above the median value. The second group was the dataset where the activists 
had a percentage of ownership below the median value.   
 
In line with our hypothesis, we observed that the premium four weeks before announcement date 
had an average value 50% for the first group (At or above median ownership percent of the 
activist) and 45% for the second group (Below median ownership percent of the activist). These 
mean values by themselves seem to have a high statistical significance when using the Student’s 
T-test. Comparison of the distributions between the samples revealed poor statistical significance 
using parametric as well as non-parametric methods. We also observed that the correlation 
between the Premium and the Ownership percentage value (10%) was statistically insignificant at 
the 95
th
 (it was significant at 90
th
 ) percentile. We also created dummy variable to indicate the 
level of Premium four weeks prior to M&A announcement date as being ‘Above Median’ or 
‘Below Median’ (based on Median = 34.575% premium four weeks prior to M&A announcement 
date). The McNemar's test statistic suggests that there is a statistically significant difference in the 
proportions of above / below median level for the premium and the corresponding above / below 
the median activist ownership percentage levels. The results are shown in the appendix section 
6.4.6 and its subsections. 
 
Overall, we conclude a lack of fair support for the hypothesis H2.c. The small dataset 
(approximately 300 cases) could be a possible reason to explain the low statistical significance. 
On the contrary, the percent ownership may not suffice by itself as being a significant factor. An 
equivalent amount at stake with a lower percent of ownership in a larger firm could be more 
important for an investor than the larger percentage of ownership in a smaller firm. Since it is 
natural to believe that the motivation and interest of an investor could be aligned with the amount 
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of one’s own personal wealth at stake; a future researcher may alternately consider the percentage 
of the activist’s wealth that the activist is investing in the target firm. Another scenario that needs 
to be considered is when multiple activists join hands in a transaction to seal the deal – we did not 
examine these “wolf-pack” style of scenarios even though we observed some similar patterns 
when we scanned thorough the database. Wolf-pack scenarios in activism context alone have 
been studied and higher returns have been attributed to it (Becht, Franks, Grant and Wagner 
2015), however the analysis in a joint activism and M&A context like we do here has not come to 
light. The question of ownership of activist in a M&A context is an interesting one from strategic 
management considerations as well as financial modeling perspective. We encourage future 
researchers to continue to examine it further. 
 
H3.a. Post-Acquisition performance for acquirer  
H3.a.  Post-acquisition performance for the acquirer of an activist targeted firm shall be higher 
than acquirers of non-activist targeted firms. 
We examined the post-acquisition performance from two perspectives. A. Event study B. 
Financial performance. The event study approach used stock performance measures to compute 
the Cumulative Abnormal returns (CAR) and the Buy and Hold Abnormal returns (BHAR). The 
CAR was computed using the Market-Model (MM), the Market Adjusted Return (MAR) and the 
Fama French Momentum (FFM) methods for numerous periods (-1y, 6m, 1y, 2y, 3y, 4y and 5y) 
relative to the date when the M&A deal became effective for the target firm, using monthly 
datasets. The estimations window used was minimum 3 to maximum 36 months, at least 3 
months prior to the event date (here it’s the M&A effective date). To reduce the effect of outliers 
and ensure that our inferences provide a fair amount of general understanding for researchers as 
well as practitioners, we excluded the outliers to consider the samples that had returns (CAR, 
BHAR and ROA) between -500% and 500% only.  
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The BHAR returns were computed using the Fama French Momentum (FFM) method for similar 
time periods using the monthly dataset. Return on Assets (ROA) was computed using the annual 
financial filings by the companies. We used the CRSP database and the Eventus software 
accessible from WRDS for the event studies. We used the COMPUSTAT database (also 
accessible from WRDS) for the financial performance information. 
 
As shown in the result tables and figures (Appendix sections 6.4.7.1. and 6.4.7.3.), we observe a 
negative set of returns for the acquirers of target firms in M&A when using the Market Model 
method as well as the Fama French Momentum method to compute abnormal returns. This result 
seems to be in line with prior research that had observed negative average returns for acquirers in 
M&A. Examining the results from the Market Adjusted Returns method (Appendix section 
6.4.7.2.) also revealed negative post-acquisition performance for All Non-Activism cases; but 
interestingly, here we observed that the market adjusted abnormal returns are positive for the 
acquirers for the Activism cases (“Activism” and “Comparable Activism” datasets) and mostly so 
(albeit at a lower level) for the “Comparable Non-Activism” cases.  
 
The charts depict a clear distinct pattern to differentiate the post-acquisition performance between 
the activism and non-activism related M&A cases. Looking closer and comparing the returns 
computed using the Market Model (MM) method, we observe an increasing mean return 
(difference in CAR for 6m: 4%, 1y: 9%, 2y: 15%, 3y: 19%, 4y: 26%, 5y: 31%) for acquirers in 
the Activism dataset, as compared to the acquirers in the All Non-Activism dataset. Similarly, we 
observe an increasing mean return (difference in CAR for 6m: 1%, 1y: 4%, 2y: 4%, 3y: 4%, 4y: 
8%, 5y: 12%) for acquirers in the Activism dataset, as compared to the acquirers in the 
Comparable Non-Activism dataset. The increase in mean return (difference in CAR for 6m: 3%, 
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1y: 6%, 2y: 11%, 3y: 16%, 4y: 23%, 5y: 28%) can also be observed in the results using the 
Market Adjusted Return (MAR) method for acquirers from the Activism dataset in contrast to the 
acquirers from the All Non-Activism dataset. We found a similar pattern of increase in mean 
return (difference in CAR for 6m: 3%, 1y: 6%, 2y: 11%, 3y: 16%, 4y: 23%, 5y: 28%) in the 
results using the Fama French Momentum four factor method for acquirers from the Activism 
dataset in contrast to the acquirers from the All Non-Activism dataset. The pattern seems to 
repeat itself for BHAR too, where we see an increase in the mean return (difference in BHAR for 
6m: 2%, 1y: 3%, 2y: 8%, 3y: 14%, 4y: 23%, 5y: 34%) using the Fama French Momentum four 
factor method for acquirers from the Activism dataset in contrast to the acquirers from the All 
Non-Activism dataset. The increased returns for the Activism dataset are also considerably higher 
than those observed from the Comparable Non-Activism dataset, across all the various methods 
used to calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) as well as the Buy and Hold 
Abnormal Returns (BHAR). The very distinctive pattern shown in the visual charts simply 
repeats itself when observing the difference between the control groups too (the “Comparable 
Activism” and “Comparable Non-Activism” datasets). The spread between the CAR and BHAR 
values between activism and non-activism samples increases with an increase in the time after the 
effective date of the M&A. For details, please refer the details in the Appendix sections 6.4.7 and 
its subsections. The difference in the CAR and BHAR levels seem to support the hypothesis 3.a.  
 
When we analyzed the CAR and BHAR results, we observe varying levels of statistical 
significance to conclude that the activism sample and the non-activism samples have different 
mean values (from parametric tests: Pooled and Satterthwaite) and also have different median 
values (from non-parametric tests: Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis). The parametric tests (Pooled 
and Satterthwaite tests) to compare the mean values in the activism sample and the comparable 
non-activism sample; or between the two control groups did not show good statistical 
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significance. We observe that the non-parametric tests indicate near-fair statistical support to 
conclude that the median values are different between the activism and comparable non-activism 
samples for post-acquisition performance in the longer term. We also observe that the non-
parametric tests indicate low statistical support to conclude that the median values are different 
between the control groups (the “comparable activism” and the “comparable non-activism” 
samples), albeit for relatively much lower sample sizes. We observed satisfactory levels of 
statistical significance to conclude that the activism sample and the non-activism samples have 
different mean and median values. The statistical significance level seems to improve slightly as 
the time past the effective date of the M&A increases from 1 year to 5 years. Additionally, we 
compared the statistical characteristics of the distributions (like mean, median, standard deviation, 
skew-ness and kurtosis, etc.) and analyzed the visualizations of the distributions (like frequency 
distributions, box plots and Q-Q plots) to compare them beyond relying on certain statistical 
measures only. We note that the CAR and BHAR results provide fair amount of support to our 
hypothesis H3.a, as shown in the results in the appendix section 6.4.7.5 and its subsections.  
 
We computed Return on Assets (ROA) as a measure financial performance, for the Acquirers. 
We observed that the average ROA for the Activism sample (1y:  8.7%, 2y: 9%, 3y: 9.4%, 4y: 
9.3%, 5y: 9.3%) continued to show a higher level of performance as compared to the All Non-
Activism sample (1y: 6.8%, 2y: 6.5%, 3y: 6.6%, 4y: 6.8%, 5y: 7.1%). We also observe similar 
patterns when comparing average ROA levels across the control groups: “Comparable Activism” 
sample (1y:  8.1%, 2y: 8.5%, 3y: 8.9%, 4y: 9.0%, 5y: 8.3%) and the “Comparable Non-Activism” 
sample (1y:  3.9%, 2y: 3.7%, 3y: 3.8%, 4y: 4.1%, 5y: 4.3%). When we analyzed the ROA results, 
we observed strong levels of statistical significance to conclude that the activism dataset, the 
comparable non-activism dataset and the non-activism dataset have different mean values (from 
parametric tests: Pooled and Satterthwaite) and also have different median values (from non-
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parametric tests: Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis). We observed similar strong levels of statistical 
significance to differentiate between the sample distributions from our two control groups (the 
“comparable activism” dataset and the “comparable non-activism” dataset).  
 
The ROA levels observed in the activist related M&A dataset shows a gradual increasing trend, 
while shows a pattern of initial decline for comparable and non-activism datasets during the first 
2-3 years, before it starts to pick up again. It can be argued that the high ROA for activist related 
M&A dataset indicates that activists are selective about their targets to begin with. It is also a 
reflection of the stock selection and intelligence gathering ability of the activists, where they are 
selective about the potential and prospects of their target firm. 
 
To understand the impact of target firm size, we repeated the tests of post-acquisition 
performance (for the period after the effective date of the M&A) after filtering the datasets for 
cases that had the enterprise value of the targets to be one hundred million US dollars or above 
for the comparable activism and the comparable non-activism datasets. The results showed 
slightly different levels of CAR, BHAR and ROA, as well as slightly better statistical significance 
than the datasets where we had considered target firms that had the enterprise value of the targets 
to be ten million US dollars or above. Overall we did not observe a significant difference between 
the results and so decided not to include those results in the interest of space in this dissertation. 
 
We conducted the analysis with two other definitions of the comparable non-activism dataset (the 
control group): A. scenario (approx. 400 cases) where we tightened the percentage band around 
ROA and firm size to be -/+ 25% instead of -/+ 50%; B. scenario (approx.. 6700 cases) where we 
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relaxed the timing criteria and considered percentage band around ROA and firm size to be -/+ 
25%. In both these cases, our conclusions on the post-acquisition performance held very well in 
all the scenarios: the results and trends were directionally the same and they also had similar 
comparative distribution characteristics with slight variations in the levels of the outcomes. For 
space reasons, we have skipped including those results here. 
 
Overall, we found fair support for our hypothesis H3.a from the stock returns based on the CAR 
and BHAR measures calculated from stock information of the firms, as well as in the ROA 
derived from the financial performance measures. The findings provide sufficient support to our 
belief that activism benefits the shareholders of the target firms as well as those of the acquirers 
of the activist targeted firms.  
 
Spill-over effects 
We also conducted an additional analysis to understand the spill-over effects of activists on other 
non-activism related target firms. We divided the All Non-Activism cases into 2 groups: 
Comparable Non-Activism and Other Not-Comparable Non-Activism.  We believe that firms 
comparable to targets of activism would make similar improvements as those firms that are 
directly targeted by activists. We also believe that acquirers of these comparable non-activism 
related target firms shall thus also benefit indirectly from the Activism action elsewhere. We 
expected to see better performance in Comparable Non-Activism cases than the Other Not-
Comparable Non-Activism cases.  
 
Please refer Appendix section 6.4.8 for results of our analysis about the spill-over effect of 
activism on comparable non-activism led M&A cases. Our belief about higher premium for the 
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comparable non-activism cases, than the other non-activism cases, did not hold. We observed a 
4% lower premium for the former sample. We confirmed our beliefs about superior acquisition 
performance of the comparable non-activism cases as compared to other non-activism related 
M&A cases. The Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) measured using the Market Model (MM) 
method for the comparable non-activism dataset was about 20% higher than the other non-
comparable non-activism dataset, five years after the M&A became effective. The results had a 
fair amount of statistical significance to support the conclusion of a positive spill-over effect of 
activism on other firms and their post-acquisition performance. 
 
 
Other observations, limitations and suggestions for further research 
We tried to examine some of the factors that influence the value of the premium near the M&A 
announcement date. We also calculated the post-acquisition performance using stock returns as 
well as financial performance measures to compare between activism related M&A with non-
activism related M&A. We also lacked access to some other fields that could have helped us 
develop a richer understanding of the subject. We employed one of the largest activism databases 
used in investor activism research so far, we are concerned about the smaller samples used by 
media and other researchers to draw conclusions. 
 
The premium we observe is the premium with reference to the M&A announcement (irrespective 
of whether it is related to activism or not) and did not consider the premium related to the 
activism announcement date. We urge future researchers to consider the returns from a certain 
period prior to the activism announcement date – to calculate the gains for normal stock holders 
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who simply hold on to their stock rather than transact (buy or sell) often to gain from the related 
events. 
 
We note an impact of the timing of Activist engagement in the M&A process on the premium 
observed four weeks prior to announcement of the M&A in the Activism data sample (after 
filtering out extreme cases that had premium values less than 0% or above 500%). A slightly 
lower premium (mean 31% and median 22%) was observed in the sample (N=1243) where 
activism happened before M&A was announced and before it became effective as compared to 
the higher premium (mean 42% and median 33%) observed in the sample (N=528) where 
Activism happened after M&A was announced but before it became effective. Interestingly, it 
shows that the larger premium happened before the activists entered the M&A! The later case 
shows activists trying to gain from an M&A that they didn’t initiate; or where the activists are 
called in to help bring a smoother closure to the M&A deal; or the activists represent shareholders 
who are opposed to the M&A; or some other reason waiting to be explored. We urge future 
researchers to examine the root cause of the premium further and find ways to differentiate the 
analysis. The earlier sample also took slightly lesser time between the announcement of the M&A 
and it becoming effective than the later sample. Schedule 13D filings only happen after 
ownership level goes above 5% of stock, so unless we have a mechanism to check the activists’ 
ownership levels before announcement of activism, it is difficult to say whether their engagement 
started after the MnA announcement or they increased their stakes later. Similarly, we hope to see 
ways to detect exit by activists. We hope future researchers can better examine the choice of 
timing by activists and acquirers.  
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We suggest future researchers to try analyzing the count of bids hypothesis with more related 
classifications in the data, to develop a richer understanding of the subject. Our finding of low 
statistical significance for premium observed in cases of activism with low versus high overall 
experience needs to be re-examined further. Our findings of a higher premium returns in cases 
where activists had prior experience in the industry of target firms, raises many related questions. 
Future researchers could also investigate the aspect of the interest focus of the activists, 
geographical or zonal preferences, the influence of the network of their relationships and the role 
of affinity groups to develop a richer understanding. 
 
To understand how activists collect information about firms, we encourage future researchers to 
check if the activist intervention was a result of the intelligence gathering by the activists or as a 
result of being tipped by a member of the board or management at the target firm. We also 
observed certain activists who entered the game just before the M&A announcement date and 
closed out their position subsequently. These activists could be blamed for the reasons all 
activists are viewed as short term players. It also fans a suspicion that either these activists are 
better informed about the market and the target firms; or they have insider information; or they 
are tipped by the target firm (directors and/or management); or they are employed as scouting 
agents by the potential acquirers. For a richer understanding, we need to explore the suspicion of 
a nexus between the activists, the target or the acquirers – because the activists may be invited to 
enable a smooth merger or acquisition for the parties supporting the activists. Social and 
professional networking databases can help future management studies to explore the 
relationships between activists and smart CEOs and board members; and whether activists could 
be used as instruments to bring strategic improvement at target firms and thus benefit the 
acquirers of these target firms. 
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We hope to see more M&A related outcomes from Activism when we have access to 
comprehensive activism databases. We felt short-handed when examining the ownership stake of 
activists, as it was not available in our database. Parsing manually is very time consuming and we 
would have preferred to collect a larger sample to our satisfaction. We encourage future 
researchers who have access to this data to reexamine our hypothesis H2.c. that predicts better 
premium returns when an ownership stake is high. 
 
We also had a few other observations, not related to the hypotheses. El-Khatib (2012) had 
observed that firms receiving shareholder proposals are associated with approximately 30% 
relatively higher chance of becoming a target of a subsequent completed acquisition. Indicating 
the power of access to asymmetric information and relationships, it was argued that takeover 
likelihood increases the most for targets where the proposal sponsor also holds shares in the 
bidder firm. This could make an interesting conflict-of-interest scenario that can be studied by 
future researchers, as more data becomes available.  
 
We missed to analyze mechanisms to attribute post-acquisition performance to the activism led 
M&A and differentiate it from other confounding factors. For example the approach by Brav, 
Jiang and Kim (2013) to measure long-term performance using plant-level data is praiseworthy. 
We showed that certain characteristics like ownership stake, specialization in an industry and 
level of experience of an activist had a positive correlation to the premium observed at M&A 
announcement. Could these factors affect the long-term returns too? It would be nice to 
understand the factors that affect the performance during the post-activism intervention and the 
post-acquisition periods. Performing multivariate analysis may also help reveal the relationships 
between the factors that influence Activism in M&A outcomes. We would like to see more 
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approaches to observe long-term performance outcomes, to influence and improve strategic 
management decision making as well as predictive financial modeling. 
 
During drill-down analysis (not reported), when we included the temporal dimension (observed 
based on yearly, 5-year or 10-year groups), we observed different patterns across industry groups. 
As the number of observations became less, we lost the ability to generalize our findings across 
the classification dimensions from an academic interest perspective. On the contrary, an increased 
granularity revealed a good insight to develop a richer understanding for a practitioner or a smart 
individual investor because it unraveled patterns of concentrated activism presence with varying 
levels of number of bidders and premiums across industry groups, market levels and economic 
cycles in comparison to the comparable non-activism and all non-activism datasets. In the M&A 
context, ownership stake plays a significant role. It needs to be examined for the herding behavior 
or wolf-pack modus-operandi discussed by other researchers in the general Activism context.  
 
Unrelated to the hypotheses we examine about post-acquisition performance, but interestingly, 
we observed that the prior 1 year performance (measured using MAR method) of the acquirers 
firms happens to be about lower for acquirers of firms that had been the targets of Activism, than 
those of firms that were not targets of activism. Could it indicate some criteria that activists 
consider while seeking acquirers for the target; or is it that such acquirers seek help from activists 
to find a suitable target and strengthen their strategic plans? Since there is a sufficient gap of time 
between the announcement of an M&A and it becoming effective, there could be numerous 
reasons to explain this behavior. We hope future research shall be able to examine this further. 
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We encourage future researchers to extend the argument of the spillover effect of the activists in 
the M&A context too. Could it explain why the comparable non-activism sample shows a slightly 
improved performance than the general non-activism related M&A outcome – in terms of the 
M&A premium around M&A announcement or in terms of the post-acquisition performance of 
the firm? Hopefully future studies could find support for some of the arguments we presented 
here to explain our observations.  
 
Little research has been done to analyze the qualitative factors that could help explain the impact 
of the behavioral aspects of the outcomes related to activism. After an extensive literature review 
of M&A studies, Haleblian et al (2009) observed that vast majority of acquisition research had 
focused on larger, publicly traded corporations using mainly quantitative archival data. It 
introduces local bias towards the limited sample and hurts interpretation. We concur that it 
highlights the lack of an integrated approach, and thus limits a scholar’s ability to fully 
comprehend the phenomenon. However, this research too has been unable to address the 
qualitative aspects satisfactorily owing to time and resource constraints. Like Schoenberg (2006) 
and a few others, we too suggest the need for more in-depth interviews, case studies, grounded 
theory development, surveys and laboratory studies to develop a deeper understanding of the 
cognitive decision making process to improve the performance outcomes in M&A. Future 
researchers can use this knowledge to predict activist interest in targets and expected investment 
returns: to quench the thirst of curious investors as well as the top management at firms who 
given the new findings in this dissertation, may choose whether to love or hate the activists.
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
When we started this research, study of the performance of an acquirer of an activist target in a 
merger or acquisition context seemed a virgin area of research. Few researchers have attempted to 
connect the dots and studied activism as a possible antecedent to successful M&A performance, 
as this study, but we have barely scratched the surface and a lot more needs to be studied. We 
found that the effect of activism on their target firms and acquirers appears to be reaching much 
farther out than previously studied. The long term returns seem to last much longer than those 
who have considered activists as myopic investors and who are interested in short term gains 
only. We conclude that the momentum of performance improvements created by activism at a 
target leads to a contagion effect that contributes to the performance (improvement) of the 
acquirer firm. We also observe a spill-over effect on similar firms comparable to the targets of 
activism in the M&A context.  
 
We used extensive data from 30 recent years to examine some key questions in this research and 
during the process found the answers to confirm some of the understanding created by existing 
research, while we refute other perceived beliefs and findings from the past. Our primary 
treatment group comprised the activism related mergers or acquisitions (M&A) cases (‘Activism’ 
dataset). 
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The objective was to compare the activism cases to all the other non-activism related M&A cases 
(“Non-Activism” dataset). We created corresponding control groups by extracting the cases that 
matched on timing of M&A, industry, firm size and prior-performance of the acquirer: 
(“Comparable Activism” and “Comparable Activism” datasets).  
 
The best premium around the announcement date of the M&A deal as well as the highest post-
acquisition performance was observed at the activism related firms and their acquirers. The 
premium and performance trends of activist related M&A were followed by the “comparable 
activism”, the “comparable non-activism” and the “non-activism” datasets. We divided our 
research to examine three key questions: Is activism led M&A good for the target firm? Do all 
activists achieve similar success in fetching good premium for the target? Does activism related 
M&A benefit the acquirer?   
 
Our first research question examined the benefits of activism to the target firm. We found that the 
premium earned by shareholders when a firm targeted by activists leads to an M&A is 
approximately 30-35% as compared to approximately 15-20% for premium earned by targets in 
non-activism related M&A. Please note that we did not consider the premium that is usually 
associated with announcement of activism. Hence, the premium that we observe at a subsequent 
point around the M&A announcement date is an even more significant finding than previously 
known from the existing investor activism research. It has significant implications for firm 
valuation, scope of target selection and determination of the price to pay by the acquirers. It can 
be an important factor for strategic management planning and financial modeling considerations 
for investment decision making. 
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We also observed that activists help bring fairness and improve the marketability for a target firm 
by getting approximately 10% higher number of bids, as compared to those firms in a M&A 
transaction that are not targeted by activists. Activists also help improve liquidity by attracting 
mostly all cash offers (about two-third cases) as compared to the non-activism related M&A 
transaction (about half cases) and comparable non-activism cases. Cash offers and more bids also 
help ensure a faster and smoother closure to the M&A transaction. Our examination of these 
attributes related to M&A transactions can be used for policy considerations and refinement of 
bylaws to protect and strengthen shareholder interests. 
 
Our second research question was, are all activists similar in their performance? We found that 
activists who specialize in their sectors, through focused industry based experience obtained 
higher premium returns (36%) than others (32%) and can safely conclude that industry focused 
experience helps bring better returns in activist related M&A returns too. We found that more 
experienced activists scored considerably higher premiums (45%) than those with lesser 
experience (37%); but we could not find a very strong statistical support to differentiate between 
the distributions. We also found that activists who obtain a higher stake in their target firm get 
slightly better returns through higher premiums (50%) as compared to (45%) where they have 
lesser ownership interest in the target firm (the values were statistically significant to have a mean 
value different than 0), but we could not find statistical significance to draw a confident 
conclusion when differentiating the distributions. Our examination revealed a positive correlation 
of the above activist attributes to the premium related to an M&A transaction. These factors can 
be used for predictive modeling, investment planning as well as strategic management 
considerations. 
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The most significant contribution to knowledge that refutes general activism and M&A research 
and popular perceptions; comes in the form of the answer to our third research question: Does 
activist influenced acquisition lead to better performance for the acquirer? While literature and 
media criticize the activists for their short term focus, we found good evidence to convince that 
indeed activism helps the acquirer achieve a better performance in the longer term, while still 
providing significant short term returns around the M&A announcement date. We used many 
different popular models for measurement of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and buy and 
hold abnormal returns (BHAR) in event studies ranging from the date when M&A transaction 
became effective to periods up to five years later. We found that 5 years after the M&A became 
effective, the acquirers of activist targeted firms were drawing approximately 30% higher market 
returns (and 10% higher market adjusted returns) than the cases where activists were not 
involved. We observed that acquirers of activist targeted firms also achieved consistently higher 
financial performance reflected in their ROA (25% relatively higher level over a 5 year period 
after the M&A became effective), as compared to the non-activism cases.  
 
Not surprisingly, the patterns of better performance outcomes showed consistent patters between 
the control groups (“comparable activism” and “comparable non-activism” samples) drawn from 
the “activism” and “non-activism” populations respectively. Interestingly, as observed in the 
post-acquisition performance results (CARs and BHARs), we observe that the “comparable non-
activism” related M&A deals seem to be only slightly better than the general non-activism deals. 
The results from the activism dataset far exceed the performance benefits from the non-activism 
dataset.  
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What can explain the superior performance attributable to an activism led M&A deal as compared 
to others? We see the need for qualitative reasoning to answer this question. Stock performance 
as well as financial performance of a firm is the result of the culmination of many factors. It has 
been discussed in the literature review as well as in the prior sections that supported the 
arguments in favor of the activism influenced M&A transactions. For brevity we shall avoid 
repeating that reasoning here. In this research, the comparable non-activism firms represent a 
control-group: they have a similar size, a similar prior performance, a similar timing around the 
M&A event and have the same industry group; thus implying that they have a similar business 
model. The similar timing of M&A also helps ensure proximity considerations. Same industry 
group also means that they have access to similar resources and considering similar prior 
performance from the comparable set it can be argued that even if they had other resource 
advantages owing to the Resource Theory (Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991), the firms were unable 
to benefit from it until the activists stepped in. However, it doesn’t refute the resource theory 
because the activists also become part of the shareholder resource pool, as they get actively 
involved with management when they step into the board and get privy to even better 
information.  
 
Through a more active involvement with the firm than other shareholders, and from a seat of 
power and influence; we believe that the activists are able to effectively communicate and 
persuade the management and the firm to consider strategic changes to the firm. They use bold 
decision-making to focus on removing “deadwood”, eliminating impediments to growth and 
improving the value of the firm. The activists share their intelligence about the prospects of a firm 
with its board, leading to self-realization of its potential within the firm (the carrot and stick 
model). This motivates the management and sets the stage for sustained long term performance at 
the target firm. 
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These strategic changes also make the firm look attractive to potential acquirers. Activists also 
help pave the way for a smoother transition during the acquisition by removing hurdles and 
dissident voices. Through a smoother M&A close, activists help the acquirer firm and its 
management and boost their confidence that further leads to achieving better performance for the 
acquirer too. The momentum effect of these strategic changes at the target and the acquirer, 
lingers on and even has a contagion effect on the acquirer.  
 
As noted, we observed the highest performance at activism related M&A cases, followed by the 
comparable activism cases, then the comparable non-activism cases and the least for the all non-
activism cases. Prior research has observed that firms and their management do not like to be 
targeted by activists. After a firm gets targeted by activists, similar comparable firms are 
motivated to ‘put their house in order’ by addressing the categories of concerns raised by 
activists. We observed a higher performance at the comparable non-activism cases than the 
general non-activism cases and believe that it also supports the notion of spillover indirect effects 
of activism on other firms sharing similar characteristics as those affected by activism directly. 
From our observation of the performance over a longer term, we observe that while the spillover 
effect is good for those firms and continues to last longer too, the benefits of the spill-over effect 
show at a relatively much lesser level as compared to the advantages of direct activist 
intervention at the target firms.  
 
This study challenged the belief that activists look for short term gains only. The research helped 
bring attention to the long-term benefits of activism by extending the dialogue to the yet virgin 
M&A domain. We provide strong evidence to support the belief that the drive and action seen in 
activism does help bring in strategic changes to a firm that not only create value in the short term 
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for the shareholders, but it also sets the momentum for a sustained long term value generation that 
acquirers seem keen to pay a premium for and still enjoy the benefits of a superior longer term 
performance compared to similar and other firms.  
 
We observed the positive spill-over effects of activism on non-targeted firms and their 
shareholders too. We concur with prior researchers (Lee and Park 2009; Brav, Jiang and Kim 
2015; Gantchev, Gredil and Jotikasthira 2015) that activism benefits the shareholders of the 
acquirers of target firms as well as acquirers of comparable non-target firms too. Thus the 
activists are advantageous to society by being advocates for shareholders’ interests and play this 
role in a democratic and less bureaucratic manner. By improving the operating performance as 
well as stock performance, activists help the target firms directly and the comparable firms 
indirectly. As a result the industry as a whole gains and competition improves.  
 
We note that activists help bring some solutions to the concerns raised by the classic agency 
theory. We introduced a new dimension to the mergers and acquisitions studies by showing that 
the activism factor influences the post-acquisition performance at the target as well as the 
acquirer firms. We also showed the positive spill-over effect of activist intervention in the M&A 
context on similar firms. It is our hope that these findings shall help reshape the public opinion; 
encourage new research by academics to comprehend the factors better; as well as help 
practitioners become receptive to the demands of the activists to proactively address matters of 
shareholder interest. We conclude that an activist is a strategic change agent whose effect 
continues to drive performance for the target and its acquirer even post-acquisition. 
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6.1. Appendix 1: Table of Activism related studies 
Table 1. Activism related studies 
Activism studies review  
(influenced by Cossin and Caballero 2013; Brav, Jiang and Kim 2010; Goranova and Ryan 2014) 
Category Criteria Notes 
Approach 
 
Pro-activist Activists help protect shareholder interests and 
discipline the firm (Brav, Jiang and Kim 2010; Goranova 
and Ryan 2014). Evidence from samples in the U.S.A. 
and outside consistently evidence that hedge fund 
activism creates value for shareholders of target 
companies (Brav, Jiang and Kim 2010) 
Anti-activist Activists are a nuisance to smooth functioning of a firm.  
Tactic 
 
Defensive Defensive activists seek to protect preexisting 
investments and use lobbying (Armour and Cheffins 
2012) 
Offensive Offensive activism investors build up their holding 
offensively on the assumption that their agitation shall 
bring in organizational changes to improve shareholder 
returns (Armour and Cheffins 2012) 
Standalone The probability of achieving at least one outcome is 
46% for stand-alone engagements (lower than wolf-
pack). Standalone deals are equivalent to Wolf-Pack in 
earning returns upon disclosure of outcomes (Becht, 
Franks, Grant and Wagner 2015). 
Wolf-Pack The probability of achieving at least one outcome is 
46% for stand-alone engagements, while it is 78% for 
wolf-pack deals because of greater influence on target 
due to higher 13.4% collective ownership stake 
compared to 8.3% for standalone. However, they do 
not earn higher returns upon disclosure of outcomes 
(Becht, Franks, Grant and Wagner 2015). 
Engagement 
(Becht, Francs, 
Mayer and 
Rossi 2015) 
Private 
engagement 
Engage target behind closed doors. Not subject to 
disclosure if share is small. More profitable.  
Public disclosure Private and public activism, are comparable in terms of 
aims and success rates. 
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Size 
(Judge et al 
2010) 
Minority 
shareholder 
Act individually 
 Majority 
shareholder 
Block Holder or institutional investor 
Motivation 
(Judge et al. 
2010; Neville 
2011) 
Social objective Socially driven activism focuses on economic equity 
issues and seeks more justice in society (Cossin and 
Caballero 2013) 
Political Primary interest of Sovereign Wealth Funds may not be 
to increase shareholder value but to pursue political-
social interests through their investments (Neville 2011) 
Financial 
interests 
Capital structure,  
Corporate 
Control 
Activists may seek to prevent acquisitions, hold out 
against bidders in takeovers or facilitate the takeover of 
a target company (Kahan and Rock 2007). 
Operational Production efficiency improvement is observed when 
activists target operational issues like business 
strategies and asset sales. Labor productivity improves 
too (Brav, Jiang, Kim 2015) 
Personal Hubris 
Social 
objective 
 
Non-profit Logsdon and Van Buren III (2008) 
Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (Logsdon and Van Buren 
III 2008) 
Labor union Logsdon and Van Buren III (2008) 
Public interest 
group 
Logsdon and Van Buren III (2008) 
Financial 
interest 
Entrepreneurial  
Capital Structure Demands about dividend, debt restructuring, or the 
firm’s recapitalization.  Activism targeting capital 
structure earn relatively lower returns (Brav, Jiang and 
Kim 2010) 
Returns Short or long term (Bessler, Drobetz and Holler 2015; 
Boyson and Mooradian 2007; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and 
Thomas 2008; Brav, Jiang and Kim 2013; Gantchev 
2013; Kahan and Rock 2007; Klein and Zur 2009; Frank 
et al 2006; Greenwood and Schor 2009; Goodwin et al. 
2014). Shareholder activism is successful in creating 
shareholder value across countries (Becht, Franks, 
Grant and Wagner 2015) 
Strategy Corporate 
Governance 
For matters such as CEO dismissal, separation of the 
CEO and Chairman of the Board roles, increase in board 
independence, CEP pay, excessive executive 
compensation and additional disclosures (Gantchev 
2013; Prevost, Rao and Williams 2012) 
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Activism targeting corporate governance  earn relatively 
lower returns (Brav, Jiang and Kim 2010) 
Merger or 
Acquisition 
Activists may seek to prevent acquisitions, hold out 
against bidders in takeovers or facilitate the takeover of 
a target company (Kahan and Rock 2007). M&A receives 
high abnormal returns (Brav, Jiang and Kim 2010; 
Greenwood and Schor 2009;  Barclay and Holderness 
1991; Klein and Zur 2006; Becht et al 2015) 
Leveraged Buy 
Out 
Effect of hedge funds on the premium is concentrated 
among hedge funds with an activism agenda: is stronger 
for management-led LBOs than for third-party LBOs, 
and is stronger in club deal LBOs than in solo-sponsored 
LBOs (Huang 2010) 
Legal or Judicial Activists may file civil or class action law suit (Girard 
2011; Cossin and Caballero 2013) 
Media coverage To gain spotlight (Cossin and Caballero 2013) 
Investor Type Hedge Funds Hedge funds are better suited to activism. HF managers 
may invest personal wealth, have stronger incentives, 
are lightly regulated, face fewer conflicts of interest 
with firms, and have lock-up provision to prevent 
investor flight (Brav, Jiang and Kim 2010;  Greenwood 
and Schor 2009). 
Activist hedge funds in the U.S. propose strategic, 
operational, and financial remedies and attain success 
or partial success in two thirds of the cases. Hedge 
funds seldom seek control and in most cases are non-
confrontational (Brav, Jiang, Thomas and Partnoy 2008). 
Pension funds Pension funds usually seem keen on corporate 
governance matters. 
They may face conflict of interest due to other business 
relationship with target firms and may have non-
financial objectives too (Brav, Jiang and Kim 2010) 
Closed-end funds Activism reduced discount (deviation of actual from 
potential value) to half its original value (Bradley, Brav, 
Goldstein and Jiang 2010) 
Sovereign Wealth 
Funds 
despite their mostly passive investments, SWFs possess 
a natural tendency toward shareholder activism ( 
Ghahramani 2013) 
Firm responses Dialogue Corporation-stakeholder engagement (Logsdon and 
Buren 2011). Corporate - shareholder activists dialogue 
(Rehbein, Logsdon and Van Buren 2013). 
Defensive Target firm reaction usually subsides after initial 
offensive stance (multiple). 
Offensive Offensive response by a firm to activism can also be an 
important aspect of integrating political strategy into 
competitive strategy (Hoffman 1996).  Initial response 
by firm and CEO is to defend offensively. 
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Manager 
response 
Socio-cognitive Managers of firms in an industry respond differently to 
activism, even when subject to common campaigns and 
strategies (Waldron, Navis and Fisher 2012) 
Impact of 
Activism 
Firm Short and Long term benefits (Goodwin et al. 2014; 
Brav et al. 2008; Bessler et al. 2015). 
Hedge funds can facilitate long-lasting changes in 
corporate governance, cash flows, and operating 
performance that benefit target firm shareholders and 
hedge fund investors alike (Boyson and Mooradian 
2010).   
Corporate restructuring (divestitures and spin-offs of 
non-core assets, and blocking diversifying acquisitions), 
and takeovers (the target firm is acquired by a strategic 
buyer or private equity fund) (Becht, Franks, Grant and 
Wagner 2015). 
Industry Benefits of activism at a firm had spill-over effects on 
similar firms in the industry, whose performance 
improves as well (Brav, Jiang and Kim 2015; Gantchev, 
Gredil and Jotikasthira 2014) 
Stock Price Hedge fund activism results in increasing share prices 
for target firms (Bessler et al. 2015). Trading by hedge 
funds produces a permanent change in the stock price, 
which occurs in equal part both prior to and concurrent 
to the trading activity (Croci and Petrella 2015) 
Activist Hedge funds themselves benefit from activism: the risk-
adjusted annual performance of hedge funds seeking 
changes in corporate governance is about 7-11% higher 
than for non-activist hedge funds and hedge funds 
pursuing less aggressive activism (Boyson and 
Mooradian 2007). 
Other 
shareholders – 
favorable 
In general, fellow shareholders benefit (free-ridership). 
Other 
shareholders - 
unfavorable 
specific hedge fund types may expropriate value from 
other minority shareholders, creating a ‘principal-
principal’ conflict (Schneider and Lori 2011) 
2-way Lessons  Firm side firms take seriously the concerns of their critics 
(Logsdon and Buren 2009; Cossin and Caballero 2013) 
Activist side activists assuming a conciliatory position allows them to 
focus on the desired change at the firm, and also 
enables them to seek allies within the targeted 
companies(Logsdon and Buren 2009; Cossin and 
Caballero 2013) 
Returns Short term The abnormal return around the announcement of 
activism is approximately 7% (Brav, Jiang, Thomas and 
Partnoy 2008). 
Long term The abnormal 7% return around the announcement 
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shows no reversal during the subsequent year (Brav, 
Jiang, Thomas and Partnoy 2008). 
Short and Long 
Term 
Hedge fund activists improve both short-term stock 
performance and long-term operating performance of 
their targets (Boyson and Mooradian 2007). 
The abnormal return around the announcement of 
activism is approximately 7%, with no reversal during 
the subsequent year. Target firms experience increases 
in payout, operating performance, and higher CEO 
turnover after activism (Brav, Jiang, Thomas and 
Partnoy 2008). 
Hedge fund activists generate substantial long term 
value for target firms and its long term shareholders 
when they function as a shareholder advocate to 
monitor management through active board 
engagement (Goodwin, Singh, Slipetz and Rao 2014) 
Success 
Factors 
Overall 
Experience 
Classifying hedge funds along lines of total activist cases 
– high frequency hedge funds showed 31.1% returns in 
three years post-activist intervention start date 
compared to -12.6% return for low-frequency hedge 
funds. Targets of high frequency hedge funds file fewer 
bankruptcies and face lesser liquidation (6%) compared 
to (16%) targets of low frequency hedge funds (Boyson 
and Mooradian 2011) 
Manager 
Experience 
75% of managers at high frequency hedge funds, 
representing 81% of all high skilled activist events have 
experience in activism gained prior to their joining their 
current hedge fund. Contrast it to 3% of managers from 
low frequency hedge funds. High frequency managers 
perform as better activists than low frequency 
managers (Boyson and Mooradian 2011).  
Target 
Identification or 
Stock Picking 
Hedge fund activists tend to target “value” firm that 
have sound operating cashflows, but have low 
valuations compared to “fundamentals”, low (sales), 
growth rates, leverage, and dividend payout ratios 
(Brav, Jiang and Kim 2010). Poor stock performance, 
high working capital and high research and 
development (R&D) observed at targets of high 
frequency hedge funds suggests that these target firms 
have a greater potential for improvement (Boyson and 
Mooradian 2011). 
Target firm 
characteristics 
Cash rich, low leverage, high working capital (Brav, Jiang 
and Kim 2010); high R&D (Boyson and Mooradian 
2011). Fat CEO packages, low performance, sound 
fundamentals. 
Organizational 
Behavior 
Revitalization of a target firm is an important outcome 
of acquisition and should be a strong consideration 
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6.2. Appendix 2: Table of Mergers and Acquisitions studies 
Table 2. Mergers and Acquisitions studies 
when making the decision to acquire (Vermeulen 2005) 
Filings 
considered 
Initial activist 
intent 13D 
Almost all activism studies related to the USA consider 
13D filings. 
Amended 13D/A Besides corrections to the original 13D filing, a 13D/A 
filing shows the change in the game-plan or strategy of 
the activists. 
Mergers and Acquisitions studies review  
(influenced by Jindra and Moeller 2014) 
Category Criteria Notes 
Approach 
 
Friendly where the board negotiates and accepts an offer. 
Synergistic transactions (Mueller and Sirower 2003) 
Hostile where the board tries to prevent a merger 
Valuations 
 
Relative Relative valuations of the merging firms and the 
market’s perception of the synergies. The valuation 
consequences of mergers, and merger wave (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 2003). 
Type 
 
Vertical merger  Occurs when firms, operating at different levels within 
an industry's supply chain, merge operations. 
Consolidation of peer firms from the same industry who 
often compete and offer similar products.  For example 
a refinery acquires an oil producer. 
Horizontal 
merger 
Combines two companies from the same industry that 
produce different products. They may not be 
competitors but exist in the same supply chain. 
Conglomerate A merger between firms that are involved in totally 
unrelated business activities. 
Product 
Extension Merger 
When players from the same market merge to combine 
their products and get access to a bigger set of 
consumers for earning higher profits. 
Motivation Social objective  
Hubris (winners’ curse) some managers believe that they are 
better than others in spotting value-generating merger 
opportunities (Roll 1986; Mueller and Sirower 2003) 
Economic Merger waves are driven mainly by economic 
motivations. The clustering over time can be attributed 
to a combination of shocks as well as capital liquidity or 
desire for cash. Shocks could be economic, regulatory 
and technological. However, sufficient macro-level 
overall capital liquidity component seems essential 
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(Harford, 2005) 
Valuation Misvaluation drives mergers. The behavior of  the 
market-to-book ratio (M/B) is driven by firm-specific 
deviations from short-run industry pricing, that long-run 
components of M/B run counter to the conventional 
wisdom: Low long-run value to book firms buy high 
long-run value-to-book firms (Rhodes–Kropfa, Robinson 
and Viswanathan 2005). 
Shleifer and Vishny (2002) also present a model of 
mergers and acquisitions based on stock market 
misvaluations of the combining firms.  In this form of 
neo-classical theory based model, mergers are a form of 
arbitrage by rational managers operating in inefficient 
markets. The key ingredients of the model are the 
relative valuations of the merging firms and the 
market’s perception of the synergies from the 
combination. The model explains who acquires whom, 
the choice of the medium of payment, the valuation 
consequences of mergers, and merger waves.  The key 
ingredients of the answers are the relative valuations of 
the combining firms and the synergies that the market 
perceives in the merger (Shleifer and Vishny 2002) 
Source of value Difference in WACC (weighted average cost of capital), 
as shown by leverage and method of payment, of 
combined firm and the combining firms may have a 
significant role. Cash payment is value creating while 
high leverage can destroy value by raising cost of capital 
of the firm (Yaghoubi, Locke and Gibb 2013). 
Industry effects The results of the study propose discrepancy in 
acquirers’ long-term abnormal returns across industries 
(1981-2007) (Yaghoubi, Locke and Gibb 2014) 
Personal Highest takeover probability is observed when the 
proposal sponsors in the target firm are also owners in 
the bidder firm (El-Khatib 2012).  
Merger Waves Neo-classical 
theory 
Acquisitions happen in waves because of need for 
restructuring at industry that is level driven 
technological, economic and regulatory shocks (Gort 
1969; Jensen 1993; Mitchell and Mulherin 1996; 
Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford 2001; Hartford 2005; 
Yaghoubi, Locke and Gibb 2013) 
 Behavioral 
Theory 
Acquisitions waves are driven by market mis-valuations 
(Shleifer and Vishny 2003; Dong, Hershleifer, 
Richardson and Teoh 2006; Bouwman, Fuller and Nain 
2009; Yaghoubi, Locke and Gibb 2013) 
Value drivers 
 
Diversification  
Synergies gained 
-  Market access 
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Synergies gained 
-  Technology 
access 
 
Capital structure Difference in WACC (weighted average cost of capital), 
as shown by leverage and method of payment, of 
combined firm and the combining firms may have a 
significant role. Cash payment is value creating while 
high leverage can destroy value by raising cost of capital 
of the firm (Yaghoubi, Locke and Gibb 2013). 
Public interest 
group 
 
Firm 
Characteristics 
Size A sample of 12,023 acquisitions by public firms from 
1980 to 2001. The equally weighted abnormal 
announcement return is 1.1%, but acquiring-firm 
shareholders lose $25.2 million on average upon 
announcement. The announcement return for 
acquiring-firm shareholders was roughly two 
percentage points higher for small acquirers 
irrespective of the form of financing and whether the 
acquired firm was public or private. The size effect is 
robust to firm and deal characteristics, and it is not 
reversed over time (Moeller, Schlingemann, Stulz 2003) 
Financial 
interest 
Entrepreneurial  
Capital Structure  
Returns The results by Swoonswang (2014) in Thai markets 
suggest that the target firm’s shareholders gain 
substantial and positive abnormal returns, while 
bidding firm’s shareholders realize 
positive rather than negative abnormal returns. The 
total gains are positive at 25.48%, indicating that 
takeovers create values. 
Strategy Merger or 
Acquisition 
Becht, Franks, Grant and Wagner (2015) separate 
corporate  restructurings into “Takeover” (the target 
firm is acquired by a strategic buyer or private equity 
fund), and  “Restructuring” (divestitures, spin-offs of 
non-core assets and the blocking of diversifying 
acquisitions). 
Firm responses Dialogue Burnett et al (2012) suggest formation of an Activist 
Control Teat (ACT) comprising senior leaders to address 
shareholder activism in the midst of M&A activities. Key 
criteria for members: Exposure to Strategy and 
Reporting, Capacity to Interact, Position and 
Communicate. 
Defensive  
Offensive  
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6.3. Appendix 3: Target characteristics with reference to Activism and 
M&A 
 
Table 3. Activism with reference to M&A 
Target 
characteristic 
Activism M&A Comments 
Size of firm Activists typically target 
small to mid-cap firms. 
Lately, large target size has 
not been a deterrent. We 
see successful outcomes 
across target size. Returns 
are best with smaller 
targets.   
Study of activism for very 
small firms has been lacking, 
as most researchers focus 
on firms above a certain size 
say 100million dollars. Effect 
of size of activist or hedge 
fund has not been studied 
much either. 
A lot of mixed 
outcomes can be seen 
in research. Mostly, 
positive returns are 
observed with smaller 
acquirers. Large 
acquirer firms tend to 
generate slightly 
negative returns.  
We can expect better 
returns for smaller 
firms where it is easier 
for the activists as 
well as the acquirer to 
understand the value 
drivers of the firm and 
control them. A larger 
target firm may have 
more complex set of 
value drivers, thus 
making it a challenge 
for the activists and 
the acquirers. Size of 
the target firm needs 
to be further studied. 
Industry Mixed observations exist. 
Certain activists are known 
to be effective across 
industries. Others have 
developed a specialist flavor 
and seem to be experts in 
their frequently targeted 
industries.  
Horizontal 
integrations merge 
competing firms to 
reduce costs, reduce 
competition, increase 
market size, increase 
customer base and 
create monopoly. HI is 
known to destroy 
value, as its often 
driven by hubris, 
rarely succeeds and 
cause regulatory and 
governance challenges 
for a larger firm.  
Vertical integration 
merges across 
industries but in same 
line example a 
manufacturer acquires 
a retailer to start 
marketing its products 
and is a form of 
Specialization of 
activists in industry 
segments can help 
them seek an 
appropriate M&A 
partner or acquirer 
firm for the target and 
can help improve the 
performance for HI. 
Similarly, experience 
with the upstream 
and downstream 
industries may help 
activists help VI. 
Further ability of 
activists to bring deep 
rooted strategic 
improvements can 
prepare a promising 
target firm for 
presentation as pure 
diversification 
candidate as well. This 
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related 
diversification). VI 
intends to bring in 
internal efficiency.  
Total diversification 
involves entering an 
unrelated industry.  
Customers care more 
about the experience 
you provide than your 
internal efficiency 
(through VI), so a 
customer focused 
business, should focus 
on HI (Vossoughi 
2014).  
subject needs further 
research. 
Technology Activists are smart to 
understand the pros and 
cons of technology use at 
their target firm. They may 
force management to 
decide for a better 
technology and harvest the 
old or underperformers. We 
don’t see many papers 
discuss it well. 
Access to newer or 
better technology can 
help improve the 
economics of scale 
and market power for 
an acquirer. It also 
offers an ability to 
diversify from being 
overly exposed to a 
single technology. 
Many M&A studies 
have discussed 
technology fairly well. 
Ability of activism to 
convince or force 
management to bring 
value creating change 
can help get a target 
firm to adopt a better 
technology sooner. It 
can also serve to 
market the target firm 
better to potential 
acquirers at a higher 
premium. This subject 
also needs more 
research. 
Market Activists target firms that 
have not optimally used 
their market muscle. 
Activists are also known to 
target firms that have little 
growth potential left of its 
own but has sufficient 
assets to harvest value in 
the market chain. Activism 
studies have not ventured 
much beyond measuring the 
firm level returns, to see 
market effects. 
Acquirers target firms 
that provide economy 
of scale, scope, 
increase customer 
base, increase market 
share, synergy of 
operation, synergy of 
discounts on raw 
materials, reducing 
taxes, diversification 
(market, product), 
access to resources 
(human, assets, 
materials, technology, 
labor, skills, 
customers). M&A 
studies have looked at 
Activists through their 
research can identify 
hidden assets and 
opportunities for 
growth. They can 
force target firm 
managers to operate 
optimally. 
Simultaneously they 
can help convince a 
potential acquirer on 
how it can improve its 
own market power 
through acquisition. 
Fresh research that 
studies market 
influence jointly in 
 120 
market effects fairly 
well.  
activism and M&A 
context can shed 
more light on the 
subject.  
Region/ 
Proximity/ 
Legal or 
Judicial 
An international study found 
that activists in their 
domestic markets perform 
better (Becht, Frank, Mayer 
and Rossi 2015). Studies at a 
more granular regional level 
are lacking.  
Regions due to 
different legal 
frameworks and 
market frameworks 
could have different 
effects. 
Further research on 
proximity is needed – 
for example to study 
effect of networking 
and dyad and triad of 
relationships - 
between activists, 
executives or board 
target firm and those 
at the acquirer firm. 
Experience Experienced activists get 
better returns for target 
firm shareholders. Skill 
builds up with experience. 
Frequent acquirers 
seem to be successful 
in getting better 
returns from 
acquisitions. 
Experienced activists 
may be collaborating 
with experienced 
acquirers (White 
Knights). It needs 
further research. 
Assets Underutilized assets are 
appealing to the activists. 
They see them as unused 
cash waiting to be 
harvested. 
Acquirers looking for 
growth or synergy 
seek targets with 
underused assets that 
can complement its 
own.  
An activism strategy 
could be to gain from 
acting as scouting 
agents for target or 
matchmakers for 
potential acquirers, 
thus bringing value to 
shareholders at the 
target as well as the 
acquirer. This win-win 
strategy needs further 
research. 
Cashflow Activists target cash rich 
companies. One of favorite 
demand of activists is to 
return the excess cash back 
to the shareholders. 
Acquirers also target 
cash rich companies. 
Company that’s sitting 
on its cash and has’t 
invested it well seems 
to be a common 
target for activists as 
well as acquirers. 
Target 
selection 
Activists are known for their 
informed and superior stock 
picking skills (Nain & Yao 
2013; Bessler, Drobetz and 
Holler 2015). 
More profitable firms are 
targeted by hedge funds 
than other activists (Klein 
and Zur 2006). 
Appropriate choice of 
a target firm and one 
that can be acquired 
at the right price and 
premium to meet the 
strategic intent, is 
essential for a well 
planned and executed 
M&A strategy to be 
It needs to be studied 
whether a subsequent 
M&A plan is part of 
the strategy of 
activists when they 
originally seek a toe-
hold investment in a 
target firm. 
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successful. M&A 
literature reveals 
numerous techniques 
for target 
identification. 
Performance Mixed performance 
outcomes have been 
reported by early 
researchers. More recent 
outcomes show short-term 
returns. Few researchers 
have attempted to show 
long-term gains (Bebchuck 
et al 2014; Goodwin et al 
2014). 
M&A rarely adds 
value because the 
expected synergy 
doesn’t materialize. 
About half of M&A are 
successful (Price 
2013). Universally, 
researchers agree that 
target shareholders 
gain considerable 
abnormal returns 
(~30%), acquirers 
usually see zero or 
negative returns and 
together the acquirer 
and target firm see a 
small yet positive 
return. M&A pays 
overall (Bruner 2002). 
Suitable target choice 
of activists with a 
focus on a strategic 
plan execution helps 
the activists. Acquirers 
can magnify the gains 
by banking on the 
momentum effect of a 
desire to perform 
post-acquisition at the 
target firm. 
Growth 
potential 
Activists target firms with 
growth potential.  
Activists also target firms 
that have no potential left 
but have sufficient assets to 
harvest value. 
Acquirers aiming for 
diversification seek 
good performing 
targets. Acquirers also 
seek targets that offer 
performance through 
synergy. 
 
Targets that are not 
operating at their full 
potential could be 
acquired for lesser 
price by the activists. 
Acquirers may also be 
interested in getting a 
target that realizes its 
shortcomings, shows 
stable cashflow and is 
operating on a 
strategic growth plan 
laid out by the 
activists. Observation 
of best shareholder 
returns in activist 
events leading to 
M&A (Greenwood and 
Schor 2009) could be 
a fair reason to study 
activism effect on 
M&A 
Corporate Hedge funds tend to acquire Acquirer firms with Standalone studies of 
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Governance stakes in firms suffering 
from weak corporate 
governance and are less 
profitable than their peers 
(Bessler et al 2015)  
weak corporate 
governance and anti-
takeover provisions 
(ATP) generate 
negative returns 
(Masulis et al 2007). 
corporate governance 
in activism and M&A 
studies need to be 
extended to 
understand the 
impact in the context 
where the target of an 
activist later serves as 
a target of the 
acquirer too. 
Firm 
Response  
Mixed results have been 
observed in a target firm’s 
response to aggressive or 
hostile approach used by 
the activists. Some have 
found better returns to 
hostile approach (Becht et al 
2010). Others have found 
best results in dealing 
behind closed-doors at the 
board-room of target firms. 
  
Financing Most activist deals are cash 
purchase from the open 
market. It also offers a 
hassle free way to exit when 
needed. 
Studies have 
produced mixed 
results. Mostly cash 
based transactions 
have generated better 
value. Stock financing 
improves debt rating 
and reduces cost of 
debt for acquirer. 
Stock financing is 
preferred by over-
valued acquirers, who 
pay a higher premium 
and so negative return 
in stock financed 
transactions is not 
surprising (Masulis et 
al 2007). 
Cash payment seem 
to be the preferred 
financing vehicle for 
both activism and 
M&A. Cash may also 
be favored by target 
firm shareholders, 
owing to the flexibility 
and better liquidity 
compared to stock.  
Premium Activists are good at 
building a position around 
market value. The exposure 
of activist intentions or 
announcements drives up 
stock price. Activists close 
their position at a premium 
relative to their purchase 
Higher the premium 
paid by an acquirer, 
lesser is the expected 
return for the 
acquirer. Like hubris 
at TMT level, 
overvaluation that 
leads to higher 
Premium reflects the 
trust and expectation 
to see better 
performance from the 
target firm post-
acquisition. Higher 
premium can be 
expected for activism 
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price. premium payment by 
larger firms is also 
attributed to M&A 
failures. 
led M&A. More 
research is needed to 
explain this complex 
but important subject. 
Society/ 
Culture 
Activists challenge the 
management and board at 
target firms, so they are not 
portrayed well by the 
managers at a firm. Activism 
stories about job losses, cuts 
on expenditures like training 
and research and 
development, add to their 
negative image.  
M&A has its own 
share of social, 
political and cultural 
integration challenges 
between the target 
firm and the acquirer 
(Cartwright and 
Schoenberg 2006). 
More behavioral 
studies are needed to 
develop a richer 
interpretation of the 
phenomenon 
associated with 
activism leading to 
M&A.  
Timing The recent activism waves 
seem to be following 
regulatory and macro-
economic changes. Spill-
over effects of activism 
create the impression of 
industry wide waves 
(Gantchev, Gredil and 
Jotikasthira 2013) 
M&A activities seem 
to happen in waves 
that follow macro-
economic, 
technological, 
industrial, regulatory 
or socio-political 
events.  
Further studies that 
examine the 
networking between 
Target firms, Activists 
and Acquirers could 
shed more light on the 
event monitoring and 
response mechanism 
that triggers the flurry 
of activism and M&A 
activities that seem to 
coincide on the timing 
aspect and provide 
hints of coordination 
and information 
sharing among the 
players.  
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6.4. Appendix 4: Result Tables and Figures 
Convention used and interpretation 
The symbols *, **, ***, **** show the significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels 
respectively. 
~The Student’s t-test checks to see if the mean is different than zero. The p-value for this 
test indicated that the mean value is not statistically significant. Here, it is advisable to use 
the trimmed mean value that was found to be significantly different than zero. 
1The t-test is a two sample test of means to test whether the mean for the sample differs 
from the mean for the activist target sample. We list both the Pooled t-Test and the 
Satterthwaite t-Test. The Pooled t-Test assumes that the two sample populations have equal 
variances. The Satterthwaite t-Test does not assume that the populations have equal 
variances. Each score is shown as a pair of t Value & its significance or p-value (Pr > |t|) that 
is shown in parentheses. The t-Tests were conducted for 95% confidence level. A 
significance value that is less than 0.05 indicates a highly significant p-value, and supports 
the conclusion of a significant difference between the sample being tested and the Activism 
sample. A significance value that is greater than or equal to 0.05 indicates a non-highly 
significant p-value, and supports the conclusion of a non-significant difference between the 
sample being tested and the Activism sample. 
2,3The Wilkoxon and Kruskal-Wallis are non-parametric tests to see if the sample concerned 
arises from different distribution than the activist target sample. The tests check whether 
the distribution of a variable is the same across different groups.  It is used primarily to 
indicate if the medians are different between the concerned sample and the activist target 
sample. The Normal Approximation Z statistic is quoted for the Wilcoxon test and it includes 
a continuity correction of 0.5. The Z-score is followed by its corresponding One-Sided p-
value (Pr > Z) and the Two-Sided p-value (Pr > |Z|) respectively in parentheses. The Chi-
Square statistic is used for the Kruskal-Wallis test. Its significance or p-value (Pr > Chi-
Square) is shown in parentheses. The tests were conducted for 95% confidence level. A 
significance value that is less than 0.05 indicates a highly significant p-value, and supports 
the conclusion of a significant difference between the sample being tested and the Activism 
sample. A significance value that is greater than or equal to 0.05 indicates a non-highly 
significant p-value, and supports the conclusion of a non-significant difference between the 
sample being tested and the Activism sample. 
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6.4.1. H1.a. Premium for target during M&A 
Test of Hypothesis H1.a. Activist influenced M&A shall lead to higher premium for target firm 
shareholders, as compared to others 
6.4.1.1. Table: Comparison of distributions 
Premium 4 weeks before M&A announcement date 
Table 4. Premium 4 weeks before M&A announcement date 
Sample N 
Conside
red / 
Total  
Mean / 
Trimmed 
Mean (1%) 
Median T- test1 
Pooled / 
Satterthwaite 
Wilcoxon 
test- Z 
statistic2 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
test- Chi 
Square3 
Filter: Exclude where Prem_4w_BefAnnDate is negative or above 500% 
Activism led M&A 1771 / 
1977 
34.09**** / 
32.23**** 
25.45    
Comparable  
Non-activism 
related M&A 
1072 / 
1239 
24.83**** / 
23.18**** 
15.12 6.50 (<.0001) 
/  
6.80 (<.0001) 
-7.7545 
(<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
60.1333 
(<.0001) 
All Non-activism 
related M&A 
20439 / 
23351 
20.54**** / 
18.48**** 
2.96  14.76 
(<.0001) / 
14.05 
(<.0001) 
24.4411 
(<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
597.3685 
(<.0001) 
 
Filter: Exclude where Prem_4w_BefAnnDate is negative or above 500% 
Comparable 
Activism led M&A 
687 / 
770 
29.44**** / 
28.19**** 
23.24    
Comparable  
Non-activism 
related M&A 
1072 / 
1239 
24.83**** / 
23.18**** 
15.12 2.99 (0.0029) 
/  
3.05 (0.0024) 
5.3641 
(<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
28.7742 
(<.0001) 
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6.4.1.2. Figure: Distributions 
Prem_4w_BefAnnDate: where Prem_4w_BefAnnDate between (0,500%) 
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(Filter: Exclude Prem_4w_BefAnnDate less than -50% or above 130%) 
 
 
Figure 2: Premium 4 weeks before M&A announcement date 
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6.4.2. H1.b. Number of Bids 
Test for Hypothesis 1.b. More bids shall be observed for the target firm in an activist influenced 
M&A deal, as compared to others 
6.4.2.1. Table: Comparison of distributions 
Number of Bids: comparison for Activism, Comparable and All Non-Activism 
Table 5. Count of bids 
Sample N Mean / 
Trimmed 
Mean (1%) 
Median T- test1 Pooled 
/ 
Satterthwaite 
Wilcoxon 
test- Z 
statistic2 
Kruskal-
Wallis test- 
Chi Square3 
Filter: None 
Activism led 
M&A 
1977 1.1229**** / 
1.1033**** 
1.0    
Comparable  
Non-activism 
related M&A 
1239 1.0129**** / 
1.0025**** 
1.0 10.06 (<.0001) 
/  
12.20 (<.0001) 
-10.2566  
(<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
105.1997 
(<.0001) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
23351 1.0264**** / 
1.0118**** 
1.0 19.20 (<.0001)  
/  
11.33 (<.0001) 
22.3474  
(<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
499.4052 
(<.0001) 
 
Filter: None 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
770 1.1221**** / 
1.0995**** 
1.0    
Comparable  
Non-activism 
related M&A 
1239 1.0129**** / 
1.0025**** 
1.0 9.20 (<.0001) 
/  
7.52 (<.0001) 
9.3100  
(<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
86.6779 
(<.0001) 
 
6.4.2.2. Figure: Distributions 
Number of Bids: comparison for Activism, Comparable and All Non-Activism 
Filter: None 
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Figure 3: Count of bids 
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6.4.3. H1.c. Cash Offer: Mode of Payment 
Test for Hypothesis 1.c. We shall observe more cash offers than stock for the target by the 
acquirer in activist led M&A 
6.4.3.1. Table: Comparison of distributions 
All Cash Offers compared 
We defined AllCashOffer as a dummy variable (CashOnly) that was assigned a value 1 when 
percent of cash was 100 and a value 0, if otherwise. 
Table 6. Mode of payment: Cash Vs. Stock Offers 
Sample N Mean / 
Trimmed 
Mean (1%) 
Medi
an 
T- test1 Pooled 
/ Satterthwaite 
Wilcoxon test- 
Z statistic2 
Kruskal-
Wallis test- 
Chi Square3 
Filter: None 
Compare All Cash Offer (100% Cash) between datasets 
Activism led 
M&A 
1977 0.6645**** / 
0.6680**** 
1.0    
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
1239 0.5496**** / 
0.5507**** 
1.0 6.58  (<.0001)  
/  
6.50 (<.0001) 
-6.5392  
(<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
42.7608 
(<.0001) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
23351 0.4832**** / 
0.4828**** 
0.0 15.57 (<.0001)  
/  
16.33 (<.0001) 
15.4933 
(<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
240.0437 
(<.0001) 
Filter: None 
Compare All Stock Offer (100% Stock) between datasets 
Activism led 
M&A 
1977 0.0749**** / 
0.0661**** 
0.0    
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
1239 0.1542**** / 
0.1467**** 
0.0 -7.18 (<.0001)  
/  
-6.69 (<.0001) 
7.1254  
(<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
50.7713 
(<.0001) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
23351 0.1643**** / 
0.1574**** 
0.0 -10.51 (<.0001) 
/  
-13.98 (<.0001) 
-10.4848  
(<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
109.9307 
(<.0001) 
 
Filter: None 
Compare All Cash Offer (100% Cash) between datasets 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
770 0.7117**** / 
0.7162**** 
1.0    
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
1239 0.5496**** / 
0.5507**** 
1.0 7.34  (<.0001)  
/  
7.50 (<.0001) 
7.2442  
(<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
52.4790  
(<.0001) 
Compare All Stock Offer (100% Stock) between datasets 
Comparable 
Activism led 
770 0.08831**** 
/ 0.0796**** 
0.0    
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M&A 
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
1239 0.1542**** / 
0.1467**** 
0.0 -4.30 (<.0001)  
/  
-4.54 (<.0001) 
-4.2806  
(<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
18.3245  
(<.0001) 
 
6.4.3.2. Figures: Distributions 
 
Figure 4: Mode of payment: Cash Only with Stock Only 
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All (100%) Cash or All (100%) Stock or OtherOrMixed Offer: No Filter 
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6.4.3.3. Table: Basic Statistics 
Mode of Payment CashOnly (Cash=100%) or StockOnly(Stock=100%) or Mixed(Any other 
combination): No Filter 
Table 7. Statistics: Mode of payment 
Data set Activism NonActivism 
Variable CashOnly StockOnly OtherOrMixed CashOnly StockOnly OtherOrMixed 
N 1977 1977 1977 23351 23351 23351 
Mean 66.46% 7.49% 26.05% 48.32% 16.43% 35.25% 
Std Dev 0.4722 0.2632 0.4390 0.4997 0.3705 0.4778 
Variance 0.2230 0.0693 0.1927 0.2497 0.1373 0.2283 
Std Error 0.0106 0.0059 0.0099 0.0033 0.0024 0.0031 
Coeff of 
Variation 
71.0508 351.6300 168.5311 103.4224 225.5559 135.5246 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1st Pctl 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5th Pctl 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10th Pctl 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25th Pctl 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 1 0 0 0 0 0 
75th Pctl 1 0 1 1 0 1 
90th Pctl 1 0 1 1 1 1 
95th Pctl 1 1 1 1 1 1 
99th Pctl 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Quartile 
Range 
1 0 1 1 0 1 
Skewness -0.6980 3.2334 1.0922 0.0673 1.8123 0.6174 
Kurtosis -1.5143 8.4634 -0.8079 -1.9956 1.2844 -1.6190 
t Value 62.58 12.64 26.38 147.75 67.75 112.75 
Pr > |t| <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
DataSet CompActivism CompNonActivism 
N Obs 770 1239 
Variable CashOnly StockOnly OtherOrMixed CashOnly StockOnly OtherOrMixed 
N 770 770 770 1239 1239 1239 
Mean 71.17% 8.83% 20.00% 54.96% 15.42% 29.62% 
Std Dev 0.4533 0.2839 0.4003 0.4977 0.3612 0.4568 
Variance 0.2055 0.0806 0.1602 0.2477 0.1305 0.2086 
Std Error 0.0163 0.0102 0.0144 0.0141 0.0103 0.0130 
Coeff of 63.6896 321.5113 200.1300 90.5563 234.3361 154.2057 
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Variation 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1st Pctl 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5th Pctl 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10th Pctl 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25th Pctl 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 1 0 0 1 0 0 
75th Pctl 1 0 0 1 0 1 
90th Pctl 1 0 1 1 1 1 
95th Pctl 1 1 1 1 1 1 
99th Pctl 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Quartile 
Range 
1 0 0 1 0 1 
Skewness -0.9365 2.9075 1.5029 -0.1998 1.9178 0.8938 
Kurtosis -1.1259 6.4701 0.2595 -1.9633 1.6808 -1.2031 
t Value 43.57 8.63 13.87 38.87 15.02 22.83 
Pr > |t| <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
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6.4.4. H2.a. Prior Experience of Activist in Industry  
Test of Hypothesis 2.a. An activist with prior experience in the industry of target firm shall get 
better premium for the target. (as compared to those with no related prior experience) 
6.4.4.1. Table: Comparison of distributions 
Prior Experience of Activist in industry of target w.r.t. Premium 4 weeks before 
announcement date 
Prior Experience: having > 1 instance     (Here Median of Prior Industry Experience = 1) 
No Prior Experience: having <= 1 instance 
Table 8. Prior industry experience of activist 
Sample N Mean / 
Trimmed 
Mean (1%) 
Medi
an 
T- test1 Pooled 
/ Satterthwaite 
Wilcoxon test- 
Z statistic2 
Kruskal-
Wallis test- 
Chi Square3 
Filter: Exclude where Premium is negative or above 500% 
Activists 
having Prior 
Experience in 
Industry of 
target firm 
803 36.2027**** 
/  
34.2983 **** 
28.31    
Activists 
having No 
Prior 
Experience in 
Industry of 
target firm 
968 32.3303**** 
/ 
30.3941**** 
23.21 -2.08 (0.0379) / 
-2.09 (0.0367) 
4.3841  
(<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
19.2205 
(<.0001) 
 
6.4.4.2. Figure: Correlation between Premium and Prior Industry Experience 
Premium 4 weeks prior to M&A announcement date: 
Activists having Prior Experience in the Industry of the target firm. 
Filter: where Premium is between (0%, 500%) 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 1771 
Between PriorExp_Act_Ind and Prem_4w_BefAnnDate  
(Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0) 
0.08402 (0.0004) 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
PriorExp_Act_Ind 1771 4.56578 7.90112 1 1.00000 50.00000 
Prem_4w_BefAnnDate 1771 34.08610 39.09331 25.45 0 354.55000 
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6.4.4.3. Figure: Distributions 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Prior experience in industry of target 
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6.4.5. H2.b. Prior Overall Experience of Activist w.r.t. Premium 
Test for Hypothesis H2.b. An activist with prior overall experience shall get better premium for 
the target than when a lesser experienced activist is involved. 
6.4.5.1. Table: Comparison of distributions 
Overall Experience of Activist w.r.t. Premium 4 weeks before announcement date 
Prior Overall Experience: > 6 experiences     (here Median Prior Overall Experiences = 6) 
No Prior Overall Experience: <= 6 experience. 
Table 9. Prior overall experience of activist 
Sample N Mean / 
Trimmed 
Mean (1%) 
Medi
an 
T- test1 Pooled 
/ Satterthwaite 
Wilcoxon test- 
Z statistic2 
Kruskal-
Wallis test- 
Chi Square3 
Filter: Exclude where Premium is negative or above 500% 
Activists 
having Prior 
Experience 
219 45.2418**** 
/ 
43.6522**** 
36.92    
Activists 
having No 
Prior 
Experience 
93 36.7741**** 
/ 
35.8635**** 
28.37 -1.82 (0.0691) / 
-1.84 (0.0676) 
-2.8784  
(0.0020) 
(0.0040) 
8.2891 
(0.0040) 
 
6.4.5.2. Figure: Correlation between Premium and Prior Overall Experience 
(Filter: consider where Premium 4 weeks before Announcement Date is between (0, 500%) 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 312 
Between PriorExp_Act and Prem_4w_BefAnnDate  
(Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0) 
0.14606 (0.0098) 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
PriorExp_Act 312 181.66987 171.38958 155 1.00000 494.00000 
Prem_4w_BefAnnDate 312 42.71776 37.64798 32.985 0 244.83000 
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6.4.5.3. Figure: Distributions 
Prior Overall Experience or Not: Activism 
Filter: consider where Premium is between (0%, 500%) 
 
 
Figure 6: Prior overall experience of activist 
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6.4.6. H2.c. Ownership Interest of Activist w.r.t. Premium 
Test for Hypothesis 2.c. An activist with greater ownership in the target firm shall get better 
premium than activists with lower ownership. 
6.4.6.1. Table: Comparison of distributions 
Ownership Interest of Activist w.r.t. Premium 4 weeks before announcement date 
Using 326 samples, with no filter we observed: 
Average Ownership share of Activist (%)   = 9.9439**** Median = 7.175 
Average Premium 4 weeks before announcement date (%) = 44.5083**** Median = 34.575 
 
Filter: consider where Premium 4 weeks before Announcement Date is between (0, 500%) 
Table 10. Ownership interest of activist 
Sample N Mean / 
Trimmed 
Mean (1%) 
Medi
an 
T- test1 Pooled 
/ Satterthwaite 
Wilcoxon test- 
Z statistic2 
Kruskal-
Wallis test- 
Chi Square3 
Premium 4 weeks before announcement date: Filter consider Premium between (0,500%) 
Above 
median 
ownership 
(%) 
138 49.9655**** 
/  
48.4452**** 
37.33    
At or Below 
median 
ownership 
(%) 
144 44.6715**** 
/ 
43.3271**** 
36.49 1.21  (0.2276)  
/  
1.20 (0.2298) 
4.3331  
(0.3325) 
(0.6649) 
0.1882 
(0.6644) 
 
6.4.6.2. Table: Correlation between Ownership stake and Premium 
(Filter: consider where Premium 4 weeks before Announcement Date is between (0, 500%) 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 282 
Between Act_Own_Pct and Prem_4w_BefAnnDate  
(Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0) 
0.09979 (0.0944) 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
Act_Own_Pct 282 0.09416 0.11005 0.0709 0.01000 1.00000 
Prem_4w_BefAnnDate 282 47.26220 36.78513 36.485 0.39000 244.83000 
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6.4.6.3. Figure: Ownership Interest of Activist w.r.t. Premium 
Ownership % of Activist in Target before Acquisition: Activism led MnA 
Filter: consider where Premium 4 weeks before announcement date is between (0, 500%) 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Ownership level of Activist in target 
 
 
 
 
 
 141 
6.4.6.4. Table: Ownership Level Vs Premium Level 
 
Premium 4 weeks prior to M&A announcement date: Where Premium is between (0%, 500%) 
 
Table 11. Ownership 
level Vs Premium level 
Frequency 
Percent 
Row Pct 
Col Pct 
 
 
Table of Prem_4w_BefAnnDate_Level by Act_Ownership_Level 
Prem_4w_BefAnnDate_Level Act_Ownership_Level 
Above 
Median 
Below 
Median 
Total 
Above Median  98 
34.75 
49.75 
71.01 
 
99 
35.11 
50.25 
68.75 
 
197 
69.86 
  
  
 
Below Median  40 
14.18 
47.06 
28.99 
 
45 
15.96 
52.94 
31.25 
 
85 
30.14 
  
  
 
Total  138 
48.94 
 
144 
51.06 
 
282 
100.00 
 
 
 
Statistics for Table of Prem_4w_BefAnnDate_Level by Act_Ownership_Level 
McNemar's Test 
Statistic (S) 25.0432 
DF 1 
Asymptotic Pr > S <.0001 
Exact Pr >= S 5.955E-07 
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6.4.7. H3.a. Post-Acquisition performance for acquirer 
Test for Hypothesis H3.a. Post-acquisition performance for the acquirer of an activist targeted 
firm shall be higher than acquirers of non-activist targeted firms. 
6.4.7.1. Market Model (MM) method: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
6.4.7.1.1. Table: Basic Statistics 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR)  
Table 12. Statistics: CAR using Market Model (MM) 
Window 
(Months 
from 
Effective 
Date) 
 Mean Median Variance Skew 
ness 
Kurtosis t  
Value 
Pr  
> |t| 
Filter: consider CAR between -500% and 500% 
Dataset: Activism Model: Market Adjusted Returns N Obs 580 
(-12,0)   0.02% -0.02% 0.3124 -0.1011 7.2523 0.01 0.9882 
(0,+6)   -0.49% -1.28% 0.2956 0.5326 13.7117 -0.4 0.6892 
(0,+12)   -1.15% -0.98% 0.4204 -0.1804 4.7608 -0.66 0.5119 
(0,+24)   -3.38% -1.27% 0.6092 -0.2379 2.7292 -1.34 0.1822 
(0,+36)   -5.95% 0.81% 0.7808 -0.3692 2.1959 -1.84 0.0669 
(0,+48)   -4.95% 0.35% 0.9156 -0.3034 2.7328 -1.3 0.1933 
(0,+60)   -6.03% 1.18% 1.0406 -0.3344 2.7603 -1.4 0.1632 
Dataset: CompActivism Model: Market Adjusted Returns N Obs 295 
(-12,0)   -1.81% -1.82% 0.3099 0.4502 3.7471 -1.54 0.1231 
(0,+6)   -1.60% -1.75% 0.2789 -0.0186 2.9591 -1.52 0.1287 
(0,+12)   -4.78% -1.33% 0.4384 -0.5106 2.3545 -2.89 0.004 
(0,+24)   -7.10% -4.48% 0.6407 -0.4321 2.5963 -2.93 0.0034 
(0,+36)   -9.46% -8.10% 0.8225 -0.0238 3.0846 -3.05 0.0024 
(0,+48)   -13.19% -6.61% 0.9762 -0.2754 2.3053 -3.58 0.0004 
(0,+60)   -17.58% -7.19% 1.1140 -0.3882 2.1182 -4.18 <.0001 
Dataset: CompNonActivism Model: Market Adjusted Returns N Obs 695 
(-12,0)   -1.81% -1.82% 0.3099 0.4502 3.7471 -1.54 0.1231 
(0,+6)   -1.60% -1.75% 0.2789 -0.0186 2.9591 -1.52 0.1287 
(0,+12)   -4.78% -1.33% 0.4384 -0.5106 2.3545 -2.89 0.004 
(0,+24)   -7.10% -4.48% 0.6407 -0.4321 2.5963 -2.93 0.0034 
(0,+36)   -9.46% -8.10% 0.8225 -0.0238 3.0846 -3.05 0.0024 
(0,+48)   -13.19% -6.61% 0.9762 -0.2754 2.3053 -3.58 0.0004 
(0,+60)   -17.58% -7.19% 1.1140 -0.3882 2.1182 -4.18 <.0001 
Dataset: NonActivism Model: Market Adjusted Returns N Obs 11002 
(-12,0)   -1.68% -1.91% 0.3853 0.7393 9.9350 -4.5 <.0001 
(0,+6)   -4.98% -3.12% 0.3692 -0.3023 9.9701 -13.95 <.0001 
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(0,+12)   -9.98% -5.54% 0.5465 -0.5519 4.5970 -18.88 <.0001 
(0,+24)   -18.39% -10.45% 0.8325 -0.5271 2.9979 -22.84 <.0001 
(0,+36)   -24.99% -15.17% 1.0428 -0.4365 2.0335 -24.78 <.0001 
(0,+48)   -30.99% -17.73% 1.2194 -0.4009 1.4614 -26.28 <.0001 
(0,+60)   -37.48% -20.39% 1.3955 -0.4019 1.2491 -27.77 <.0001 
 
6.4.7.1.2. MM: Chart  
Market Model: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
 
 
Figure 8: CAR: Market Model 
  
-40.00%
-35.00%
-30.00%
-25.00%
-20.00%
-15.00%
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
 -1y 6m 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
Post-Acquisition Performance of Acquirer 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
measured using Market Model (MM) 
(Filter: Consider CAR between (-500%,500%)) 
Activism CompActivism CompNonActivism NonActivism
 144 
6.4.7.1.3. Table: Comparison of distributions  
Table 13. Post-acquisition performance: CAR using MM 
Sample N 
Consi
dered 
/ Total  
Mean / 
Trimmed 
Mean (1%) 
Medi
an 
T- test1 Pooled 
/ Satterthwaite 
Wilcoxon test- 
Z statistic2 
Kruskal-
Wallis test- 
Chi Square3 
Filter: consider CAR between -500% and 500% 
1y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_3 (0,+12m) CAR) 
Activism led 
M&A 
580 / 
1977 
-0.0115 /  
-0.0097 
-
0.009
8 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
702 / 
1239 
-0.0478*** /  
-0.0446*** 
-
0.013
3 
1.51 (0.1321) 
 /  
1.51 (0.1306) 
2.3832 
(0.0086)  
(0.0172) 
5.6795 
(0.0172) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
10691 
/ 
23357 
-0.0998**** 
/  
-0.0957**** 
-
0.055
4 
3.83 (0.0001) 
 /  
4.84 (<.0001) 
3.7330 
(<.0001)  
(0.0002) 
13.9353 
(0.0002) 
2y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_4 (0,+24m) CAR) 
Activism led 
M&A 
580 / 
1977 
-0.0338 /  
-0.0330 
-
0.012
7 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
702 / 
1239 
-0.0710** /  
-0.0671** 
-
0.044
8 
1.06 (0.2905) 
 /  
1.06 (0.2882) 
2.6138 
(0.0045)  
(0.0090) 
6.8321 
(0.0090) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
10691 
/ 
23357 
-0.1839**** 
/  
-0.1799**** 
-
0.104
5 
4.28 (<.0001) 
 /  
5.65 (<.0001) 
4.2387 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
17.9663 
(<.0001) 
3y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_5 (0,+36m) CAR) 
Activism led 
M&A 
580 / 
1977 
-0.0595* /  
-0.0580* 
0.008
1 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
702 / 
1239 
-0.0946** /  
-0.0963** 
-
0.081
0 
0.78 (0.4373) 
 /  
0.78 (0.4350) 
3.0456 
(0.0012)  
(0.0023) 
9.2757 
(0.0023) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
10691 
/ 
23357 
-0.2499**** 
/  
-0.2465**** 
-
0.151
8 
4.33 (<.0001) 
 /  
5.61 (<.0001) 
4.7693  
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
22.7462 
(<.0001) 
4y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_6 (0,+48m) CAR) 
Activism led 
M&A 
580 / 
1977 
-0.0495 /  
-0.0494 
-
0.003
5 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
702 / 
1239 
-0.1320***  
/  
-0.1298*** 
-
0.066
1 
1.55 (0.1219) 
 /  
1.56 (0.1197) 
3.9765 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
15.8128 
(<.0001) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
10691 
/ 
23357 
-0.3099**** 
/  
-0.3075**** 
-
0.177
3 
5.07 (<.0001) 
 /  
6.54 (<.0001) 
5.4616 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
29.8295 
(<.0001) 
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5y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_7 (0,+60m) CAR) 
Activism led 
M&A 
580 / 
1977 
-0.0603 /  
-0.0604 
0.011
8 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
702 / 
1239 
-0.1758**** 
/  
-0.1710** 
-
0.071
9 
1.90 (0.0574) 
 /  
1.91 (0.0558) 
4.4181 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
19.5197 
(<.0001) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
10691 
/ 
23357 
-0.3748**** 
/  
-0.3730**** 
-
0.203
9 
5.35 (<.0001) 
 /  
6.95 (<.0001) 
5.9577 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
35.4943 
(<.0001) 
 
Filter: consider CAR between -500% and 500% 
1y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_3 (0,+12m) CAR) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
295 / 
770 
-0.0174 /  
-0.0117 
-
0.005
6 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
695 / 
1239 
-0.0474*** /  
-0.0443*** 
-
0.012
7 
1.02 (0.3065) 
 /  
1.08 (0.2800) 
0.9483 
(0.1715)  
(0.3430) 
0.8995 
(0.3429) 
2y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_4 (0,+24m) CAR) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
295 / 
770 
-0.0269 /  
-0.0271 
-
0.011
7 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
695 / 
1239 
-0.0706*** /  
-0.0673*** 
-
0.044
4 
1.02 (0.3092) 
 /  
1.07 (0.2840) 
0.9599 
(0.1685)  
(0.3371) 
0.9217 
(0.3370) 
3y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_5 (0,+36m) CAR) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
295 / 
770 
-0.0630 /  
-0.0547 
0.009
4 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
695 / 
1239 
-0.0940** /  
-0.0963*** 
-
0.081
4 
0.56 (0.5740) 
 /  
0.59 (0.5533) 
1.4078 
(0.0796)  
(0.1592) 
1.9824 
(0.1591) 
4y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_6 (0,+48m) CAR) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
295 / 
770 
-0.0421 /  
-0.0372 
-
0.004
2 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
695 / 
1239 
-0.1303***  
/  
-0.1287*** 
-
0.065
8 
1.35 (0.1765) 
 /  
1.43 (0.1521) 
1.8883 
(0.0295)  
(0.0590) 
3.5661 
(0.0590) 
5y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_7 (0,+60m) CAR) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
295 / 
770 
-0.0378 /  
-0.0394 
0.013
2 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
695 / 
1239 
-0.1725**** 
/  
-0.1686**** 
-
0.071
9 
1.80 (0.0721) 
 /  
1.88 (0.0601) 
2.2664 
(0.0117)  
(0.0234) 
5.1373 
(0.0234) 
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6.4.7.1.4. MM: Figures: Distributions  
Post-Effective Date Acquisition performance (Market Model) 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
(Filter: consider CAR between -500% and 500%) 
 
1y (CAR_Window_3: 0-12 months after effective date of M&A) 
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2y (CAR_Window_4: 0-24 months after effective date of M&A) 
 
 
 
 
 
 148 
3y (CAR_Window_5: 0-36 months after effective date of M&A) 
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4y (CAR_Window_6: 0-48 months after effective date of M&A) 
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5y (CAR_Window_7: 0-60 months after effective date of M&A) 
 
Figure 9: CAR: MM Distributions 
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6.4.7.2. Market Adjusted Returns (MAR) method 
MAR :  Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
6.4.7.2.1. Table: Basic Statistics 
Table 14. Statistics: CAR using Market Adjusted returns (MAR) 
Window 
(Months 
from 
Effective 
Date) 
 Mean Median Variance Skew 
ness 
Kurtosis t  
Value 
Pr  
> |t| 
Filter: consider CAR between -500% and 500% 
Dataset: Activism Model: Market Adjusted Returns N Obs 580 
(-12,0)   3.78% 2.91% 0.3330 0.2881 3.1215 2.73 0.0065 
(0,+6)   2.33% 3.22% 0.2818 0.8100 18.0500 1.99 0.0474 
(0,+12)   3.56% 4.29% 0.3794 -0.1888 6.7737 2.26 0.0241 
(0,+24)   4.28% 5.68% 0.5037 -0.3330 4.9965 2.05 0.041 
(0,+36)   3.99% 6.71% 0.6012 -0.4105 4.7871 1.6 0.1102 
(0,+48)   7.17% 8.78% 0.6480 -0.2238 4.1343 2.67 0.0079 
(0,+60)   7.87% 10.74% 0.6743 -0.4746 4.1212 2.81 0.0051 
Dataset: CompActivism Model: Market Adjusted Returns N Obs 702 
(-12,0)   1.90% 1.41% 0.3061 0.3459 1.3099 1.06 0.2878 
(0,+6)   0.95% 2.82% 0.2263 -0.6016 2.6989 0.72 0.4708 
(0,+12)   2.07% 2.93% 0.3277 -1.0236 7.2819 1.09 0.2783 
(0,+24)   3.49% 4.80% 0.4408 -0.2551 2.8803 1.36 0.1753 
(0,+36)   1.73% 4.94% 0.5119 -1.2275 6.6373 0.58 0.5623 
(0,+48)   5.42% 7.81% 0.5262 -0.6095 3.0482 1.77 0.078 
(0,+60)   6.47% 8.06% 0.5710 -0.7263 5.1825 1.95 0.0527 
Dataset: CompNonActivism Model: Market Adjusted Returns N Obs 702 
(-12,0)   4.67% 2.47% 0.3666 0.6652 2.5394 3.39 0.0007 
(0,+6)   0.73% 1.05% 0.2668 -0.1315 2.9913 0.72 0.469 
(0,+12)   -0.67% -0.35% 0.3687 -0.4027 2.6007 -0.48 0.6308 
(0,+24)   0.95% 3.51% 0.4998 -0.4871 4.7581 0.51 0.612 
(0,+36)   0.65% 1.85% 0.5938 -0.0786 6.9702 0.29 0.7724 
(0,+48)   2.20% 2.78% 0.6422 -0.2924 6.0372 0.91 0.3629 
(0,+60)   1.44% 3.26% 0.6766 -0.2426 4.7947 0.57 0.5704 
Dataset: NonActivism Model: Market Adjusted Returns N Obs 11002 
(-12,0)   9.87% 6.05% 0.4756 1.4753 8.9449 21.74 <.0001 
(0,+6)   -0.34% 0.74% 0.3424 -0.1284 8.4712 -1.03 0.3025 
(0,+12)   -1.66% 1.29% 0.4793 -0.6656 5.5874 -3.62 0.0003 
(0,+24)   -2.96% 2.52% 0.6693 -0.6826 4.6074 -4.64 <.0001 
(0,+36)   -2.94% 2.80% 0.7719 -0.6862 3.6249 -3.98 <.0001 
(0,+48)   -2.04% 4.13% 0.8405 -0.6440 3.2278 -2.54 0.011 
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(0,+60)   -2.18% 5.43% 0.9035 -0.6629 2.8862 -2.53 0.0114 
 
6.4.7.2.2. MAR: Chart 
 
 
Figure 10: CAR: Market Adjusted Returns 
 
6.4.7.2.3. Table: Comparison of Distributions 
Table 15. Post-acquisition performance: CAR using MAR 
Sample N 
Consi
dered 
/ Total  
Mean / 
Trimmed 
Mean (1%) 
Medi
an 
T- test1 Pooled 
/ Satterthwaite 
Wilcoxon test- 
Z statistic2 
Kruskal-
Wallis test- 
Chi Square3 
Filter: consider CAR between -500% and 500% 
1y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_3 ((0,+12m) CAR) 
Activism led 
M&A 
580 / 
1977 
0.0356** /  
0.0380*** 
0.043    
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
708 / 
1239 
-0.0067 /  
0.0043 
-
0.004 
2.02 (0.0434) 
 /  
2.02 (0.0440) 
0.8673 
(0.1929)  
(0.3858) 
0.7522 
(0.3858) 
All Non-
activism 
10981 
/ 
-0.0166** /  
-0.0121** 
0.013 2.58 (0.0099) 
 /  
2.3432 
(0.0096)  
5.4908 
(0.0191) 
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Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
measured using Market Adjusted Returns( MAR) method 
(Filter: Consider CAR between (-500%,500%)) 
 
Activism CompActivism CompNonActivism NonActivism
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related M&A 23357 3.18 (0.0015) (0.0191) 
2y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_4 ((0,+24m) CAR) 
Activism led 
M&A 
580 / 
1977 
0.0428** /  
0.0452** 
0.057    
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
708 / 
1239 
0.0095 /  
0.0136 
0.035 1.19 (0.2361) 
 /  
1.18 (0.2365) 
0.2835 
(0.3884)  
(0.7768) 
0.0804 
(0.7768) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
10981 
/ 
23357 
-0.0296**** 
/  
-0.0236**** 
0.025 2.57 (0.0102) 
 /  
3.31 (0.0010) 
1.8822 
(0.0299)  
(0.0598) 
3.5425 
(0.0598) 
3y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_5 ((0,+36m) CAR) 
Activism led 
M&A 
580 / 
1977 
0.0399 /  
0.0425* 
0.067    
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
708 / 
1239 
0.0065 /  
0.0087 
-
0.019 
1.00 (0.3170) 
 /  
1.00 (0.3176) 
-0.1494 
(0.4406)  
(0.8813) 
0.0223 
(0.8812) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
10981 
/ 
23357 
-0.0294**** 
/  
-0.0232*** 
0.028 2.13 (0.0334) 
 /  
2.66 (0.0079) 
1.5220 
(0.0640)  
(0.1280) 
2.3165 
(0.1280) 
4y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_6 ((0,+48m) CAR) 
Activism led 
M&A 
580 / 
1977 
0.0717** /  
0.0727** 
0.088    
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
708 / 
1239 
0.0220 /  
0.0247 
0.028 1.38 (0.1685) 
 /  
1.38 (0.1689) 
0.6287 
(0.2648)  
(0.5295) 
0.3953 
(0.5295) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
10981 
/ 
23357 
-0.0204** /  
-0.0143* 
0.041 2.60 (0.0094) 
 /  
3.28 (0.0011) 
2.0591 
(0.0197)  
(0.0395) 
4.2401 
(0.0395) 
5y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_7 ((0,+60m) CAR) 
Activism led 
M&A 
580 / 
1977 
0.0787*** /  
0.0826*** 
0.107    
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
708 / 
1239 
0.0144 /  
0.0163 
-
0.033 
1.70 (0.0898) 
 /  
1.70 (0.0897) 
0.08445 
(0.1992)  
(0.3984) 
0.7133 
(0.3984) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
10981 
/ 
23357 
-0.0218** /  
-0.016* 
0.054 2.64 (0.0083) 
 /  
3.43 (0.0006) 
2.1563 
(0.0155)  
(0.0311) 
4.6497 
(0.0311) 
 
Filter: consider CAR between -500% and 500% 
1y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_3 ((0,+12m) CAR) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
295 / 
770 
0.0207 /  
0.0259*** 
0.029    
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
708 / 
1239 
-0.0067 /  
0.0043 
-
0.003
5 
1.11 (0.2688) 
 /  
1.16 (0.2459) 
1.1151 
(0.1324)  
(0.2648) 
1.2438 
(0.2647) 
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2y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_4 ((0,+24m) CAR) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
295 / 
770 
0.0349** /  
0.0372** 
0.048    
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
708 / 
1239 
0.0095 /  
0.0136 
0.035 0.76 (0.4496) 
 /  
0.80 (0.4261) 
0.6094 
(0.2711)  
(0.5423) 
0.3715 
(0.5422) 
3y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_5 ((0,+36m) CAR) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
295 / 
770 
0.0173 /  
0.0296* 
0.049    
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
708 / 
1239 
0.0065 /  
0.0087 
-
0.019 
0.27 (0.7843) 
 /  
0.29 (0.7712) 
0.8730 
(0.1913)  
(0.3826) 
0.7624 
(0.3826) 
4y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_6 ((0,+48m) CAR) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
580 / 
770 
0.0542* /  
0.0607** 
0.078    
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
708 / 
1239 
0.0220 /  
0.0247 
0.028 0.76 (0.4465) 
 /  
0.83 (0.4091) 
1.4000 
(0.0808)  
(0.1615) 
1.9604 
(0.1615) 
5y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_7 ((0,+60m) CAR) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
295 / 
770 
0.0647* /  
0.0724** 
0.081    
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
708 / 
1239 
0.0144 /  
0.0163 
-
0.033 
1.12 (0.2630) 
 /  
1.20 (0.2304) 
1.5919 
(0.0557)  
(0.1114) 
2.5345 
(0.1114) 
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6.4.7.2.4. Figure: Distributions (5y) 
MAR: 5y after M&A Effective Date (Filter: consider where CAR between -500% and +500%) 
using Market Adjusted Returns (MAR) method 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for Activism, ComparableNonActivism and 
All NonActivism related MnA 
(Filter: consider CAR between -500% and 500%) 
 
 
Figure 11: CAR: MAR Distributions 
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6.4.7.3. Fama French Momentum (FFM) method: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
6.4.7.3.1. Table: Basic Statistics 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) after M&A Effective Date  
Table 16. Statistics: CAR using Fama French Momentum (FFM) method 
Year 
(Relative 
to 
Effective 
Date) 
Mean Median Variance Skewness Kurtosis t  
Value 
Pr  
> |t| 
Filter consider CAR between -500% and 500%    
DataSet Activism    
-1y -0.56% -0.58% 0.0872 -0.2422 7.0885 -0.46 0.6487 
0y -1.91% -2.00% 0.1058 -0.1623 7.3017 -1.41 0.159 
1y -3.61% -1.35% 0.2118 -0.3575 4.0495 -1.88 0.0599 
2y -7.14% -2.53% 0.4045 -0.3192 2.6764 -2.7 0.0072 
3y -9.99% -3.34% 0.6367 -0.4165 2.9004 -3.01 0.0027 
4y -9.40% -1.77% 0.8455 -0.1213 1.7707 -2.46 0.0143 
5y -10.64% -2.39% 1.0021 -0.2873 2.2453 -2.55 0.0109 
Dataset CompActivism    
-1y -1.24% -2.15% 0.2685 0.1263 3.8131 -0.79 0.4297 
0y -3.21% -1.64% 0.3038 -0.3881 2.7051 -1.82 0.0703 
1y -4.62% -1.01% 0.4300 -0.3627 3.0377 -1.85 0.0657 
2y -8.17% -3.09% 0.5567 -0.1908 0.4927 -2.52 0.0122 
3y -13.82% -5.01% 0.7147 -0.3706 0.8414 -3.32 0.001 
4y -13.70% -1.78% 0.8602 -0.2204 0.9638 -2.74 0.0066 
5y -14.04% -3.09% 0.9651 -0.3858 1.7279 -2.5 0.013 
Dataset CompNonActivism    
-1y -1.62% -1.62% 0.0781 0.7421 4.2120 -1.53 0.1269 
0y -1.22% -1.06% 0.1034 0.6283 5.4896 -1 0.3171 
1y -5.41% -2.96% 0.2406 -0.3166 5.8452 -2.9 0.0038 
2y -9.44% -5.48% 0.4491 -0.2867 5.0616 -3.71 0.0002 
3y -14.05% -10.04% 0.7223 0.1230 4.3079 -4.35 <.0001 
4y -18.39% -10.03% 0.9683 0.1669 3.2426 -4.92 <.0001 
5y -22.48% -11.13% 1.2304 0.0659 3.2341 -5.34 <.0001 
Dataset NonActivism    
-1y -1.24% -1.28% 0.1260 0.4062 8.3998 -3.59 0.0003 
0y -4.54% -2.74% 0.1561 -0.3008 5.8498 -11.78 <.0001 
1y -9.59% -5.54% 0.3406 -0.3528 4.2683 -16.83 <.0001 
2y -18.25% -10.42% 0.7481 -0.4419 3.0790 -21.62 <.0001 
3y -25.67% -15.88% 1.1378 -0.3689 1.8442 -24.66 <.0001 
4y -31.97% -20.55% 1.5399 -0.2848 1.4062 -26.4 <.0001 
5y -38.27% -23.48% 1.9852 -0.2595 1.1760 -27.83 <.0001 
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6.4.7.3.2. FFM: Chart 
 
Figure 12: CAR: Fama French Momentum method 
 
6.4.7.3.3. Table: Comparison of Distributions 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) using Fama French Momentum Two-Step (FFM) method:  
1y, 2y, 3y, 4y & 5y after M&A Effective Date  
(Filter: consider CAR between -500% and 500%) 
Table 17. Post-acquisition performance: CAR using FFM 
Sample N 
Consi
dered 
/ Total  
Mean / 
Trimmed 
Mean (1%) 
Medi
an 
T- test1 Pooled 
/ Satterthwaite 
Wilcoxon test- 
Z statistic2 
Kruskal-
Wallis test- 
Chi Square3 
Filter: consider CAR between -500% and 500% 
1y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_3 ((0,+12m) CAR) 
Activism led 
M&A 
578 / 
1977 
-0.0361* /  
-0.0321* 
-
0.014 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
693 / 
1239 
-0.0541*** /  
-0.0519*** 
-
0.030 
0.67 (0.5027) / 
0.67 (0.5002) 
-0.6217 
(0.2671) 
(0.5341) 
0.3866 
(0.5341) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
10502 
/ 
23357 
-0.0959**** 
/  
-0.0935**** 
-
0.055 
2.42 (0.0155) / 
2.99 (0.0029) 
2.3760 
(0.0088) 
(0.0175) 
5.6452 
(0.0175) 
-45.00%
-40.00%
-35.00%
-30.00%
-25.00%
-20.00%
-15.00%
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
 -1y 6m 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
Post-Acquisition Performance of Acquirer 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
 using Fama French Momentum method  (FFM) method 
(Filter: Consider CAR between (-500%,500%)) 
 
Activism CompActivism CompNonActivism NonActivism
 158 
2y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_4 ((0,+24m) CAR) 
Activism led 
M&A 
578 / 
1977 
-0.0714** /  
-0.0676** 
-
0.025 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
693 / 
1239 
-0.0944*** /  
-0.0932**** 
-
0.055 
0.62 (0.5332) / 
0.63 (0.5313) 
0.8501 
(0.1976) 
(0.3953) 
0.7227 
(0.3953) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
10502 
/ 
23357 
-0.1825**** 
/  
-0.1791**** 
-
0.104 
3.04 (0.0023) / 
4.00 (<.0001) 
2.8288 
(0.0023) 
(0.0047) 
8.0022 
(0.0047) 
3y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_5 ((0,+36m) CAR) 
Activism led 
M&A 
578 / 
1977 
-0.0999*** /  
-0.0963*** 
-
0.033 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
693 / 
1239 
-0.1405**** 
/  
-0.1446**** 
-
0.100 
-0.87 (0.3833) / 
-0.88 (0.3806) 
1.4713 
(0.0706) 
(0.1412) 
2.1649 
(0.1412) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
10502 
/ 
23357 
-0.2567**** 
/  
-0.2540**** 
-
0.159 
3.48 (0.0005) / 
4.51 (<.0001) 
3.5045 
(0.0002) 
(0.0005) 
12.2812 
(0.0005) 
4y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_6 ((0,+48m) CAR) 
Activism led 
M&A 
578 / 
1977 
-0.0940** /  
-0.0940** 
-
0.018 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
693 / 
1239 
-0.1839**** 
/  
-0.1900**** 
-
0.100 
1.67 (0.0948) / 
1.68 (0.0928) 
2.1426 
(0.0161) 
(0.0321) 
4.5909 
(0.0321) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
10502 
/ 
23357 
-0.3197**** 
/  
-0.3192**** 
-
0.206 
4.31 (<.0001) / 
5.63 (<.0001) 
4.4133 
(<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
19.4772 
(<.0001) 
5y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_7 ((0,+60m) CAR) 
Activism led 
M&A 
578 / 
1977 
-0.1064** /  
-0.1046** 
-
0.024 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
693 / 
1239 
-0.2248**** 
/  
-0.2284**** 
-
0.111 
1.98 (0.0478) / 
2.00 (0.0458) 
2.5132 
(0.0060) 
(0.0120) 
6.3165 
(0.0120) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
10502 
/ 
23357 
-0.3827**** 
/  
-0.3832**** 
-
0.235 
4.65 (<.0001) / 
6.30 (<.0001) 
4.9543 
(<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
24.5451 
(<.0001) 
 
Filter: consider CAR between -500% and 500% 
1y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_3 (0,+12m)) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
295 / 
770 
-0.0462* /  
-0.0441** 
-
0.010 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
693 / 
1239 
-0.0541** /  
-0.0519** 
-
0.030 
0.24 (0.8114) / 
0.25 (0.8014) 
0.2948 
(0.3841) 
(0.7682) 
0.0870 
(0.7681) 
2y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_4 (0,+24m)) 
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Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
295 / 
770 
-0.0817** /  
-0.0812** 
-
0.031 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
693 / 
1239 
-0.0944**** 
/  
-0.0933**** 
-
0.055 
0.29 (0.7756) / 
0.31 (0.7589) 
0.4015 
(0.3440) 
(0.6881) 
0.1613 
(0.6880) 
3y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_5 (0,+36m)) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
283 / 
770 
-0.1382*** /  
-0.1349*** 
-0.05    
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
693 / 
1239 
-0.1405**** 
/  
-0.1446**** 
-
0.100 
0.04 (0.9672) / 
0.04 (0.9648) 
0.5116 
(0.3045) 
(0.6089) 
0.2619 
(0.6088) 
4y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_6 (0,+48m)) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
295 / 
770 
-0.1370*** /  
-0.1361*** 
-
0.178 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
693 / 
1239 
-0.1839**** 
/  
-0.1900**** 
-
0.100 
0.71 (0.4772) / 
0.75 (0.4532) 
1.2093 
(0.1133) 
(0.2265) 
1.4628 
(0.2265) 
5y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_7 (0,+60m)) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
295 / 
770 
-0.1404**** 
/  
-0.1372**** 
-
0.031 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
693 / 
1239 
-0.2248**** 
/  
-0.2284**** 
-
0.111 
1.14 (0.2561) / 
1.20 (0.2299) 
1.605 
(0.0484) 
(0.0968) 
2.7577 
(0.0968) 
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6.4.7.3.4. Figure: Distributions (5Y) 
Fama French Momentum Abnormal Returns: 5y (CAR_Window_7)  
(Filter: consider CAR between -500% and 500%) 
Fama French Momentum Two-Step (FFM) method 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)  
 
  
Figure 13: CAR: FFM Distributions 
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6.4.7.4. Fama French Momentum (FFM) method: Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
6.4.7.4.1. Table: Basic Statistics 
Fama French Momentum method 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) measured monthly for 6m, 1y, 2y, 3y, 4y & 5y after 
M&A Effective Date  
(Filter: Consider BHAR between -500% and 500%) 
Table 18. Statistics: BHAR using FFM method 
Year 
(Relative 
to 
Effective 
Date) 
Mean Median Variance Skewness Kurtosis t  
Value 
Pr  
> |t| 
DataSet Activism    
-1y -2.13% -1.98% 0.1047 0.7716 6.8736 -1.55 0.1205 
6m -0.83% -1.75% 0.1123 2.5908 29.7517 -0.58 0.5593 
1y -3.50% -3.20% 0.1974 0.9790 6.6401 -1.86 0.0639 
2y -8.70% -7.43% 0.4465 0.3596 3.6814 -3.07 0.0022 
3y -14.41% -9.63% 0.7524 0.3299 2.8776 -3.92 0.0001 
4y -19.29% -10.00% 1.1479 0.1150 2.9667 -4.25 <.0001 
5y -26.32% -11.12% 1.5503 -0.1370 3.2579 -4.98 <.0001 
Dataset CompActivism    
-1y -2.43% -2.43% 0.0916 1.0604 5.3467 -1.35 0.1777 
6m -2.55% -0.95% 0.0902 -0.3079 2.5536 -1.43 0.1543 
1y -3.91% -2.30% 0.1778 0.2097 2.3428 -1.56 0.1196 
2y -9.20% -7.79% 0.3790 -0.1576 2.8279 -2.52 0.0125 
3y -19.01% -10.29% 0.6541 -0.3587 2.6711 -3.95 <.0001 
4y -25.80% -12.31% 1.0111 -0.4262 2.9053 -4.32 <.0001 
5y -31.72% -12.31% 1.5483 -0.3110 3.5571 -4.29 <.0001 
Dataset CompNonActivism    
-1y -2.50% -4.78% 0.1402 2.3139 17.7371 -1.72 0.0861 
6m 0.16% -1.00% 0.1010 1.2018 6.3094 0.13 0.894 
1y -4.08% -4.48% 0.2274 0.4134 4.8961 -2.2 0.0283 
2y -11.23% -9.53% 0.5032 -0.0557 2.9042 -4.07 <.0001 
3y -19.65% -15.18% 0.8385 -0.0174 3.0090 -5.52 <.0001 
4y -27.48% -21.15% 1.2414 -0.0130 2.0231 -6.34 <.0001 
5y -40.61% -23.21% 1.7721 -0.3395 1.9093 -7.84 <.0001 
Dataset NonActivism    
-1y -3.29% -4.38% 0.1729 1.0532 14.8024 -7.64 <.0001 
6m -2.59% -3.03% 0.1432 0.6476 10.9196 -6.6 <.0001 
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1y -6.78% -6.26% 0.3128 0.3179 5.5253 -11.71 <.0001 
2y -16.85% -15.20% 0.7157 0.0078 3.3348 -19.24 <.0001 
3y -28.64% -25.15% 1.1766 0.0345 1.7396 -25.51 <.0001 
4y -42.44% -34.23% 1.7263 0.0089 0.9368 -31.2 <.0001 
5y -60.44% -44.09% 2.5062 -0.1434 0.6648 -36.88 <.0001 
 
 
6.4.7.4.2. FFM: Chart 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) measured monthly for 6m, 1y, 2y, 3y, 4y & 5y after 
M&A Effective Date  
(Filter: Consider BHAR between -500% and 500%) 
 
Figure 14: BHAR: Fama French Momentum method 
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6.4.7.4.3. Table: Comparison of Distributions 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) using Fama French Momentum method 
1y, 2y, 3y, 4y & 5y after M&A Effective Date (Filter: consider BHAR between -500% and 500%) 
Table 19. Post-acquisition performance: BHAR using FFM 
Sample N 
Consi
dered 
/ Total  
Mean / 
Trimmed 
Mean (1%) 
Medi
an 
T- test1 Pooled 
/ Satterthwaite 
Wilcoxon test- 
Z statistic2 
Kruskal-
Wallis test- 
Chi Square3 
Filter: consider BHAR between -500% and 500% 
1y after M&A Effective Date (BHAR_Window_3 (0,+12m)) 
Activism led 
M&A 
556 / 
1977 
-0.0350* /  
-0.0422** 
-
0.032 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
661 / 
1239 
-0.0408** /  
-0.0438** 
-
0.045 
0.22 (0.8277) / 
0.22 (0.8267) 
0.2088 
(0.4173) 
(0.8346) 
0.0436 
(0.8345) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
9330 / 
23357 
-0.0678**** 
/  
-0.0709**** 
-
0.063 
1.36 (0.1747) / 
1.61 (0.0966) 
1.5107 
(0.0654) 
(0.1309) 
2.2823 
(0.1309) 
2y after M&A Effective Date (BHAR_Window_4 (0,+24m)) 
Activism led 
M&A 
556 / 
1977 
-0.0870*** /  
-0.0917*** 
-
0.074 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
661 / 
1239 
-0.1123**** 
/  
-0.1105**** 
-
0.095 
0.64 (0.5251) / 
0.64 (0.5230) 
0.6385 
(0.2616) 
(0.5232) 
0.4077 
(0.5231) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
9330 / 
23357 
-0.1685**** 
/  
-0.1688**** 
-
0.152 
2.23 (0.0257) / 
2.75 (0.0061) 
2.5092 
(0.0060) 
(0.0121) 
6.2962 
(0.0121) 
3y after M&A Effective Date (BHAR_Window_5 (0,+36m)) 
Activism led 
M&A 
556 / 
1977 
-0.1441**** 
/  
-0.1514**** 
-
0.096 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
661 / 
1239 
-0.1965**** 
/  
-0.1953**** 
-
0.152 
1.02 (0.3085) / 
1.02 (0.3062) 
1.2397 
(0.1075) 
(0.2151) 
1.5370 
(0.2151) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
9330 / 
23357 
-0.2864**** 
/  
-0.2879**** 
-
0.252 
3.04 (0.0024) / 
3.70 (0.0002) 
3.4929 
(0.0002) 
(0.0005) 
12.2007 
(0.0005) 
4y after M&A Effective Date (BHAR_Window_6 (0,+48m)) 
Activism led 
M&A 
556 / 
1977 
-0.1929**** 
/  
-0.2023**** 
-
0.100 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
661 / 
1239 
-0.2748**** 
/  
-0.2762**** 
-
0.211 
1.30 (0.1939) / 
1.30 (0.1924) 
1.7479 
(0.0402) 
(0.0805) 
3.0554 
(0.0805) 
All Non- 9330 / -0.4244**** - 4.08 (<.0001) / 4.7366 22.4358 
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activism 
related M&A 
23357 /  
-0.4288**** 
0.342 4.88 (<.0001) (<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
5y after M&A Effective Date (BHAR_Window_7 (0,+60m)) 
Activism led 
M&A 
556 / 
1977 
-0.2632**** 
/  
-0.2692**** 
-
0.111 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
661 / 
1239 
-0.4061**** 
/  
-0.4084**** 
-
0.232 
1.92 (0.0550) / 
1.93 (0.0536) 
2.0262 
(0.0214) 
(0.0427) 
4.1060 
(0.0427) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
9330 / 
23357 
-0.6044**** 
/  
-0.6102**** 
-
0.441 
4.99 (<.0001) / 
6.17 (<.0001) 
5.5828 
(<.0001) 
(<.0001) 
31.1672 
(<.0001) 
 
Filter: consider BHAR between -500% and 500% 
1y after M&A Effective Date (BHAR_Window_3 (0,+12m)) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
283 / 
770 
-0.0391* /  
-0.0430** 
-
0.023 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
661 / 
1239 
-0.0408** /  
-0.0438** 
-
0.045 
0.05 (0.9602) / 
0.05 (0.9582) 
0.4742 
(0.3177) 
(0.6354) 
0.2250 
(0.6353) 
2y after M&A Effective Date (BHAR_Window_4 (0,+24m)) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
283 / 
770 
-0.0920*** /  
-0.0909*** 
-
0.078 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
661 / 
1239 
-0.1123**** 
/  
-0.1105**** 
-
0.095 
0.42 (0.6767) / 
0.44 (0.6591) 
0.7048 
(0.2405) 
(0.4810) 
0.4969 
(0.4809) 
3y after M&A Effective Date (BHAR_Window_5 (0,+36m)) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
283 / 
770 
-0.1901**** 
/  
-0.1875**** 
-
0.103 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
661 / 
1239 
-0.1965**** 
/  
-0.1953**** 
-
0.152 
0.10 (0.9192) / 
0.11 (0.9151) 
0.6943 
(0.2437) 
(0.4875) 
0.4823 
(0.4874) 
4y after M&A Effective Date (BHAR_Window_6 (0,+48m)) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
283 / 
770 
-0.2580**** 
/  
-0.2577**** 
-
0.123 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
661 / 
1239 
-0.2748**** 
/  
-0.2762**** 
-
0.211 
0.22 (0.8274) / 
0.23 (0.8203) 
0.9268 
(0.1770) 
(0.3541) 
0.8591 
(0.3540) 
5y after M&A Effective Date (BHAR_Window_7 (0,+60m)) 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
283 / 
770 
-0.3172**** 
/  
-0.3245**** 
-
0.123 
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Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
661 / 
1239 
-0.4061**** 
/  
-0.4084**** 
-
0.232 
0.96 (0.3381) / 
0.98 (0.3252) 
1.2629 
(0.1033) 
(0.2066) 
1.5951 
(0.2066) 
 
 
6.4.7.4.4. Figure: Distributions (5Y) 
Fama French Momentum Abnormal Returns: 5y (BHAR_Window_7)  
(Filter: consider BHAR between -500% and 500%) 
Post-Effective Date Acquisition performance 
using Fama French Momentum Two-Step (FFM) method 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR)  
for Activism, ComparableNonActivism and All NonActivism related MnA 
(Filter: consider BHAR between -500% and 500%) 
 
 
Figure 15: BHAR: FFM Distributions 
 166 
 
 
6.4.7.5. Financial Performance: Return on Assets (ROA) 
6.4.7.5.1. Table: Basic Statistics 
Return on Assets (ROA): Acquisition performance  
Table 20. Statistics: Return on Assets (ROA) 
Year 
(Relative 
to 
Effective 
Date) 
Mean Median Variance Skewness Kurtosis t  
Value 
Pr  
> |t| 
Filter (consider ROA between -500% and 500%)    
DataSet Activism    
-1y 9.28% 9.74% 0.0140 -2.6129 26.1407 16.42 <.0001 
0y 8.59% 9.10% 0.0157 -7.5596 132.0492 19.81 <.0001 
1y 8.67% 9.61% 0.0091 -1.0494 5.2940 24.51 <.0001 
2y 8.97% 9.60% 0.0104 -1.9590 16.6510 21.73 <.0001 
3y 9.41% 10.03% 0.0093 -1.5065 11.0550 21.22 <.0001 
4y 9.33% 10.59% 0.0097 -2.2659 15.2938 19.27 <.0001 
5y 9.25% 11.09% 0.0115 -2.3794 13.8987 15.92 <.0001 
Dataset CompActivism    
-1y 9.98% 8.32% 0.0101 0.9404 0.7540 14.43 <.0001 
0y 8.14% 7.18% 0.0063 0.7559 -0.2142 19.73 <.0001 
1y 8.06% 6.48% 0.0064 0.5910 -0.3439 18.02 <.0001 
2y 8.52% 6.95% 0.0086 -0.2910 5.0176 14.76 <.0001 
3y 8.87% 8.05% 0.0075 0.3709 0.5316 14.78 <.0001 
4y 9.02% 9.94% 0.0071 0.4747 -0.8242 14.15 <.0001 
5y 8.30% 9.06% 0.0075 -0.0765 0.6823 11.33 <.0001 
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Dataset CompNonActivism    
-1y 4.52% 1.88% 0.0054 1.9845 201.9295 37.66 <.0001 
0y 4.19% 1.93% 0.0044 1.9806 65.3704 58.09 <.0001 
1y 3.89% 1.95% 0.0037 1.8634 138.9603 50.46 <.0001 
2y 3.74% 1.76% 0.0044 0.8379 171.8552 45.66 <.0001 
3y 3.77% 1.67% 0.0041 1.6272 78.9524 47.91 <.0001 
4y 4.05% 1.65% 0.0043 1.9512 34.9807 50.72 <.0001 
5y 4.28% 1.58% 0.0049 2.0280 47.0396 52.52 <.0001 
Dataset NonActivism    
-1y 7.52% 3.43% 0.0188 -7.1121 201.9295 37.66 <.0001 
0y 7.12% 3.12% 0.0139 -3.2345 65.3704 58.09 <.0001 
1y 6.79% 3.07% 0.0157 -5.8426 138.9603 50.46 <.0001 
2y 6.51% 3.03% 0.0161 -7.6568 171.8552 45.66 <.0001 
3y 6.61% 3.05% 0.0136 -3.8231 78.9524 47.91 <.0001 
4y 6.75% 3.18% 0.0114 -2.0750 34.9807 50.72 <.0001 
5y 7.08% 3.37% 0.0107 -2.0202 47.0396 52.52 <.0001 
 
 
6.4.7.5.2. ROA: Chart 
Return on Assets (ROA): Chart 
 
Figure 16: Return on Assets (ROA) 
 
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
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 -1y 0y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
Post-Acquisition Performance of Acquirer 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
measured using Annual data from Compustat 
(Filter: Consider ROA between -500% and 500%) 
Activism CompActivism CompNonActivism NonActivism
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6.4.7.5.3. Table: Comparison of distributions 
ROA: Table: Comparison of Distributions  
Table 21. Post-acquisition performance: ROA 
Sample N 
Consi
dered 
/ Total  
Mean / 
Trimmed 
Mean (1%) 
Medi
an 
T- test1 Pooled 
/ Satterthwaite 
Wilcoxon test- 
Z statistic2 
Kruskal-
Wallis test- 
Chi Square3 
Filter: Consider where ROA is between (-500%, 500%) 
1y after M&A Effective Date 
Activism led 
M&A 
725 / 
1977 
0.0867**** /  
0.0890**** 
0.096
1 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
756 / 
1239 
0.0389**** /  
0.0373**** 
0.019
5 
11.53 (<.0001) 
 /  
11.43 (<.0001) 
12.9349 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
167.3141 
(<.0001) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
8648 / 
23357 
0.0679**** /  
0.0704**** 
0.030
8 
3.93 (<.0001) 
 /  
4.95 (<.0001) 
6.7382 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
45.4033 
(<.0001) 
2y after M&A Effective Date  
Activism led 
M&A 
612 / 
1977 
0.0897**** /  
0.0924**** 
0.096
0 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
668 / 
1239 
0.0374**** /  
0.0367**** 
0.017
6 
10.96 (<.0001) 
 /  
10.77 (<.0001) 
12.0022 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
144.0558 
(<.0001) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
7916 / 
23357 
0.0651**** /  
0.0684**** 
0.030
3 
4.68 (<.0001) 
 /  
5.63 (<.0001) 
6.8327 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
46.6864 
(<.0001) 
3y after M&A Effective Date  
Activism led 
M&A 
474 / 
1977  
0.0941**** /  
0.0968**** 
0.100
3 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
576 / 
1239 
0.0377**** /  
0.0366**** 
0.016
7 
11.31 (<.0001) 
 /  
10.89 (<.0001) 
11.8437 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
104.2750 
(<.0001) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
7155 / 
23357 
0.0661**** /  
0.0684**** 
0.030
5 
5.11 (<.0001) 
 /  
6.03 (<.0001) 
7.3130 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
53.4795 
(<.0001) 
4y after M&A Effective Date  
Activism led 
M&A 
413 / 
1977  
0.0933**** /  
0.0974**** 
0.105
9 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
500 / 
1239 
0.0405**** /  
0.0387**** 
0.016
5 
9.66 (<.0001) 
 /  
9.32 (<.0001) 
10.6003 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
112.3682 
(<.0001) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
6456 / 
23357 
0.0675**** /  
0.0691**** 
0.031
8 
4.77 (<.0001) 
 /  
5.13 (<.0001) 
6.7946 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
46.1668 
(<.0001) 
5y after M&A Effective Date 
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Activism led 
M&A 
340 / 
1977 
0.0925**** /  
0.0968**** 
0.110
9 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
430 / 
1239 
0.0428**** /  
0.0401**** 
0.015
8 
7.76 (<.0001) 
 /  
7.40 (<.0001) 
9.2389 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
85.3597 
(<.0001) 
All Non-
activism 
related M&A 
5861 / 
23357 
0.0708**** /  
0.0718**** 
0.033
7 
3.75 (0.0002) 
 /  
3.63 (0.0003) 
5.7809 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
33.4195 
(<.0001) 
 
Filter: Consider where ROA is between (-500%, 500%) 
1y after M&A Effective Date 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
318 / 
770 
0.0806**** /  
0.0797**** 
0.064
8 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
756 / 
1239 
0.0389**** /  
0.0373**** 
0.019
5 
9.28 (<.0001) 
 /  
8.35 (<.0001) 
7.966  
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
63.4678 
(<.0001) 
2y after M&A Effective Date  
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
258 / 
770 
0.0852**** /  
0.0852**** 
0.069
5 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
668 / 
1239 
0.0374**** /  
0.0367**** 
0.017
6 
8.75 (<.0001) 
 /  
7.57 (<.0001) 
7.7750 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
60.4526  
(<.0001) 
3y after M&A Effective Date  
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
208 / 
770  
0.0887**** /  
0.0880**** 
0.080
5 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
576 / 
1239 
0.0377**** /  
0.0366**** 
0.016
7 
8.90 (<.0001) 
 /  
7.76 (<.0001) 
7.7220 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
59.6324  
(<.0001) 
4y after M&A Effective Date  
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
174 / 
770  
0.0902**** /  
0.0895**** 
0.099
4 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
500 / 
1239 
0.0405**** /  
0.0387**** 
0.016
5 
7.95 (<.0001) 
 /  
7.08 (<.0001) 
6.5409 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
42.7858 
(<.0001) 
5y after M&A Effective Date 
Comparable 
Activism led 
M&A 
140 / 
770 
0.0830**** /  
0.0833**** 
0.090
6 
   
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
430 / 
1239 
0.0428**** /  
0.0401**** 
0.015
8 
5.57 (<.0001) 
 /  
4.99 (<.0001) 
5.1902 
(<.0001)  
(<.0001) 
26.9412 
(<.0001) 
 
 170 
6.4.7.5.4. Figure: Distribution (5y) 
Post-Effective Date Acquisition performance 
Return on Assets (ROA) using company financials data from Compustat 
for Activism, ComparableNonActivism and All NonActivism related MnA 
(Filter: consider ROA between -500% and 500%) TestPeriod = 5 y 
 
 
Figure 17: ROA Distributions 
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6.4.8. Spill-over effect: Comparable Non-Activism Vs All Non-Activism 
Post-Effective Date Acquisition performance  
(SpillOver Effect of Activism on ComparableNonActivism cases) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns using Market Model (MM) for  
ComparableNonActivism and OtherNotComparableNonActivism related MnA 
(Filter: consider CAR between -500% and 500%) 
 
We divided the All Non-Activism cases into 2 groups: Comparable Non-Activism and Other Not-
Comparable Non-Activism.  
The assumption is that firms comparable to targets of activism would make similar improvements 
as those directly targeted by activists, and their acquirers shall thus benefit indirectly from 
Activism action elsewhere. 
We expect to see better performance in Comparable Non-Activism cases than the Other Not-
Comparable Non-Activism cases. 
 
6.4.8.1.1. Table: Basic Statistics 
Table 22. Statistics: Spill-over effect 
Year 
(Relative 
to 
Effective 
Date) 
Mean Median Variance Skewness Kurtosis t  
Value 
Pr  
> |t| 
DataSet Comparable Non-Activism    
-1y -1.86% -1.86% 0.0964 0.4560 3.7566 -1.58 0.1149 
0y -1.56% -1.75% 0.0779 -0.0166 2.9806 -1.47 0.1408 
1y -4.74% -1.27% 0.1915 -0.5101 2.4109 -2.86 0.0044 
2y -7.06% -4.44% 0.4090 -0.4239 2.6420 -2.91 0.0037 
3y -9.40% -8.14% 0.6732 -0.0131 3.1467 -3.02 0.0026 
4y -13.03% -6.58% 0.9510 -0.2724 2.3488 -3.52 0.0005 
5y -17.25% -7.19% 1.2343 -0.3829 2.1770 -4.09 <.0001 
Dataset OtherNotComparable Non-Activism    
-1y -1.30% -1.75% 0.1632 0.7799 9.8184 -2.98 0.0029 
0y -5.33% -3.27% 0.1517 -0.2835 9.6695 -12.71 <.0001 
1y -10.72% -5.99% 0.3268 -0.5210 4.4331 -17.41 <.0001 
2y -19.92% -11.54% 0.7552 -0.4979 2.7682 -21.27 <.0001 
3y -26.89% -15.66% 1.1712 -0.4142 1.7832 -23.06 <.0001 
4y -32.80% -17.90% 1.5911 -0.3741 1.2643 -24.14 <.0001 
5y -39.29% -21.63% 2.0697 -0.3724 1.0560 -25.35 <.0001 
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6.4.8.1.2. Figure: Distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. CAR: Spill-over effect chart 
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6.4.8.1.3. Table: Comparison of distributions 
 
Post-acquisition performance: Spill-Over Effect of Activism on Comparable Non-Activism related 
M&A 
Table 23. Post-acquisition performance: Spill-Over effect of Activism 
Sample N 
Consi
dered 
/ Total  
Mean / 
Trimmed 
Mean (1%) 
Medi
an 
T- test1 Pooled 
/ Satterthwaite 
Wilcoxon test- 
Z statistic2 
Kruskal-
Wallis test- 
Chi Square3 
Filter: consider Premium 4 weeks before announcement date between -500% and 500% 
Premium 4 weeks before announcement date 
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
779 / 
1239 
34.1673**** 
/  
32.4260**** 
27.12    
Other Not- 
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
10322 
/ 
22118 
38.0963**** 
/  
35.8413**** 
25.99 -2.46 (0.0140) / 
-3.05 (0.0023) 
0.0179 
(0.4929) 
(0.9657) 
0.0003 
(0.9857) 
 
Filter: consider CAR between -500% and 500% 
1y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_3 (0,+12m)): Market Model CAR 
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
695 / 
1239 
-0.0474*** /  
-0.0443*** 
-
0.012
7 
   
Other Not- 
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
8615 / 
22118 
-0.1072**** 
/  
-0.1033**** 
-
0.059
9 
2.70 (0.0070) / 
3.38 (0.0008) 
2.26642 
(0.0039) 
(0.0077) 
7.0978 
(0.0077) 
2y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_4 (0,+24m)): Market Model CAR 
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
695 / 
1239 
-0.0706*** /  
-0.0673*** 
-
0.044
4 
   
Other Not- 
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
8615 / 
22118 
-0.1992**** 
/  
-0.1953**** 
-
0.115
4 
3.82 (0.0001) / 
4.95 (<.0001) 
3.6742 
(0.0001) 
(0.0002) 
13.5000 
(0.0002) 
3y after M&A Effective Date (CAR_Window_5 (0,+36m)): Market Model CAR 
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
695 / 
1239 
-0.0940*** /  
-0.0963*** 
-
0.081
4 
   
Other Not- 
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
8615 / 
22118 
-0.2689**** 
/  
-0.2658**** 
-
0.156
6 
4.17 (<.0001) / 
5.26 (<.0001) 
3.7266 
(<.0001) 
(0.0002) 
13.8876 
(0.0002) 
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4y after M&A Effective Date (BHAR_Window_6 (0,+48m)): Market Model CAR 
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
695 / 
1239 
-0.1303*** /  
-0.1287*** 
-
0.065
8 
   
Other Not- 
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
8615 / 
22118 
-0.3280**** 
/  
-0.3262**** 
-
0.179
0 
4.04 (<.0001) / 
5.02 (<.0001) 
3.7007 
(0.0001) 
(0.0002) 
13.6953 
(0.0002) 
5y after M&A Effective Date (BHAR_Window_7 (0,+60m)): Market Model CAR 
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
695 / 
1239 
-0.1725**** 
/  
-0.1686**** 
-
0.071
9 
   
Other Not- 
Comparable 
Non-activism 
related M&A 
8615 / 
22118 
-0.3929**** 
/  
-0.3917**** 
-
0.216
3 
3.94 (<.0001) / 
4.91 (<.0001) 
3.7424 
(<.0001) 
(0.0002) 
14.0056 
(0.0002) 
 
6.4.8.1.4. Figure: Distributions (5Y) 
Post-Effective Date Acquisition performance  
(SpillOver Effect of Activism on ComparableNonActivism cases) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns using Market Model (MM) for 
ComparableNonActivism and OtherNotComparableNonActivism related MnA 
(Filter: consider CAR between -500% and 500%) 
 
 
Figure 19: CAR Spill-Over effect Distributions 
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6.5. Appendix 5: Data Gathering Flow Diagram 
 
SEC filings 
database 
(Source: EDGAR 
/ SEC Info / 
Hand Collected) 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
database  
(Source: SDC 
Platinum) 
Stock price at 
and around 
event dates  
(source CRSP / 
EVENTUS) 
Firm financial 
information 
(Source: S&P 
CAPITAL IQ 
COMPUSTAT) 
Identify M&A cases 
Fetch event information 
Identify Activism cases 
Financial 
details 
Fetch financial 
information 
Event details 
Figure 20: Data collection 
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